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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Dalvinder Singh Grewal" data-source="post: 226816" data-attributes="member: 22683">CHAPTER VIII                                    MAJOR BATTLES:War is fought with the will of the government, competence of the armedforces and support of the nation. (Carl von Clauswitz)The Pakistani infiltration was a real surprise; Its detection being a tedious and delayed process. Even though there is supposed to a set system of Early Warning elements; Advance Posts, Obervations Posts, Intelligence Posts, Electronic Posts, patrols and what not in different names set by forward battalions, Brigade HQs, Div HQs, Army Intelligence, RAW, IB and even state CID that are meant to provide timely and accurate information about any intrusion, the information because, as if no agency worked. One wonders as to how all these agancies failed so miserably that the Pak regulars carried out detailed recconnaissance, moved forward, dumped supplies, dug in positions and even constructed bunkers undetected. It is realy a sad story on the part of Indian Intelligence system dealt with in a separate chapter. The reports are that Pakistan planned the detailed operations in 1998. The information gathered from an ISI operative and Hizub militant Azhar Shafi Mir in Dec 1998 and the maps found on the body of Ali Mohammad Dar another Hizb militant on Aug 9, 1998 surely indicated that preparations for this infiltration had started as long back in mid-1998 and the aim was to cut off northern Kashmir from the valley. Detailed reconnaissance was carried in Jan-Feb 1999 and the intruders started infiltrating and dumping by mid-April and entrenched themselves by end-April, all undetected by indians. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a> Even though RAW & IB had enough information regarding enemy intention on Leh-Kargil road by Oct 1998, but they failed to react. The first information about their intrusion came from shepherds of Garkhun village in Batalik sub-sector on May 3, 1999, but that too was not taken seriously. First patrol was sent on May 5th. Lt. Kalia of 4 JAT Regiment to check only whether the slow had melted at the top and the vacated position could be reoccupied. This patrol was captured and mutilated; body bags of all patrol members returned a month later. Second patrol was sent on May 6th and third on May 9th, all facing ambush. Initial Indian reactions lacked seriousness and concern. Defence Minister George Fernedez assured Indian citizens that the intruders would be vacated within 48 hours. Army Chief Gen V. P. Malik continued his tour of Poland. Army Commander Lt. Gen. H.M.Khanna took casual leave and proceeded to Pune, rather being on the frontline. Corps Commander 15 Corps Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal gave little importance to this intrusion and told the Frontline ," If I don't take notice of them, it will make no difference. If they come off the heights in summer, they will be slaghtered. And if don't leave them in the winter, they will freeze to death."<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn2" target="_blank">[2]</a> In the initial briefings, the commander 121 Brigade told 18 Grenadiers’ commanding officer that there were no more than 8-10 infiltrators on the heights. “Just go up,” he ordered with casual bravado, “and bring them down by their neck.” By the time the realisation came to the commanders that the Pakistan regulars from NLI and SSG prepared and occupied impregnable positions on Dras, Kaksar, Mushkoh valley, Turtok and Chorbatla, the convoys on Srinagar-Leh were halted by direct fire from machine guns and mortars perched on these hills aside the highway and by directed and pin-pointed Pakistan Artillery, it appeared stratling. Northern Kashmir was virtually cut-off. Pakistan had occupied over 80 posts in around 150 kilometres of Kargil sector with Dras on one end and Batalik on the other. The immediate intention of the infiltrators appeared : to cutoff 150 Km of Srinagar-Leh Road. The Srinaga-Leh highway , the lifeline for troops is open for four months in a year from June to September, after which it is snow bound. If the infiltrators could not be dislodged by then the Army would have to move massive supplies of rations, ammunition and men of the army and civilians rations before the highway was rendered impassable. This would be a monumental task which it could ill-afford. The strength and seriousness of large scale infiltration dawned only by the third week of May. By then the conventional infantry tactics proved inadequate to evacuate the well entrenched enemy. It was only on May 25 that the high powered Cabinet committee on security (CCS) met for the first time, following desperate appeals by a team led by J&K Chief Minister Shiekh Abdullah. The visit followed a hard intelligence that a group of 70 insurgencts had used the mashkoh valley route to cross into Sonamarg, and from there to Doda. It was realised that it would be a long drawn battle and not a 48 hours affair. The 'bravado attacks' were to be stopped and the enemy was to be contained till full intelligence was gathered. The well planned and organised attacks with mass support of Air and artillery atttacks were preferred to getting the troops butchered. CCS decided to use air power, to move large re-enforcements and to arrange winter clothings for the troops. Accalimatisation