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Fuelling the Fire: How India won the hearts and minds of Punjab’s Sikhs - Part 1
By Sebastian Melmoth
When George W. Bush announced the end of military operations in Iraq many hailed the miraculous and speedy destruction of Saddam’s army as an opportunity for immediate peace and prosperity. Now, in retrospect, the fan fare rings hollow and the “victory accomplished” banner reads woeful naivety. In the academic community there were those who warned of the possibility of insurgency but such concerns were disparaged or simply ignored. As the Government of Sri Lanka is poised to militarily destroy the LTTE there remains the possibility of continued insurgent terrorism, a word synonymous with the LTTE. Such concerns have been suggested by Howard Debenham, former Australian high commissioner to Sri Lanka. Clearly conflict dynamics make Iraq and Sri Lanka distinctly different, to compare them would be a worthless exercise, however, similar academic fears of a resurgence of violence should be neglected.
This final, of a series of three articles, will track the evolution of the counter insurgency operation conducted by India against extremist Sikh militants. Again, the article will follow the frame work of liddism: the conflict is viewed as a boiling po; no matter how much pressure is applied to the lid, the water inside continues to boil; eventually steam will escape, perhaps scalding the hand on the lid; the heat, boiling the water, is the political grievances, the root cause of the conflict; any additional suffering endured by the affected population only adds fuel to the fire. The conflict in Punjab offers an example of the paramount importance of winning hearts and minds in order to take away the political motivations, the heat, and create sustainable peace.
Although Sikhs are a minority within India, 80% of the entire Sikh population live in Punjab, contributing two thirds of the states total. After partition the Sikhs were not recognised as an official minority, and as such were not afforded minority rights. By the 1960s Punjab was the only region in India not organised on linguistic lines. In light of this the Akali Dal, the major Sikh party, stepped up pressure for a linguistic reorganization of Punjab. Originally the movement was peaceful and used non-violent tactics of agitation based on the model developed by Gandhi. Although a compromise was reached in 1966, a series of socio-economic problems polarised the Sikh population. Capitalising on this sense of alienation and disenfranchisement an enigmatic leader, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, gained increasing support for his calls for an independent Sikh state based on strict Sikh fundamentalism.
In the face of violent clashes between Bhindranwale’s supporters and Hindu and moderate Sikh groups the Indian government ordered collective punishments against the entire Sikh population. When the Indian state stopped all Sikhs from travelling to New Delhi for the Asian Games in 1982, a turning point was reached and popular sympathies began to shift towards militancy. In 1984, the government took decisive action when Bhindranwale established a military strong hold in the Golden Temple. Operation Blue Star was a military victory but a political catastrophe. Although Bhindranwale was killed and his base destroyed, the attack was launched on a day when Sikhs from across the world congregate at the Golden Temple and hundreds of Sikh civilians were killed. Ultimately, Operation Blue Star caused a severe escalation of the conflict and the justification given for the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two Sikh bodyguards. In the wake of Blue Star an attempt to broker peace concluded with the Longowal agreement between the Indian government and Sikh moderates. However, the negotiations did not involve the militants who were supported by the civilian population. The Sikh moderate leader, Harchand Singh Longowal, was assassinated by Sikh militants and the Indian government failed to implement the promised reforms. Violence continued and Punjab was placed under direct Presidential rule. In 1987, the Indian government again attempted to regain control of Punjab through military action with Operation Black Thunder, a second attempt to retake the Golden Temple from Sikh militants. Though less destructive, Black Thunder followed the same failings of Blue Star; the intervention was a politically counter productive and was not supported by a wider counter-insurgency campaign. The Indian government only managed to truly turn the tide against the militants when it recognised the importance of the Sikh population as part of the solution, as opposed to part of the problem. A two part campaign was developed where by the militants were targeted through grass roots counter insurgency, and political engagement and dialogue was increased to address grievances of the wider Sikh population. The weakening of the militant movement, militarily and politically, resulted in a fracturing of the struggle into multiple splinter groups. The insurgents began fighting more amongst themselves than against the Indian security forces. Individual separatist groups attempted to increase their stake hold in the conflict by recruitment drives that brought in new but ideologically unprepared cadres. The movements became undisciplined, and “criminalized”, increasingly engaged in robbery, extortion, rape, indiscriminate killings and ever-escalating terrorist attacks on innocent civilians, ultimately turning Sikh society against the separatist movement as a whole.
