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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Dalvinder Singh Grewal" data-source="post: 226818" data-attributes="member: 22683">Chapter XI Post scriptIt is literally an uphill task for the Indian Army as it inches its way towards the posts held by battle-hardened infiltrators in the high ranges. And it knows it's going to be a long haul. “Army men seek posting at front: While brave jawans are fighting it out in the high mountains of Kargil, officers who have been posted in peace stations are restive to join them in the battle field. The morale of the Army is very high as evident from a spate of voluntary offiers from officers to joint the operations. The Army Training Command (ARTRAC) has been flooded with the letters from officers, most of whom have been detached from their units and posted in peace stations. Even officers in the medically low category have volunteered to got to the front. Maj Sunil Thomas of 5 Maratha Rifles Light Infantry Battalion, who has been posted as general staff officers at the headquarters, has in his letter to the GOC-in-C, ARTRAC, referred to the shortage of officers and volunteered to join the operations, despite being in the medically low category. He had also enclosed his certificate of willingness, essential for those in medically low category, and requested that he should be posted with the battalion for the duration of the Kargil operation. Similarly, Lt.-Col. H.W. Martin, who was relieved from the Maratha Rifles Light Infantry Battalion, which is on the way to Kargil from Ladakh, has also expressed his desire to join his unit. Col Martin, who has been reemployed at the Regimental Centre, Belgaum, has in his letter stated that his unit needs him and he wants to join action on the front. My 32 years of experience with the unit would be useful at the time of the crisis, he had stated. Similarly, Maj Gen T.S. Shergill, who is presently posted at Mhow, has also requested the GOC-in-C, ARTRAC, that he should be posted in the Jammu and Kashmir sector. Only two days ago Maj Satish malik, who was kept in medically low category but opted to join his unit in the Kashmir valley, hit a landmine and lost one of his legs. However, such happenings have not deterred others in the medically low category from joining the battle. The jawans who have been asked to move to the front from here are also in high spirits. Sepoy Ankush Chavan, who has to report at Kargil the next week, says he would not visit his family at Ahmednagar and then go to the front after collecting his official kit from Pune. He said he was very keen to join his brethern and prove his mettle. Senior Army officers and their wives here are all praise for media which had played an important role in keeping the people informed about the action in the battlefield. The manner in which countrymen had supported the Army had also helped in boosting the morale of the jawans. Unlike the previous wars, the presence of the electronic media and extensive coverage by the print media had made the national sentiments more visible, they felt. (The Tribune, June 22,1999) No Indian general is willing to say how long the battle will last except for vague replies of "it will take time" and the army will have to tread cautiously. They now put the strength of the infiltrators at 700, almost 300 more than the original estimate a fortnight ago. Almost every day Major-General V.S. Budhwar, general officer commanding-in-chief, 3 Division, discovers newer enemy locations which are then added to the map in the Operations Room at his make-shift headquarter in Kargil. Wireless messages pour in from commanding officers of different units asking for additional troops. Already, four additional brigades estimated to have over 20,000 men have been moved to do battle in Kargil. The army estimates that its troops have killed over 300 infiltrators but has so far showed no evidence to bolster its claims. The Indian Air Force has been pressed into service in a bid to cut down on the time required to uproot the intruders by at least a month. Since its first strike on May 26, the air force has been carrying out over 40 sorties daily. On May 31, even Mirage 2000s were used for air reconnaissance and special missions -- to pick out the radar stations that Pakistan has deployed. The air strikes have reportedly succeeded in lowering the morale of the infiltrators. Intercepts of the wireless messages of the intruders -- which is the only way to find out the success rate -- indicate casualties as well as some distress calls. "There are nine bodies, what do we do with them?" and "when are you sending reinforcements?" are among the intercepts that are now being studied. One of the intercepted message which was worrying the army pertains to the infiltrators continuing with their namaz (prasyers) even as Indian Air Force fighter planes zeroed in on them. Says a senior army officer, "They even suffered up to 30 casualties, at least that is what the intercept says, but the fact that they continued praying instead of seeking shelter shows their level of motivation." Also, the well-entrenched intruders have a formidable {censored}nal to