of troops was to be ensured to limit casualitiies. Till the reinforcement arrived, the available troops were required to gain information and 'encircle and choke' the enemy. Accordingly, air strikes and heavy artillery fire to pin down the enemy started with effect from 26 July and 18 Garhwal was to suuround and gain a foothold in Tololing, 8 Sikh was to do the same around Tiger hill, the two most important features from where the road Srinafgar leh was directly affected. Several ridge lines in Mushkoh, Drass, Kaksar, Batalik, Turtuk an Chorbat-La were occupied to keep an eye on the enemy and to stop the spread. Air Force was asked to destroy the supply line of enemy. The Sector was divided into four sub-sectors as per priority of operations: Priority 1 - Dras Sub-Sector Priority 2 - Batalic Sub-Sector Priority 3 - Mushkoh Valley Sub-Sector Priority 4 - Kaksar Sub-Sector In addition Siachen-Chorbatla-Turtuk was also active. Dras Sub-Sector Dras is a small village on Srinagar-leh highway. Its occupation cuts off Ladakh. About 300 Pak regulars with a sprinkling of mujahideen with mortar and air-defence guns held four strategic ridges overlooking the highway. These Key locations were : i) Tololing Hills Pt 4590 Pt 5140 Tiger Hill Dras Area was the responsibility of Commander 121 Infantry Brigade (based at Kargil) of 3 Mountain Division (based at Leh). 121 Inf bde under Brig. Surinder Singh defending 150 km hilly terrain with 4 Jat Regiment and Punjab Regiment did not know what was happening and what they should do except making their immediate priority to clear the enemy from features blocking the road. The intrusion in this sector occurred between end-April. It was detected in the second week of May. No clear picture emerged about the details of the intrusion for quite a few days. There were no immediate troops around to evacuate the intruders. On May 14, 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh were taken off from counter insurgency operations and told by 121 Inf Bde to bring down infiltrators occupying Tololing Heights and Tiger Hill respectively blocking all the movement on the road Srinagar-Leh through pin-pointed fire. The sheer determination and kill capacity of the enemy bloodied the grenadiers and Sikhs so bad that they were halted in their feet. More troops had to be rushed in not only to clear the ridges but also to stop the deadly onslaught of the well entrenched regulars of the enemy on Grenadiers. It will probably go down as the mis-hit of the war. Sequence therafter clarifies this. May 15 to May 22: Induction of 2 Naga and 18 Garhwal Rifles, isolation of Tololing Hills by 18 Grenadiers and Tiger Hill by 8 Sikh. May 22: Attacks launched by Nagas, Garhwalis and Grenadiers on Tololing Hill from three different directions. None found any headway. 18 Grenadiers failed in their attack with heavy casualities 27/28 May : 18 Grenadiers fiercely attacked Tololing, their bravery was cited. June 2: 18 Grenadiers led their fourth bloodiest attack but badly failed June 3- Heavy artillery shelling of the enemy posts Jun 11 - Induction of 2 Rajputana Rifles June 12: Attack by 2 Rajputana Rifles June 13: Tololing top captured by 2 Rajputana rifles Night June 13/14: 18 Grenadiers attacked Hump gallantly Night June 15/16 : 13 J& K Rifles and 18 Grenadiers captured Hump (Tololing Ridge) . Capture of 4590 by 2 Rajputana Rifles Night June 19/20: Pt. 5140 was taken by Garhwal Rifles, J&K Rifles and 2 Naga Night June 27/28: 18 Garhwal repulsed counter attack on Point 4700 Night June 28/29: 18 Garhwal repulsed counter attack on Point 5140 Night July 03/04: 18 Grenadiers Captured Tiger Hill Night July 4/5 : Capture of Pt. 4875 by 13 J & K Rifles. 17 JAT captured Whale Back & Pimple I Night July 6-7 : Battle of Twin Bump capture by 2 Naga Night July 6-7 : 8 Sikh captures Helmet and India Gate, features on the Western Spur of Tiger Hill 8 July Raid on Enemy Mortar position by 2 Naga, 17 JAT captured Pimple II Night July 28/29 : Capture of Three Pimple area by 2 Rajputana Rifles 108 medium regiment was in direct support to 121 Mtn Bde. It facilitated capture of Tololing Ridge, Pt 5140, Tiger Hill, Pt. 4875 and other features in Drass sub sector. Tololing Hills The tales of the first attack on Tololing are hair-raising. The three battalions tried to make their way up to Tololing from two sides but made little headway in the face of saturation fire. When the Grenadiers began operations on May 22, they were bloodied so badly that commanders in the valley below realised what they were up against. With virtually no cover and intruders entrenched all across the ridges in bunkers fortified with iron girders and corrugated sheets, an advance was stopped even as it began. Things were so bad that two other battalions were stuck for 16 days on a ridge below Tololing, pinned down by gunfire and artillery barrage pin-pointed by observers on the heights. Movement was only possible during bad weather or on moon-less nights when the wind screamed along with gunfire and temperature hovered between minus 5 and minus 11 degrees centigrade. From the base, it would take at least 11 hours for a fit, acclimatised soldier to climb the 16,000 ft to the top. Crawling up, inch by inch, along the steep, smooth incline in the face of blanket firing by the intruders made troops’ task highly risky. “It was almost a suicidal mission,” recalled an officer. Barely acclimatised, a five-metre trudge would leave