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Guru Granth Sahib
Composition, Arrangement & Layout
ਜਪੁ | Jup
ਸੋ ਦਰੁ | So Dar
ਸੋਹਿਲਾ | Sohilaa
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਿਰੀਰਾਗੁ | Raag Siree-Raag
Gurbani (14-53)
Ashtpadiyan (53-71)
Gurbani (71-74)
Pahre (74-78)
Chhant (78-81)
Vanjara (81-82)
Vaar Siri Raag (83-91)
Bhagat Bani (91-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਝ | Raag Maajh
Gurbani (94-109)
Ashtpadi (109)
Ashtpadiyan (110-129)
Ashtpadi (129-130)
Ashtpadiyan (130-133)
Bara Maha (133-136)
Din Raen (136-137)
Vaar Maajh Ki (137-150)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗਉੜੀ | Raag Gauree
Gurbani (151-185)
Quartets/Couplets (185-220)
Ashtpadiyan (220-234)
Karhalei (234-235)
Ashtpadiyan (235-242)
Chhant (242-249)
Baavan Akhari (250-262)
Sukhmani (262-296)
Thittee (296-300)
Gauree kii Vaar (300-323)
Gurbani (323-330)
Ashtpadiyan (330-340)
Baavan Akhari (340-343)
Thintteen (343-344)
Vaar Kabir (344-345)
Bhagat Bani (345-346)
ਰਾਗੁ ਆਸਾ | Raag Aasaa
Gurbani (347-348)
Chaupaday (348-364)
Panchpadde (364-365)
Kaafee (365-409)
Aasaavaree (409-411)
Ashtpadiyan (411-432)
Patee (432-435)
Chhant (435-462)
Vaar Aasaa (462-475)
Bhagat Bani (475-488)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੂਜਰੀ | Raag Goojaree
Gurbani (489-503)
Ashtpadiyan (503-508)
Vaar Gujari (508-517)
Vaar Gujari (517-526)
ਰਾਗੁ ਦੇਵਗੰਧਾਰੀ | Raag Dayv-Gandhaaree
Gurbani (527-536)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਹਾਗੜਾ | Raag Bihaagraa
Gurbani (537-556)
Chhant (538-548)
Vaar Bihaagraa (548-556)
ਰਾਗੁ ਵਡਹੰਸ | Raag Wadhans
Gurbani (557-564)
Ashtpadiyan (564-565)
Chhant (565-575)
Ghoriaan (575-578)
Alaahaniiaa (578-582)
Vaar Wadhans (582-594)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੋਰਠਿ | Raag Sorath
Gurbani (595-634)
Asatpadhiya (634-642)
Vaar Sorath (642-659)
ਰਾਗੁ ਧਨਾਸਰੀ | Raag Dhanasaree
Gurbani (660-685)
Astpadhiya (685-687)
Chhant (687-691)
Bhagat Bani (691-695)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਤਸਰੀ | Raag Jaitsree
Gurbani (696-703)
Chhant (703-705)
Vaar Jaitsaree (705-710)
Bhagat Bani (710)
ਰਾਗੁ ਟੋਡੀ | Raag Todee
ਰਾਗੁ ਬੈਰਾੜੀ | Raag Bairaaree
ਰਾਗੁ ਤਿਲੰਗ | Raag Tilang
Gurbani (721-727)
Bhagat Bani (727)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੂਹੀ | Raag Suhi
Gurbani (728-750)
Ashtpadiyan (750-761)
Kaafee (761-762)
Suchajee (762)
Gunvantee (763)
Chhant (763-785)
Vaar Soohee (785-792)
Bhagat Bani (792-794)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਲਾਵਲੁ | Raag Bilaaval
Gurbani (795-831)
Ashtpadiyan (831-838)
Thitteen (838-840)
Vaar Sat (841-843)
Chhant (843-848)
Vaar Bilaaval (849-855)
Bhagat Bani (855-858)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੋਂਡ | Raag Gond
Gurbani (859-869)
Ashtpadiyan (869)
Bhagat Bani (870-875)
ਰਾਗੁ ਰਾਮਕਲੀ | Raag Ramkalee
Ashtpadiyan (902-916)
Gurbani (876-902)
Anand (917-922)
Sadd (923-924)
Chhant (924-929)
Dakhnee (929-938)
Sidh Gosat (938-946)
Vaar Ramkalee (947-968)
ਰਾਗੁ ਨਟ ਨਾਰਾਇਨ | Raag Nat Narayan
Gurbani (975-980)
Ashtpadiyan (980-983)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਲੀ ਗਉੜਾ | Raag Maalee Gauraa
Gurbani (984-988)
Bhagat Bani (988)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਰੂ | Raag Maaroo
Gurbani (889-1008)
Ashtpadiyan (1008-1014)
Kaafee (1014-1016)
Ashtpadiyan (1016-1019)
Anjulian (1019-1020)
Solhe (1020-1033)
Dakhni (1033-1043)
ਰਾਗੁ ਤੁਖਾਰੀ | Raag Tukhaari
Bara Maha (1107-1110)
Chhant (1110-1117)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕੇਦਾਰਾ | Raag Kedara
Gurbani (1118-1123)
Bhagat Bani (1123-1124)
ਰਾਗੁ ਭੈਰਉ | Raag Bhairo
Gurbani (1125-1152)
Partaal (1153)
Ashtpadiyan (1153-1167)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਸੰਤੁ | Raag Basant
Gurbani (1168-1187)
Ashtpadiyan (1187-1193)
Vaar Basant (1193-1196)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਾਰਗ | Raag Saarag
Gurbani (1197-1200)
Partaal (1200-1231)
Ashtpadiyan (1232-1236)
Chhant (1236-1237)
Vaar Saarang (1237-1253)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਲਾਰ | Raag Malaar
Gurbani (1254-1293)
Partaal (1265-1273)
Ashtpadiyan (1273-1278)
Chhant (1278)
Vaar Malaar (1278-91)
Bhagat Bani (1292-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਾਨੜਾ | Raag Kaanraa
Gurbani (1294-96)
Partaal (1296-1318)
Ashtpadiyan (1308-1312)
Chhant (1312)
Vaar Kaanraa
Bhagat Bani (1318)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਲਿਆਨ | Raag Kalyaan
Gurbani (1319-23)
Ashtpadiyan (1323-26)
ਰਾਗੁ ਪ੍ਰਭਾਤੀ | Raag Prabhaatee
Gurbani (1327-1341)
Ashtpadiyan (1342-51)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਜਾਵੰਤੀ | Raag Jaijaiwanti
Gurbani (1352-53)
Salok | Gatha | Phunahe | Chaubole | Swayiye
Sehskritee Mahala 1
Sehskritee Mahala 5
Gaathaa Mahala 5
Phunhay Mahala 5
Chaubolae Mahala 5
Shaloks Bhagat Kabir
Shaloks Sheikh Farid
Swaiyyae Mahala 5
Swaiyyae in Praise of Gurus
Shaloks in Addition To Vaars
Shalok Ninth Mehl
Mundavanee Mehl 5
ਰਾਗ ਮਾਲਾ, Raag Maalaa