keep the troops advancing uphill at bay. They have heavy machine guns, light machine-guns, air-defence guns and mortars, besides possibly plenty of shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Their supplies are constantly replenished by Pakistani troops with the Indian armed forces still unable to choke the links. At Kaksar, the army has made some headway but it is still extremely difficult to uproot the intruders. Initially spread over an area of up to 4 km, the infiltrators have been forced, through air strikes, to an area of about 1 km. This is around post 5299. Besides, it is only one location among at least eight to 12 others which army officers say are strongly-held positions. As one army officer revealed, the difference in height between the infiltrators and the Indian Army is anywhere between 2,000 ft and 4,000 ft. So it will be a while before ground troops can engage them in a battle. "Unlike in Punjab or even the Valley, we can't run our troops like a comb over the enemy," says Major General A.S. Sihota, chief of staff, 15 Corps. At Batalik, where Saravanan died fighting, the army has begun to close in on the well-fortified intruders on 16,000-20,000-ft high peaks. Bolstered by air strikes and heavy artillery fire support, the infantry has begun to engage the intruders in close-quarter battles on the mountain tops. Last week, the army dislodged them from two ridges after hand-to-hand gun battles that led to at least eight army casualties. At least 10 intruders were killed while two were captured alive by a team of crack commandos. Batalik's ridges are less steep on the PoK side, an advantage that helped the intruders breach the LoC and occupy the heights without their movements being noticed. For Indian troops, negotiating these features from heights of 10,000-12,000 ft is a herculean task that requires massive logistics. "As the mountain warfare eats up the troops, building advantages in logistics is the key to neutralising the intruders," says Lt-General Krishan Pal of the 15 Corps. Maintaining the combat soldiers on heights is an arduous task. For instance, four soldiers are required to maintain one fighting soldier. As a result the administrative tail becomes long and accounts for the large number of troops deployed. To speed up movement, the army requisitioned two companies of General Service (GS) and Artillery Task (AT) mules, besides roping in hordes of local mules and porters to ferry supplies -- ration and ammunition -- to the forward locations. The army mules carry 100-150 kg load, transporting even dismantled heavy artillery guns up the mountains. "The strategy is to move the artillery positions up front to force the intruders to keep their heads down and allow the infantry to move up on the heights," says an army official. Neutralising the fortified positions of the intruders has been a time-consuming and nerve wracking struggle. Last week, a company of combat troops helped by night vision devices set out to dislodge a Pakistani picket on a peak at 16,000 ft, named after Bollywood heroine Madhuri by an army officer. Carrying "survival ration" of gur-chana and weathering sub-zero temperatures, they inch their way up even as artillery guns try and pin down the intruders to facilitate their excruciatingly slow advance. "You have to crawl by inches at night. Negotiating the mountains requires tremendous planning and logistic support. From a vantage position on the top even 10 intruders can halt the advance of 1,000 soldiers, " explains a young captain in the company. All across the threatened LoC in the Kargil sector, the Indian Army realises it is an uphill talks to dislodge the intruders quickly. Capture of Pt 13620 & Block Rock On May 13, 4 Rajput and 85 Light Regiment were given the task to capture Pt 13620 and its adjoining Black Rocks by May 17,1965. The Rajputs were holding a frontage of nearly 15 km. By taking a calculated risk, Rajputs could muster three companies less a platoon for the attack. For artillery support on the objectives there was only 853 Light Battery of already located in Kargil (6x4.2inch mortars, range a paltry 4100 yards). The 852 Light Battery airlifted from Pathankot to Leh arrived from there after dark on May 16 and was deployed near the Harka Bahadur Bridge to take on likely enemy reaction astride the Shingo River. To capture these two massive hill features, held by the enemy, these were very slender resources by any tactical reckoning. However, the enemy had been lulled into complacency by our well known reluctance to undertake any aggressive hostile activity across the CFL ever since the ceasefire on January 1,1949. We were counting upon achieving complete surprise. We hoped that surprise combined with our high morale and determination will offset our paucity of resources. Rajputs were very well led. On May 14, Capt Ranbir Singh Kang requested CO Rajputs (Col Sudarshan) to be reassigned to his old platoon which had been chosen to lead to attack. A similar request was made by Capt Ahluwalia. While Sudarshan acceded to Ranbir, Ahluwalia could not be spared from D Company detailed to hold the defensive frontage. The sleepy tenure of normal activity was rigidly maintained. The