soldiers, weighed down by guns, equipment packs and ammunition weighing 25 kg or more, panting for breath. “Every gram of the weight you carrying is extra load,” said Captain Ajit Singh of the 16 Grenadiers who was part of the initial assault. “And you have to choose between your ration and ammunition, a 2 kg food pack or 100 bullets." Ajit, like many of his colleagues, chose bullets. For three days, he said, he survived on cigarettes. The trade-off however didn’t work. A day later, a company of Grenadiers led by Major Adhikari attempted a berserk assult. They were stopped just 15 m short of the ridge and all hell broke loose. Adhikari and two others died in hand-to-hand combat, intruders poured fire and pushed them back 30 m, then more, then some more, a retreat that forced 23 year-old Captain Sachin Nimbalkar and his men to perch behind a large rock fronting a tiny ledge on a sheer cliff-face for three days 15,000 ft up. No grenades were left to lob; nowhere to go. Then came a bizarre experience for Nimbalkar, who led a group of commandos called Ghatak (deadly). Through a crack in a rock, he could see eye to eye and even talk to the enemy. “Come up sir, we have no weapons and you can take your officer’s body,” Nimbalkar recalled one of the intruders taunting him to recover Adhikari’s body. Nimbalkar cracked then. “I have come to collect your body as well,” he shouted back in impotent rage. As the casualities mounted repaidly and the army realised it hadn’t made much headway the brass changed tactics. There was no point just blindly dispatching companies in the hope that they would be able to evict the intruders who had by then taken up vantage poistions on key heghts and spread themselves as a senior officer described “like cicken pox”. So they went in for what in military parlance is called a “tactical pause’. They told the government they needed at least two to three weeks to not only bring additional troops into the area but also to stock up their arms and ammunition. Five additional brigades were brought in and clothing and equipment rushed from all over the country. The army also decided that instead of going after the intruders in all the sectors, it would first concentrate on freeing the Srinagar-Lah highway from any threat. Securing the highway was possible only by neutralising the infiltrators occupying the heights over Drass: they were lodged a mere 4 km away from the highway at Tololing and 8 km away at Tiger Hill. To achieve this, a three-pronged strategy was devised: To stop any further ingress, get troops to encircle these points from as many sides as possible. Use air power to demoralise infiltrators and inflict damage to bunkers and tents occupied by them. Soften the area being occupied by the intruders and press ground troops into action for a hand-to-hand combat to finish them or push them back. The toll continued to be high: close to 400 Indians soldiers died in the war and around 500 seriously injured. But there was a significant difference. A month ago, the soldiers carrying the stretchers looked a demoralised lot as the enemy seemed to hold the advantage. But now, they are swearing revenge. “We’ll go back and kill the b…,” said one his face flushed with anger, in Drass. Most of the injured were similarly charged. “I killed three of them and would have stayed on but sir ordered me to evacuate,” said one. Just a month ago, the large-scale intrusion had caught the Indian Army ill-equipped to handle the crisis. One example: A majority of the Indian troops stationed at Drass and Kargil did not have extreme cold-climate clothing or bullet-proof jackets. They had outdated communication sets that were a burden to lug around. It came home more vividly when the Indian Air Force(IAF) was called in to assist and lost three aircraft within three days of air operation. Days later, the intruders’ post would be annihilated, Adhikari’s body removed, Nimbalkar’s rage assuaged. The fightback started on June 2 with “Sir, we will meet you at Tololing” On the night of June 2, the Grenadiers led their fourth bloody assault against the intruders before the army brass decided enough was enough. The Indian Army was losing men: the expected “softening” of enemy positions by blasting them with artillery and mortar fire appeared only to harden the resolve of the well-fortified, Pakistani regulars with a sprinkling of do-or-die mujahideen. Every move against Tololing was being met with deadly covering cross-fire from adjacent heights where the intruders were entrenched. Recapturing Tololing became the current priority in the Kargil war. Attack on Tololing preceeded with Pre H-hour firing which included IAF strikes and heavy Artilley and mortar shelling. Heavy artillery and mortar shelling was resorted to by Indian troops to isolate the positions of the infiltrators as the air strikes successfully engaged the targets intensified by the ground forces. The Tololing peaks were also simultaneously shelled from Dras in the east, Mataan in the south-west and Thasgam in the north-east. Almost 12,000 shells were ired by the Indian troops during the long battle to recapture the Tololing Hills. This resulted in the intruders fleeing from their bunkers or getting killed in their pickets, especially after being pounded by IAF jets and then bombarded by artillery guns. The main thrust of attacks was to debilitate them on the hill-tops, blast off their cover and communication set-up and then launch an infantry