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<blockquote data-quote="Dalvinder Singh Grewal" data-source="post: 226969" data-attributes="member: 22683"><p>The MEA's readout and the foreign secretary's briefing informed that there was an agreement that when it comes to development, the two sides were 'partners rather than rivals.' This has long been a Chinese framing, which India appears to have accepted. For instance, this was not something that the Indian readout had said after the Modi-Xi meeting in Kazan. That said, the Indian side also specified its framework of the three mutuals—'mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity' as the 'basis' for a 'stable relationship.'</p><p></p><p>Several differences obviously still persist. India and China both continue to look at the boundary issue from different perspectives. China desires for it to be compartmentalized from the rest of the relationship. India believes that peace and tranquility in the border areas are significant for the continued development of ties.</p><p></p><p>Cross-border terrorism and China's ties with Pakistan also remain a source of tension. Most significantly, however, the structural fault line between India and China is around the order in Asia. China desires a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia. India believes that a multipolar Asia must be at the heart of a multipolar world.</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/sep/01narendra-modi-xi-jinping-putin1.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p></p><p>IMAGE: Modi, Xi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Council summit in Tianjin. Photograph: ANI Photo</p><p></p><p><strong>India and China have a difficult and complex relationship, which has been in a cold freeze since the Galwan conflict in 2020. Given the historical tensions and China's more recent support of Pakistan against India during Operation Sindoor, can the current diplomatic thaw truly be seen as a 'reset'?</strong></p><p><strong>How cautious should India be in engaging with China going forward?</strong></p><p></p><p>What's currently underway is not a 'reset.' The relationship between India and China is not likely to go back to what it was in the past. What needs to be arrived at is a new balance.</p><p></p><p>The question from the Indian perspective is not about whether one should be cautious or not. The question that we in India need to ask is what sort of a relationship do we desire with China? What's in India's interests? And how do we get to that desirable destination? Strategic clarity on these is what should guide policy, rather than caution.</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/sep/03modi-xi-jinping-1.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p>IMAGE: Modi with Xi in Tianjin. Photograph: DPR PMO/ANI Photo</p><p></p><p><strong>Can India realistically reduce its concerns about the US by partnering with China, given that China remains its foremost strategic adversary?</strong></p><p>The strategic goal of Indian policy must be to ensure the development and well-being of Indians. With that in mind, I don't think that one should think about these relationships as binaries. They are not.</p><p></p><p></p><p>Of course, the strategic environment that one operates in is impacted by the actions of others. But one should be careful to not overemphasize the impact of one relationship on the other.</p><p></p><p>There is also an internal logic to India's relationships with each of the global powers. Ties with the US, Europe, Japan, and Australia are based on shared strategic interests and are crucial to meet India's development and security needs. Apart from capital and technology, Western countries are critical sources for demand that can aid India's economic growth.</p><p></p><p>Of course, there are frictions that can emerge from time to time, and the present situation with the US is clearly turbulent. But it is important to maintain engagement, keeping the big picture in mind, maintaining resolve on certain bottom lines, and approaching these challenges with a sense of confidence in the long-term strategic convergences, while leveraging our diverse set of partnerships.</p><p></p><p>The need for a stable relationship with China, on the other hand, is an imperative of geography and geopolitics. China can also be an important development partner for India, but it cannot replace Western demand. So each has its own logic and utility.</p><p></p><p><strong>As an observer of China and Chinese media, how was the meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Xi Jinping analyzed and portrayed by the Chinese media?</strong></p><p></p><p>There exists a substantial degree of skepticism among Chinese analysts and media commentators. The general view is that this is a tactical easing, owing to the pressures brought about by the Trump administration.</p><p></p><p>Of course, this view is accompanied by a whole lot of <em>schadenfreude</em>. Official media, meanwhile, have essentially sought to portray India's presence at the SCO summit as a victory for Chinese diplomacy and vision for the world.</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/sep/03modi-sco-summit-1.