The path to direct link is
Sri Lanka Breaking News-Daily Mirror Online
By Sebastian Melmoth
When George W. Bush announced the end of military operations in Iraq many hailed the miraculous and speedy destruction of Saddam’s army as an opportunity for immediate peace and prosperity. Now, in retrospect, the fan fare rings hollow and the “victory accomplished” banner reads woeful naivety. In the academic community there were those who warned of the possibility of insurgency but such concerns were disparaged or simply ignored. As the Government of Sri Lanka is poised to militarily destroy the LTTE there remains the possibility of continued insurgent terrorism, a word synonymous with the LTTE. Such concerns have been suggested by Howard Debenham, former Australian high commissioner to Sri Lanka. Clearly conflict dynamics make Iraq and Sri Lanka distinctly different, to compare them would be a worthless exercise, however, similar academic fears of a resurgence of violence should be neglected.
This final, of a series of three articles, will track the evolution of the counter insurgency operation conducted by India against extremist Sikh militants. Again, the article will follow the frame work of liddism: the conflict is viewed as a boiling po; no matter how much pressure is applied to the lid, the water inside continues to boil; eventually steam will escape, perhaps scalding the hand on the lid; the heat, boiling the water, is the political grievances, the root cause of the conflict; any additional suffering endured by the affected population only adds fuel to the fire. The conflict in Punjab offers an example of the paramount importance of winning hearts and minds in order to take away the political motivations, the heat, and create sustainable peace.
Although Sikhs are a minority within India, 80% of the entire Sikh population live in Punjab, contributing two thirds of the states total. After partition the Sikhs were not recognised as an official minority, and as such were not afforded minority rights. By the 1960s Punjab was the only region in India not organised on linguistic lines. In light of this the Akali Dal, the major Sikh party, stepped up pressure for a linguistic reorganization of Punjab. Originally the movement was peaceful and used non-violent tactics of agitation based on the model developed by Gandhi. Although a compromise was reached in 1966, a series of socio-economic problems polarised the Sikh population. Capitalising on this sense of alienation and disenfranchisement an enigmatic leader, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, gained increasing support for his calls for an independent Sikh state based on strict Sikh fundamentalism.
In the face of violent clashes between Bhindranwale’s supporters and Hindu and moderate Sikh groups the Indian government ordered collective punishments against the entire Sikh population. When the Indian state stopped all Sikhs from travelling to New Delhi for the Asian Games in 1982, a turning point was reached and popular sympathies began to shift towards militancy. In 1984, the government took decisive action when Bhindranwale established a military strong hold in the Golden Temple. Operation Blue Star was a military victory but a political catastrophe. Although Bhindranwale was killed and his base destroyed, the attack was launched on a day when Sikhs from across the world congregate at the Golden Temple and hundreds of Sikh civilians were killed. Ultimately, Operation Blue Star caused a severe escalation of the conflict and the justification given for the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two Sikh bodyguards. In the wake of Blue Star an attempt to broker peace concluded with the Longowal agreement between the Indian government and Sikh moderates. However, the negotiations did not involve the militants who were supported by the civilian population. The Sikh moderate leader, Harchand Singh Longowal, was assassinated by Sikh militants and the Indian government failed to implement the promised reforms. Violence continued and Punjab was placed under direct Presidential rule. In 1987, the Indian government again attempted to regain control of Punjab through military action with Operation Black Thunder, a second attempt to retake the Golden Temple from Sikh militants. Though less destructive, Black Thunder followed the same failings of Blue Star; the intervention was a politically counter productive and was not supported by a wider counter-insurgency campaign. The Indian government only managed to truly turn the tide against the militants when it recognised the importance of the Sikh population as part of the solution, as opposed to part of the problem. A two part campaign was developed where by the militants were targeted through grass roots counter insurgency, and political engagement and dialogue was increased to address grievances of the wider Sikh population. The weakening of the militant movement, militarily and politically, resulted in a fracturing of the struggle into multiple splinter groups. The insurgents began fighting more amongst themselves than against the Indian security forces. Individual separatist groups attempted to increase their stake hold in the conflict by recruitment drives that brought in new but ideologically unprepared cadres. The movements became undisciplined, and “criminalized”, increasingly engaged in robbery, extortion, rape, indiscriminate killings and ever-escalating terrorist attacks on innocent civilians, ultimately turning Sikh society against the separatist movement as a whole.
The path to direct link is
Sri Lanka Breaking News-Daily Mirror Online