attack. Indian Air Force (IAF), despite the skies being partly cloudy, carried out air strikes in the Dras sector. The IAF had carried out the first attacks in this region since May 26. Till June 12 the area was targeted by Indian jet softening targets after which the Indian troops started advancing. It was during operations in this region that India had lost an MI-17 helicopter. An IAF spokesman confirmed the crashing of a Pakistani helicopter in Skardu in which a Brigadier, some other officers and men were killed. The concern brought Tipnis to the Kargil theatre on June 16. After an aerial survey, the Air Chief strongly hinted that the air force was functioning under severe constraints. "The government wants to ensure there is no escalation. The implications of restricted use of air power were made clear to it." Meanwhile, Pakistan continued shelling from almost all along the Line of Control extended from Kanzalwan, Keran, Tangdhar, Poonch, Krishanaghati, Bhimbargali and Naushera.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn3" target="_blank">[3]</a> For the next nine days, the army bolstered its artillery fire-power by bringing in more than eight batteries (each with six Bofors howitzers and medium-sized guns). Fresh assault plans and logistics were worked out. The 18 Grenadiers were asked to hold on to three positions on different ridge-lines they had retreated to, and provide a “fire base” to soldiers of a battalion of the relatively fresh 2 Rajputana Rifles now assigned the task of regaining the Tololing Top. The assault was to be launched from the firm foothold that the Grenadiers had established on slopes of three ridges about 300m below the enemy’s positions. Meanwhile, the hard lessons learnt by the Grenadiers were being absorbed by the “Rajputana Rifles”. For a week before the final assault on June 12, the battalion conducted mock operations on a nearby ridge similar to Tololing. They chalked out their assault strategies on a sand and stone model they had designed after reconnaissance of the Tololing heights from different directions. The weapons and ammunition were test fired, an exercise that eliminated a defective lot of hand grenades that had been affected by long storage. Heavy ammunition was physically carried up the slopes below Tololing by even the washermen, cobblers and barbers of the battalion-it takes four people to support one soldier in this battlefield. “We were primed for the attack,” said Lt Parveen Tomar, 23, commissioned just five months before. Tomar was in a determined company. This was a team of about 90 volunteers hand-picked by Colonel Ravindranath. Among them were some of the battalion’s sportsmen, mostly athletes. Recalled Ravindranath: “They told me, ‘We want to prove that we are not good just in peace time but also in war.’” On June 11, letters were written and left behind with friends to post in case some didn’t return. By 8 p.m. on June 12, the Rajputana Rifles' assault team was ready behind big boulders just 300 m short of their target. Shortly before the charge. Ravindranath gave a final pep talk to his men. “I have given you what you wanted. Now, you have to give me what I want.” The men were so charged that a JCO Bhanwer Singh interjected to say, “Sir, come to the Tololing Top in the morning. We will meet you there.” A frontal attack was the only option. But unlike earlier attempts, this one was well prepared. For more than four hours before the attack, as many as 120 artillery guns pounded the Tololing ridges incessantly, firing at least 10,000 shells-50,000 kg of TNT, enough to pulverise most of New Delhi-at the intruders’ fortified positions to soften them up. “It was like a Diwali we had never seen before,” recalled a Rajputana Rifles officer. One ridge line near Tololing Top was so heavily bombarded that it was christened “Barbaad Bunker” by the troops. Meanwhile, there was another kind of preparation. As the teams, designated “Abhimanyu”, “Bheem” and “Arjun” after characters from the Mahabharata, were climbing up, Lt. Vijayant, another Rajputana officer, was playing songs from the Hindi movie Border on his Walkman to pep up his platoon. As soon as the artillery fire died down, the assault team charged quickly. One went straight up. Another went around a lower ridge to cut off the enemy’s retreat. A platoon of Grenadiers had meanwhile positioned itself to provide covering fire and prevent intruders on nearby ridges from coming to the aid of their shell-shocked confederates on Tololing. Indian troops used the craters made by the shelling for cover as they inched up the slopes one hand-hold at a time, digging bayonets for leverage, firing as they climbed. By midnight, it was still progressing slowly, as Pakistani machine gunfire streamed incessantly. That’s when a reserve platoon led by Major Gupta attacked from the rear and closed in on the Top. In the hand-to-hand battle with intruders, Gupta and six others were killed. Bhanwer Singh, the eager JCO who had extended the invitation to Colonel Ravindranath, was among the dead. But the Top belonged once again to India. The war zone was littered with bodies-among them 50 intruders and Pakistan army regulars from the Northern Light Infantry. Dug in for a long war, the dead and escaping intruders had left behind ghee, tinned pineapple, butter packed in a military farm, and plenty of honey. Solders of the ration-starved Rajputana Rifles assault team used the ghee to keep themselves