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p>IMAGE: Modi delivers India's statement at the Shanghai Cooperation Council summit in Tianjin, September 1, 2025. Photograph: DPR PMO/ANI Photo</p><p></p><p><strong>An important question exists : If Xi asserts that the border issue should not define overall China-India relations, how can normal relations be achieved when de-escalation remains incomplete, restrictions on Indian troop patrols continue, and the tragic loss of 20 soldiers still looms large?</strong></p><p></p><p>The proverbial proof of the pudding when it comes to this current round of engagement between the two sides will eventually lie in de-escalation in Eastern Ladakh.</p><p></p><p>After Wang Yi's visit to Delhi in August, three new steps were announced.</p><p></p><p>An expert group to explore early harvest in boundary delimitation in the India-China border areas; a working group to advance effective border management; and the creation of general-level mechanisms in the eastern and middle sectors.</p><p></p><p>How these mechanisms progress will be important if the new dual-track approach that the two sides are talking about has to succeed.</p><p></p><p><img src="https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/aug/22wang-yi2.jpg?w=670&h=900" alt="" class="fr-fic fr-dii fr-draggable " style="" /></p><p>IMAGE: Modi meets Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi, August 19, 2025. Photograph: @narendramodi</p><p></p><p><strong>Given that trade has become a major priority for India following the 50% tariffs imposed by President Trump, what decisive gains has India made in trade agreements with China?</strong></p><p></p><p>Data from China's General Administration of Customs for January to July tells us that Indian exports to China have fallen 7.1% year on year. There's a lot of room for China to import more from India. This can happen with regard to primary commodities, iron ores, marine goods, and even pharmaceuticals.</p><p></p><p>There's also significant scope in expanding services trade. But Beijing needs to open up for all of this, easing the barriers that are in place. That said, China is unlikely to fill the demand loss for Indian sectors that are hit by American tariffs. For that, the government and companies will have to look elsewhere.</p><p></p><p><strong>What are the reasons for China's desire to 'normalize' relations with India?</strong></p><p></p><p>Apart from some of the obvious economic interests, an India that is accommodative of China's rise and interests in the Indo-Pacific is a strategic asset for Beijing.</p><p></p><p>To achieve this end, it will engage in coercion but also dialogue on its terms. It is in this context that we should look at the Chinese desire for a new normal.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Dalvinder Singh Grewal, post: 226969, member: 22683"] The MEA's readout and the foreign secretary's briefing informed that there was an agreement that when it comes to development, the two sides were 'partners rather than rivals.' This has long been a Chinese framing, which India appears to have accepted. For instance, this was not something that the Indian readout had said after the Modi-Xi meeting in Kazan. That said, the Indian side also specified its framework of the three mutuals—'mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity' as the 'basis' for a 'stable relationship.' Several differences obviously still persist. India and China both continue to look at the boundary issue from different perspectives. China desires for it to be compartmentalized from the rest of the relationship. India believes that peace and tranquility in the border areas are significant for the continued development of ties. Cross-border terrorism and China's ties with Pakistan also remain a source of tension. Most significantly, however, the structural fault line between India and China is around the order in Asia. China desires a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia. India believes that a multipolar Asia must be at the heart of a multipolar world. [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/sep/01narendra-modi-xi-jinping-putin1.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: Modi, Xi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Council summit in Tianjin. Photograph: ANI Photo [B]India and China have a difficult and complex relationship, which has been in a cold freeze since the Galwan conflict in 2020. Given the historical tensions and China's more recent support of Pakistan against India during Operation Sindoor, can the current diplomatic thaw truly be seen as a 'reset'? How cautious should India be in engaging with China going forward?[/B] What's currently underway is not a 'reset.' The relationship between India and China is not likely to go back to what it was in the past. What needs to be arrived at is a new balance. The question from the Indian perspective is not about whether one should be cautious or not. The question that we in India need to ask is what sort of a relationship do we desire with China? What's in India's interests? And how do we get to that desirable destination? Strategic clarity on these is what should guide policy, rather than caution. [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/sep/03modi-xi-jinping-1.