limited build-up and all preparatory activities, including deployment of our mortars 3000 feet up on a hillside, were carried out at night. Sudarshan had taken over command of 4 Rajput only a few days earlier. My regiment, not even a year old, was determined to earn its spurs in its first battle. Both of us had a high stake in success of this attack. Joint planning started on May 13 itself. We agreed that for the sake of surprise there would no pre-attack registration of targets by artillery. During the attack itself no artillery fire would be brought down till the surpise was lost and the attacking troops called for artillery support through the forward artillery observers accompaning them. On the left, B Company commanded by Major baljit Randhawa were assigned to capture Pt 13620. C Company less one platoon was in reserve. On the right A Company under Major Bhatnagar was to capture Black Roocks. Sudarshan and his command party would accompany the left column. H. Hour (time fixed to cross the start line for the attack) was fixed at 0230 Hours May 17. The enemy had approximately a platoon supported by MMG and mortars on each of the assigned objectives. A section of MMGs with some troops were also known to be holding the saddle connecting the two objectives. The detailed layout of enemy defences on the Black Rocks was not so well known. On Pt 13620 enemy defences were linear along the axis of attack and surrounded by a five feet high stone parameter wall. Due to this layout and the narrowness of the hilltop, B Coy organised its attack by platoons echeloned in depth. A similar patttern was followed by a Company. Patrolling had revealed that the north-west approached to Pt 13620, chosen in all contingency planning was not feasible due to cliffs enroute. A more negotiable route from the south-west through reentrants was selected. On the 14/15 and 15/16 nights of May, relief and concentration of troops earmarked for the attack took place. On May 16 troops prepapred for the attack. Leaders down to sections went forward in small groups to observe Pt 13620 from a concealed view point. A patrol was deployed in this area to keep enemy activities constantly under watch. Soon after dark on May 16, the left column led by B Company took off for the forming up place (FUP) for the attack secured ahead of them, approximately 300 yards from the objective. At times soldiers had to claw their way up the steep slopes on all fours during this stiff climb of nearly 4000 feet. The FUP was reached by 0200 hours. It was bitterly cold. Skin froze to the metal parts of weapons if touched with bare hands. Being a silent attack and artillery was not firing on the objective on a timed programme; it was decided to kick off half an hour earlier. After the leading platoon had covered half the distance to the parameter wall the enemy opened up with all its weapons. Troops coming under heavy fire for the first time tended to go to ground. Here was when the time immemorial creed of leadership in battle, “Follow me” came into play. Ranbir, though already wounded in the scalp, Ramdjawa amnd Sundarshan came to the fore, firing light machine guns picked up from there the dead and the wounded. The men steadied and the momentum of attack picked up. Over the wall and hand-to-hand fighting delivered the coup de grade. Whoever of the enemy could run, jumped down the reverse slope and ade good their escape. By 0430 Pt 13620 was firmly in our hands. Ten enemy dead were counted. On the right advance of A Company was held up by unexpected fire from two bumps enour first victory after the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir. There casualties were fairly heavy. Killed officer: Major baljit Randhawa, JCOs 2 and other ranks 10. Wounded officer; other rank 60. Gallantry awards, Randhawa, MVC; Ranbir Kang, Baib Sub Girdhari Singh, each Vr.C; Mention in Despatches,2. Kargil brings memories flooding back. On May 17; around 11 am as I looked far down to Kargil and the road, I marvelled at the determination and valour of these steep and inhospitable slopes hampered by their lowered physical efficiency at this high altitude and then assaulted these formidable defences in the face of enemy fire. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a> When 4 Rajput first moved into that area, we were required to take on charge all the tinned rations from the outgoing unit. This process of handing/taking over is looked upon with great uspicion by the junior staff of the incoming unit. One day a JCO (Junior Commissioned Officer) came up to me and said, “Sir, idhar bahut crasshing (his was of pronouncing crossing) ho raha hai.” What he meant was that the outgoing unit was substituting one type of ration with another. I asked him to be more specific. He said, “Sir, ek tin par likha hai G-U-A-V-A. Khol Kar dekha to andar se nikla peru”. The poor Maratha JCO didn’t know it was the same thing in both the languages. Then, there was the general officer who always declined the biscuits served with tea during his visits; because he liked them crisp while those offered in that weather were obviously soft. One day our intrepid mess secretary asked the General’s helicopter pilot to get fresh biscuits before taking off from Srinagar. When the biscuits arrived during the next visit, they were offered to the General who declined. When told that they were fresh and crisp, he picked up one, conveyed his appreciation and casually dipped it in his tea before munching on it. These and some others are the lighter moments in Army life which keep us going and in good humour, regadless of hardship and wars. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn2" target="_blank">[2]</a> Kaksar: The enemy’s aim here was to threaten Kargil, but icy winds and glaciers prevented the estimated 100 intruders from significant process. Though not a priority target, Indian troops kept them in check. In the military sense, those were the days of relative calm. Vehicles moved at night with full head lights. Locals would throng the Army Cinema in their scores to enjoy their favourite movies. Bazars used to hum with activity till very late at night. Kargil Hotels were invariably short of accommodation for trekkers and tourists. Smartly attired chidren, optimism writ large on their innocent faces, were noticed going to their schools, in batches big and small. As if to forebode the future, tranquility of the night was occasionally shattered with the creackle of machine gun fire in the Kaksar area. Thumps and thuds of artillery fire were, however missing, Pakistani habit of constantly nibbling at our territory had earlier resulted in what was known as Dalung intrusion. Our projected image of a status-quo power had thus far prevented us from generating strong enough military response against it. Hopefully operation Vijay has taken care of it now. Considered as challenging assignments, one was indeed lucky to have been posted not only at Kargil but also at Tangdhar and Poonch, during the service. On balance the tenure at Kargil was the most exciting. Apart from Service factors, it was due to the peculiarities of terrain, the climate and the special ethnic composition in the area which made all the difference.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn3" target="_blank">[3]</a> Fear of Escalation: As India makes initial gains and Pakistan remains resilient, there are growing fears that the border conflict may go beyond Kargil. These days the sayings of the famed 19th century Prussian military strategist are much in demand in the subcontinent. Including the better known "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means" that Pakistan seems to be following with almost religious fervour in Kashmir. As the battle between India and Pakistan for control of the commanding heights in Kargil enters its sixth bloody week, the conflict, instead of abating, is showing ominous signs of intensifying. The death toll continues to be alarmingly high. By June 24, India had lost as many as 175 armed forces personnel and 550 were injured. The Indian Army claims it has killed over 350 Pakistani army regulars and injured twice that number -- a figure hotly disputed by Islamabad. Last week saw India make substantial progress in its effort to push back the intruders across the 110-km stretch of the Line of Control (LoC) between Zoji La Pass and Leh. In a dramatic assault, the Indian Army recaptured the key peak of Tololing that overlooks the strategic Srinagar-Leh highway which Pakistan had hoped to paralyse. It was the army's first big victory in an area considered a chicken's neck and it thwarted Pakistan's major objective of cutting off Drass and thereby Leh from the rest of the valley. Yet there was little time for India to celebrate as its troops engaged the Pakistani Army in pitched battles to regain vital peaks such as Tiger Hill, Jubar and Kukarthang and to push back intrusions that in many areas still extend up to 4 km on the Indian side of the LoC. As the casualties mounted, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's government faced growing pressure from the armed forces to end its policy of restraint and allow Indian troops to cross the LoC at least in the Kargil sector to enable them to cut off Pakistani supply lines to the intruders. Such a decision is fraught with risks as it may result in the battle spreading to other areas along the 3,000-km Indo-Pak border. The big question that loomed last week: Are we heading for a full-scale war with Pakistan? (By Raj Chengappa, Rohit Saran and Harinder Baweja) Time is running out. Tough measures like squeezing Pakistan economically must be taken.The Indian armed forces have so far scrupulously observed Vajpayee's orders not to cross the LoC but their patience is running thin. Diplomatically, the policy of restraint has paid off with even leaders of the powerful G-8 warning Pakistan, without naming it, to pull back the intruders and restore the sanctity of the loc. But India warned the countries last week that its policy of restraint cannot be open-ended and that international pressure has to go beyond just lip sympathy. As Brajesh Mishra, principal secretary to the prime minister and national security adviser, says, "We do not have unlimited patience and time." The Indian Army plans to instal unattended ground sensors, short range battlefield surveillance radars and