warm during the night when temperatures dipped to minus 10 degrees centrigrades. Next morning, breakfast consisted of chunks of butter dipped in honey. “We really enjoyed that,” says Major Sanjeed Bajan. Indian soldiers in Dras have by now got used to interruptions in radio messages. These were frequency intercepts by the Pakistani Army. They cut in with sophisticated electronic jammers to blank out radio sets. Sometimes, mujahideen and Pakistani soldiers shouted curses and war cries. At 4.10 a.m. on June 13, there was no such problem when Colonel M.B. Ravindranath, Commanding Officer of the 2 Rajputana Rifles, radioed the commander of the 8 Mountain Division Major-General Mohinder Puri, camping some 20 km away. It was a simple, terse message :”Sir, I’m on Tololing Top.” Minutes earlier, his troops had recaptured the key ridge in the Drass Sector after a fierce, night-long hand-to-hand battle. One officer, two JCOs and seven jawans lay dead before him on a moonscape of tortured rock that often tilted at 80 degrees, where cover is a prayer and ammunition a combination of bayonet, bare hands and bravery. Later that day, Ravindranath would weep in his tent as he counted the price of gaining a height that has probably changed the course of the Kargil war. This is the place that claimed Major Rajesh Adhikari, Captain Vivek Gupta and Lt-Colonel G. Viswanathan, the place that has accounted for more than half the dead in this war. In return, the heights above Dras valley were free from intruders and a critical section of the 510-km long Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway was safe. “Tololing being bang on the road, it choked our throats,” said a field commander. “That pressure is now off.” The victory earned Ravindranath and his men a rare, direct and immediate “well-done” from Army Chief V.P.Malik. Numerous decorations later followed which included Once Tololing fell, the enemy’s resistance on other nearby ridges faded. By June 13 morning, the Rajputana Rifles had recaptured “Barbaad Bunker” about 100m south west of Tololing and Point 4590. By June 14, the Hump was taken by the Granadiers. In the next three days, all points in nearby ridges were back in Indian hands. The morale of the troops was up. A cheer went up when the war-weary jawans returned from the Tololing heights in Dras with tidings that they had a firm foothold on a ridge which had been eating up the men. Once Tololing was taken, it took just six days for Indian Troops to notch up a string of successes by evicting well-entrenched intruders on four nearby outposts with names that had become the talking point of {censored}tail circuits and village gatherings- Point 4590, Rocky Knob, Hump and point 5140. It later lead to the recapture of a similarly strategic height of Tiger Hill. On June 16, two days after Point 4590 was taken, shells landed on the army's Brigade Headquarters at Matayen, forcing it to move further down towards Meenamarg. Pt 4590 After Tololing next feature close to LoC and affecting the road Srinagar-Leh was Pt 4590 on the same heights as Tololing. It was regained on 13 June but after losing an officer, a JCO and 18 men. It was a critical point from where Pakistan had been targeting the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway. The recapture also meant that the army was making advances into the enemy camp and had reached a stage where it could take on the invaders in hand-to-hand combat. "Exchange of small-arms fire is on in more than a dozen places now," said Major-General P.P.S. Bindra, MGGS, Northern Command. Subedar Chander Bhan, Subedar Karan Singh and Subedar Man Singh, who led the charge of their platoons up these features, said that those on the top of the hills were regular Army men. “They were certainly not militants. We have observed militants behaviour in CI Operations. They would fire a couple of shots and then run away.” But at Tololing, Point 4590 and Point 5149, things were different. “We are trained soldiers. We can easily identify the kind of resistance the enemy is putting up. The way they fought, the manner in which they coordinated their fire theway they counter-attacke This all shows that they were trained soldiers of a regular army. And they are highly motivated. They fought to the last.” Lieut Parveen Tomar who, along with Captain Bajaj, led the assault on Tololing in which Maj Vivek Gupta was among those killed, described the hand-to-hand combat which preceded the capture of the feature. "I was with the leading platoon. One section was behind me and the other section was on my right. When my section was about to reach the objective, hardly 5 metres away, the enemy opened fire. In the first burst of fire, three of our chaps got hit. Maj Vivek Gupta told me to get from one side while he himself would go from the front. Major Gupta charged the bunker from the front but was hit. In the meantime, I came from the right side and took the objective. “They fought hard because they knew it was an important feature which, if recaptured by us, would make National Highway 1 A safe in the Dras Sector.” Col Khushal Thakur and Lieut-Col M.B. Ravindernath, who were in charge of the assaults on these features, said the battle was bloody. "While the enemy was entrenched in bunkers on the top, we had to climb inch by inch taking shelter behind big boulders and rocks.” The arms and ammunition recoverd included two assault reifles five universal machine guns, two spare