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: Modi with Xi in Tianjin. Photograph: DPR PMO/ANI Photo [B]Can India realistically reduce its concerns about the US by partnering with China, given that China remains its foremost strategic adversary?[/B] The strategic goal of Indian policy must be to ensure the development and well-being of Indians. With that in mind, I don't think that one should think about these relationships as binaries. They are not. Of course, the strategic environment that one operates in is impacted by the actions of others. But one should be careful to not overemphasize the impact of one relationship on the other. There is also an internal logic to India's relationships with each of the global powers. Ties with the US, Europe, Japan, and Australia are based on shared strategic interests and are crucial to meet India's development and security needs. Apart from capital and technology, Western countries are critical sources for demand that can aid India's economic growth. Of course, there are frictions that can emerge from time to time, and the present situation with the US is clearly turbulent. But it is important to maintain engagement, keeping the big picture in mind, maintaining resolve on certain bottom lines, and approaching these challenges with a sense of confidence in the long-term strategic convergences, while leveraging our diverse set of partnerships. The need for a stable relationship with China, on the other hand, is an imperative of geography and geopolitics. China can also be an important development partner for India, but it cannot replace Western demand. So each has its own logic and utility. [B]As an observer of China and Chinese media, how was the meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Xi Jinping analyzed and portrayed by the Chinese media?[/B] There exists a substantial degree of skepticism among Chinese analysts and media commentators. The general view is that this is a tactical easing, owing to the pressures brought about by the Trump administration. Of course, this view is accompanied by a whole lot of [I]schadenfreude[/I]. Official media, meanwhile, have essentially sought to portray India's presence at the SCO summit as a victory for Chinese diplomacy and vision for the world. [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/sep/03modi-sco-summit-1.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: Modi delivers India's statement at the Shanghai Cooperation Council summit in Tianjin, September 1, 2025. Photograph: DPR PMO/ANI Photo [B]An important question exists : If Xi asserts that the border issue should not define overall China-India relations, how can normal relations be achieved when de-escalation remains incomplete, restrictions on Indian troop patrols continue, and the tragic loss of 20 soldiers still looms large?[/B] The proverbial proof of the pudding when it comes to this current round of engagement between the two sides will eventually lie in de-escalation in Eastern Ladakh. After Wang Yi's visit to Delhi in August, three new steps were announced. An expert group to explore early harvest in boundary delimitation in the India-China border areas; a working group to advance effective border management; and the creation of general-level mechanisms in the eastern and middle sectors. How these mechanisms progress will be important if the new dual-track approach that the two sides are talking about has to succeed. [IMG]https://im.rediff.com/news/2025/aug/22wang-yi2.jpg?w=670&h=900[/IMG] IMAGE: Modi meets Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi, August 19, 2025. Photograph: @narendramodi [B]Given that trade has become a major priority for India following the 50% tariffs imposed by President Trump, what decisive gains has India made in trade agreements with China?[/B] Data from China's General Administration of Customs for January to July tells us that Indian exports to China have fallen 7.1% year on year. There's a lot of room for China to import more from India. This can happen with regard to primary commodities, iron ores, marine goods, and even pharmaceuticals. There's also significant scope in expanding services trade. But Beijing needs to open up for all of this, easing the barriers that are in place. That said, China is unlikely to fill the demand loss for Indian sectors that are hit by American tariffs. For that, the government and companies will have to look elsewhere. [B]What are the reasons for China's desire to 'normalize' relations with India?[/B] Apart from some of the obvious economic interests, an India that is accommodative of China's rise and interests in the Indo-Pacific is a strategic asset for Beijing. To achieve this end, it will engage in coercion but also dialogue on its terms. It is in this context that we should look at the Chinese desire for a new normal. [/QUOTE]
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