hand-held thermal imagers, backed by a secure, modern communication system to prevent future intrusions along the Line of Control (LoC) , akin to the one it is currently facing in Kargil and Drass sectors. These sophisticated systems would give the Indian Army early warnings of large and medium scale infiltrations across the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir, according to Janes Defence Weekly. The Weekly, in its latest issue, says that a 180-200 km stretch of extremely inhospitable terrain along the LoC, which has suddenly become hot after the recent large scale recent intrusion by Pakistan backed mercenaries, is in danger of becoming another Siachen Glacier for the Indian and Pakistani forces. “Even after the Indian Army throws out the mercenaries from the vital posts overlooking the Leh- Srinagar highway, the Army would now have to have a large permanent military presence in the area. Units in the Kargil- Drass sector have been ordered to hold their positions and not to withdraw even after evicting the intrudres,” Janes reported. “The Indian Army is concerned that establishing posts in the harsh Kargil region could surpass the daily expenditure of Rs.30 million in Siachen Glacier,” Janes reports, adding that if the Indians have presence, the Pakistanis too could not avoid keeping troops in the region. According to the weekly, the strategy employed by the Pakistan-backed mercenaries is the same as that used by Pakistan in the three wars they have fought against India - to dominate the national highway linking Srinagar to Leh, and to internationalise the Kashmir issue since India has been winning the proxy war in Kashmir. The defence weekly says that Pakistan intelligencestrategists have chosen a vital sector to hit the Indians since the (Line of Control) from the international border from Jammu to the Zojila Pass at the end of the Kashmir valley is well guarded as is the 75 km stretch of the Siachen Glacier. “The 180-200 km stretch of the LoC from the Zojula Pass to Khor that lies beyond Leh in the Nubra valley was relatively undefended,” the weekly said, adding that this snowy, mountainous wasteland with ridges upto 6060 ft high, is the second coldest place after Sibera and is covered by 4 to 6 meters of snow between October and June, with temperatures ranging from - 20 degree celsius to 60 degree celsius.(The Tribune,June 12,1999) Despite war preparations, how the Kargil conflict progresses in the next fortnight held the key. While India is waiting for the foreign countries and agencies "to deliver", the army is taking no chances. In the past three weeks, mechanised and artillery divisions have advanced to forward positions all along the border in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir where five out of India's 11 Corpse formations are stationed. The army has cancelled all leave -- "100 per cent recall" in military parlance -- and all personnel have been asked to report back. Trains have been pressed into service to transport tanks and heavy ammunition to Pokhran and Jaisalmer in Rajasthan. Ammunition reserves have been sent to forward locations in Rajasthan and other sectors. This gives the Indians the option of an offensive strike anywhere along the border. The army, navy and air force are on high alert and preparations are on to stock fuel for the air force and the army's artillery units. Defence Minister George Fernandes, who flew to Kutch to review the military preparedness, says the armed forces are ready to give a "befitting reply". As part of civil defence preparedness, sirens and blackout drills have been conducted in the border areas. India's Prithvi and Agni missiles are reportedly in operational readiness in view of Pakistani comments that it may even exercise its nuclear options. A sense of confidence has returned to the army after the success in Tololing. It had been caught off balance by the failure of intelligence agencies, including its own, to detect the massive intrusion. Army chief General V.P. Malik told India Today: "Now both my feet are on the ground. We are fully balanced in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere." One reason for the build-up in the border areas is that the army does not want to be caught off guard again. As a serving general says, "We are now a step ahead and have sent a message to the Pakistanis that they better not try to take us on elsewhere." As part of the propaganda blitz, the army has been providing proof of the extent of Pakistan's involvement in Kargil. Last week in Delhi it displayed a range of captured armament including maps and identity papers showing that many of the intruders were Pakistani army regulars. Malik told the press on June 23 that the Indian Army is respecting the government's directive not to cross the LoC despite the "constraints" it has placed on the ongoing operations in Kargil. The army is unlikely to immediately open up other sectors of conflict unless Pakistan expands the base of the war. Meanwhile, Pakistan too has kept five of its 11 corp formations in a state of readiness. BSF field reports indicate a high level of activity including movement of heavy vehicles and transfer of equipment to the