barrels, eight belt foxesof the UMG, two Chinese rifles, a rocket propelled grenade and a radio set. Brig Amar Aul, in charge of the Army operations in the Dras Sector, said, "There was no doubt that the enemy operating in the area are regular Pakistani army soldiers. “We have not come across any trace of mercenaries or the Taliban here.” On June 20, Defence sources clarified that five main posts were recaptured in Tololing and Dras Sub-sectors. Two key posts in the Batalik sub-sector were also recaptured after fierce fighting and Indian troops were close to Point 5140. Twenty three Pakistani army regulars were killed as the mopping up operations were under way around Point 5140 or the Barbad post in the Dras sector. Two sangars (field fortifications) of the Pakistani army regulars were also destroyed during the operation at Point 5203 in the Batalik sector. Point 5140 After Tololing & pt 4590, next important feature in Dras sector was Pt 5140. Having faced reverses in Tololing and being pushed out of the region, the Pakistani army targeted Indian soldiers advancing to Point 5140 with heavy artillery and mortar firing to inflict casualities. The recapture of Pt 5140 was crucial for further operations The Point was held by over a ‘company strength’ of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry, which necessitated the simultaneous attacks along multiple approaches. With the recovery of pay book from a Pakistani soldier, it was established the presence of Pakistani soldiers belonging to sub-units 3, 4 & 5 of the Northern Light Infantry in the Dras, Kargil-Batalik battle grounds. Garhwal Rifles, J&K Rifles and Naga Regiments were tasked to recaptrure Pt 5140. The IAF fightes straffed the localities for three days. The entire ridge including the area around Point 5140 had been softened by air operations that targeted the enemy continuously from 26 May to 12 June. Air Force was closely co-ordinating with the Army in their operations and the Air Force was quite satisfied that the loss of Mi-17 Helicopter in this area on 28 May, has not been in vain. An IAF spokeman said that Air Force had been carrying out operations in this sector intermittently from 26 May to 12 June then allowing the Army to move in.dets. In the last three days it had smashed intruders' stronghold in Munthodalo, Dras and the Mushkoh valley. Heavy artillery and mortar fire consolidated positions on Point 5140. Adverse weather conditions prevailing in Srinagar and the area ahead of it hampered air strikes for the third day running and the Indian Air Force did not carry out any air strikes on the pockets of intrusion. The degree of difficulty involved in executing the offensive manoeuvres can be seen in the time taken to regain it. In this operation a large number of casualties of the enemy were inflicted although there was no exact detail of numbers. India lost three jawans in the operations and nine others were wounded. Indian troops advanced towards the highest feature at a height of 5,140 m on Tololing and towards the nearby Tiger Hill. However, the detailed map at the Operations Room in the 15 Corps office in Srinagar from where the battle was being coordinated also showed that while some progress had been made, there was still a long way to go. As Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis said in Srinagar, "The pace is slow because the terrain is difficult. Recapturing bases will take time." It had taken the Indian Army about a month to recapture the three hill features. “It has been a hard grind for the Army”, said Brigadier Aul, "The terrain is difficult. When we started our operations almost a month back, there was snow on the ridge line. The going was extremely difficult. The environment isunfavourable. People have to be acclimatised for these kind of operations which extend from 10,000 feet to almost 17,000 feet. In addition, we have to equip troops with special clothing. Build-up of rations and ammunition also takes time. That is the reason why these operationstake such a long time. The capture of Point 5140 came almost 21 days after the recapture of Tololing hill on June 29, took away the infiltrators advantage of sitting atop National Highway 1A. This point is the closest to the national highway and the infiltrators had been interfering with the movement of the convoys along it. The Indian troops gained full control of it and were soon completely entrenched. The capturing of Point 5140 helped Indian troops target Tiger Hill better and reduce casualties. Mopping up operations continued at Point 5140, which was about 800 to 900 m from the Line of Control (LoC) as the crow flies. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn4" target="_blank">[4]</a> The ferocity of the Tololing battle is a sure-fire indicator of how army commanders grossly miscalculated the strength and sustaining power of the intruders,<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn5" target="_blank">[5]</a> the bravery, loyality, dedication of the Indian soldiers and leadership qualities specially the commitment of the leaders at junior level. The casualties among the Indian soldiers rose sharply upto 144 men killed, the eviction of infiltrators from the Tololing ridges had given a strategic impetus to the Army operations in the region. The Army came very close to Tiger Hill and the Line of Control and concentrated on advances in this region. Despite the coordinated army and air operations, precision air strikes were difficult because the infiltrators were spread like "chicken pox". Fresh locations kept cropping up. Though intercepts indicated that the invaders were running short of supplies at a few places, yet they were going strong. This could be gauged from the accuracy of enemy artillery fire in a battle in which the Indian toll stood at 106 killed, 242 wounded. Pakistan army continued to shell ‘point 5140, the heigh feature on the Tololing hill which was recaptured by Indian troops on Saturday The Indian troops atop ‘point 5140’ were retaliating adequately and effectively to Pakistani shelling, they added. Army sources said 340 Pakistani army regulars had so far been killed in the Kargil operations India lost 165 armymen while 323 were injured. The intruders had more information about Indian developments. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's itinerary on June 12 was well known to them despite of utmost secrecy as five shells hit Baru village -- 4 kms from Kargil town -- where Vajpayee was scheduled to meet migrants. He was forced to remain at the helipad as security reasons did not permit him to go to Matayen in the Dras sub-sector where shells landed on the officers' mess killing the mess havaldar. By Jun 19 India had a full control of Tololing. To capture Tololing, Indian Army continued its incremental advance. Four improvised bunkers of the intruders were destroyed and three Universal Machine Guns with ammunitions were recovered in the Tololing area. Army advanced further at Humridge line and pushed back the enemy by four kilometers. Tololing returned to Indian control. Fierce fighting went on at Point 5140 to reclaim Tiger Hill. There were 800 to 900 intruders in the Area. 350 intruders were expected killed. By June 21, Indian troops were able to recapture the entire strategic Tololing Hills situated almost at the height of almost 17,000 ft, following a 10-hour fierce close hand-to-hand combat with infiltrators. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Army spokesman, Col Bikram Singh of the DGMO, said in the operations, the Indian troops had also recovered a large number of arms and ammunition. Among the arms and ammunition recovered were five universal machineguns (UMG), four AK-56 and other rifles, a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher, 11 RPG rockets, eight boxes of UMG ammunition belts, spare UMG barrels and an ANPRC radio set with booster. The latest Indian casualties were 149 killed, 297 wounded and nine missing in action. Unlike India, which was aware of a measured approach, Pakistan had not only openly admitted to its troops' involvement in the Kargil battle but was even being bold enough to violate Indian air space. In second week of June, a Pakistani helicopter intruded into Indian air space over Drass. "Their helicopters are operating clandestinely," admitted Tipnis. Heightened air and artillery activity saw the navy and the air force went on full alert. "Pakistan has made deployments on tactical locations. They are preparing for action and it is imperative for the Indian Navy to prepare itself to prevent any surprises at sea," said Naval Chief Sushil Kumar. The moving in of artillery and armoured brigades by Pakistan along the Line of Control, while aimed at engaging India in more than just the Kargil sector, also led to widespread panic and civilian dislocation. "Repeated announcements by Pakistani authorities from mosques close to the border asking civilians to move out has spread panic," said A.S. Aulakh, IG, BSF. War phobia was whipped up in nearly 200 villages along the 544-km long Indo-Pak border in Punjab from where civilians started fleeing despite appeals. Further down in Rajasthan, the army moved to forward bases and is now advising villagers to dig bunkers. "Their strategy is to try and thin our forces but we will not rest till our territory is vacated," said Bindra. Battle was still half way. Pt 5140 was a major victory when the Army re-established its control over the highest feature on the ridge Point 5140 after fierce fighting by these battalions. With this victory the entire Tololing ridge in the Dras Sector were cleared of enemy positions overlooking the national highway connecting Srinagar to Leh in the Dras sub-sector. Mopping up operations was going on at Point barely 800 to 900 metres away from the Line of Control. Pakistani firing was reported along the Line of Control in Uri, Poonch, Bhimbergali and Naushera Sectors. Heavy fighting continued in the sub-sectors of Dras, Kaksar and Batalik. Pakistan continued to use mortar and artillery fire in Keren, Krishna Ghati and Naushera. Pakistan used its drones for receonnaisance which were sited along LoC. In the operation to recapture Point 5140 or the Barbad post, initial assessment by the Army had pointed to the killing of at least 13 Pakistani army regulars taking the total count to 336 Pakistani army regulars killed since the beginning of the operations. Soldier who took part in the operations to recapture these hill features said that the intruders atop the mountains were dressed in tracksuits or Pathan suits. Not many carried document. But a few documents found from the bodies of infiltrators at the three recaptured hill features blew the lid off the elaborate Pakistan’s deception plan. It was clear that men of Pakistan’s North Light Infantry were operatiing from these ridges. Among the 13 intruders killed at Point 5140 on Sunday was the