Punjab sector from where Pakistan is most likely to launch its attack in the event of a war. Indian Army sources say the Pakistani build-up is not yet in an "aggressive mode". Nor have the two armies made any decisive movements of their strike corps, which would signal that a war was nigh. But as a senior Indian Army officer observes, "Pakistan is always known for whistling in the dark." Men and equipment make for a winning combination in a war. Except the one raging in Kargil. The mounting Indian casualties are partly being attributed to the scarcity of critical combat aids. This, many say, is because of the mismanagement of the country's defence spending in the past decade. Vice-Admiral (retired) K.K. Nayyar, a member of the 1990 Arun Singh Committee on defence expenditure, claims, "The Kargil crisis is directly attributable to the starvation of funds for the armed forces during the '90s." Some examples: An army requisition for low-intensity conflict equipment worth less than Rs 50 crore has been awaiting approval of both the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs since 1997. Its clearance would have provided the forces in Kargil with critical aids like night-vision devices (cost about Rs 2 lakh a piece; shortfall about 700), commando equipment (worth Rs 11 crore), snow mobiles (Rs 2 crore for 10) and rocket and grenade launchers (requirement: 5,000 and 2,000, costing Rs 10 crore). » About 10 per cent (between 20-40) of the Bofors FH 77 B guns have been dysfunctional for want of spares. The lack of spares has forced cannibalisation (stripping parts of one gun to use them in another). So grave was the perceived shortage of spares that the Parliament's Standing Committee even suggested "lifting of the ban on Bofors for licensed production" of its spares in India. Less than a month after that warning, India is importing shells for Bofors guns at prices up to $1,000 (Rs 43,000) a piece. The army has no battlefield surveillance and gun-locating radar and is woefully short of self-propelled guns and communication equipment. If some of these spares and equipment had been available, they would not only have reduced casualties but may also have prevented the very occurrence of the conflict. Says Jasjit Singh, director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA): "Kargil represents the failure of India's conventional military deterrence." Part of the reason for this has been the severe defence cuts. From a peak of 3.6 per cent in 1987-88, the share of defence expenditure in India's gross domestic product (GDP) had slipped to 2.33 per cent in 1998-99. Though this is a global trend, India spends a smaller proportion of GDP on defence than Pakistan and China do. Yet, experts believe the real devil is not in the amount that is spent on defence but the manner in which it is spent. Comments A.K. Ghosh, former finance adviser in the Ministry of Defence: "Money is used best when it flows according to a plan. The Indian armed forces have not had a long-term plan for years." The fault is not really theirs because the plans made were not approved. In fact, since 1985 defence has been on a virtual plan holiday. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-90) was cleared by the cabinet only in 1989, rendering it ineffective. The Eighth Plan (1991-95) was never cleared and even the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) is yet to be approved. As a result the army is short of at least 300 T-90 and T-72 battle tanks and about a thousand 155 mm artillery guns to sharpen its edge in a full-scale war. Besides the other two services have also been severely impacted by budget cuts. For the air force to score a decisive victory over Pakistan, it should have at least 44 squadrons. It currently has only 39 and a half squadrons. Naval preparedness is no better. An IDSA study shows that between 1990 and 1999, the number of principal naval combatants like submarines and destroyers fell from 44 to 36. Hinting that the forces are clearly unhappy with the state of affairs, Malik said last week, "If a war is thrust on us we shall fight with whatever we have, but in the meantime the government must take serious steps to see that whatever is needed by us is made available as early as possible." Nobody wants to admit it but a reason for the delay in striking decisively in Kargil was that the forces were ill-prepared for such an offensive. As a senior officer says, "Preparedness is not like a light switch that you can turn on and off at will. It needs time and planning." The Pakistani Army was clearly better prepared as it struck first. But it is aware that in a full-scale war the odds are heavily stacked against it. And so at the moment it is content to take on the Indian Army only in the Kargil heights where it enjoys an advantage.<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> The Tribune, June 27,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref2" target="_blank">[2]</a> The Time of India, August 5,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref3" target="_blank">[3]</a> Brig S.S.Nakai(Retired) North Plus, Sunday, August 15,1999</blockquote>

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