body of Subedar Sayyed Mohammad Shah of 6 NLI, a resident of Skardu. He was the first Pakistani junior commissioned officer (JCO) to be killed on this side of the LoC by the Indian Army. Pt 5140, Being the highest feature along the Tololing ridge, the positioning of Indian troops on it had brought them at the same level with infiltrators holed up on Tiger Hill, the next feature in the region. It had also brought the Indian troops to within a kilometre of the Line of Control in the Dras sector. Pakistani troops resorted to unprovoked artillery firing in Machil and Gurez sectors of North Kashmir forcing several people to flee the area, official sources said. People from several border villages migrated to safer places following heavy Pakistani shelling. “The only challenge now is the Tiger Hill. There is no other feature in the Dras where the enemy is dominating us now. Our troops are fully acclimatised now. We are ready to face the challenge and I am sure that in a few days time, you will hear the Tiger hill is with us. The enemy strength sitting atop the hill is about 40-50. He cannot stay there for long.”<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn6" target="_blank">[6]</a> Said Brig Aul. But this was however not true. At least one Pakistani position on the western face of Tiger Hill remained intact until the withdrawal. Significant reinforcements of irregulars were found until July 8 on this feature.There had been concerted counterattacks with regular NLI troops on Pt. 5100 and Pt. 4,875 from this feature. Bodies of Major Iqbal and Captain Imtiaz Malik of the 12 Northern Light Infsantry and Captain Karnal Sher of the 165 Mortar regiment were recovered from these hills.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn7" target="_blank">[7]</a> Pakistan Army involvement proved The seizure of the ANPRC Radio which is used only by Pakistani regulars was a clear proof of direct involvement of Pakistani troops in the intrusion. In three days Pakistan lost 21 personnel including an officer. Brig AK Chopra told newsmen in Srinagar that the dead Pakistani officer and soldiers belonged to 6 North Light Infantry. The body of a Pakistani soldier identified as Nk Mohammed Noor was also recovered from Tololing. While pointing out that only Pakistani army regulars were fighting the Indian troops and that the mercenaries were actually involved in just providing the logistic support to them, the Army spokesman said that a radio set was not to be found with the militants or the mercenaries who generally use the Citizenband wireless sets. The army spokesman said there had been a distinct change in the enemy tactics in which Pakistani army regulars were holding positions in sangars and were using trained mercenaries as porters to ensure supplies. He said an estimated 700 Pakistani army regulars were still holding positions in the Kargil region and about 200 mercenaries were being used as porters to provide the logistical support. He pointed that a large number of Pak regulars were entrenched in echelons of the heights and came down to make up the number as and when Pak regulars were killed. The Army also recovered more documents of Pakistani army regulars including a pay book of a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO). He has been identified as Sayyed Mohd Shah of the 6 Northern Light Infantry. Pakistan continued its unprovoked artillery and mortar firing in Uri, Rampur, Poonch, Bhimbergali, Naushera and Palanwala sectors, to which Indian troops were responding “adequately and appropriatedly”.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn8" target="_blank">[8]</a> Pakistan Army Chief Gen Parvez Musharaf confessed before tribals of the Bajour agency (NWFP) on Sep 9, 1999, that his troops had captured 500 sq.km of Indian territory across the LoC but in the greater interest of the country, the armed forces were withdrawn from Kargil. He boasted of Pakistani victory over 10 times more organised and equipped forces of India in Kargil.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn9" target="_blank">[9]</a> Tiger Hill Tiger Hill is a strategic position very close to the LoC. The Enemy was holding Tiger Hill complex comprising of Tiger Hill Top, Eastern slope, Western Slope, India Gate, Helmet, Rocky Knob and Rhino Horn in large strength and was well fortified. Srinagar-Leh road could be directly targetted from theses features and their occupation had held up movement of convoys. These positions were occupied by a few mujaideens as per the initial information and by a strong contingent of regular troops of NLI and SSG as was found out after its capture. The infiltrators in Tiger Hill were getting immense logistic support from across the border, allowing them to put up a strong resistance. Evacuation of enemy from these positions was essential to restore safe movement on Srinagar-Leh highway. The army brass had learnt a lot of lessons from the first big success- the capture of Tololing and its key heights Point 4590 and Point 5140 between June 12 and 18. The most important one was: size up the enemy before launching ground troops and take him on from a place where he is least expecting you. This is what was done before the assault on Tiger Hill began. Troops encircled Tiger Hill from three sides before the final assault for the top.(See box) The two victories have had a major psychological impact on the battlefront. As Brigadier Arun Aul, brigade commander, 56 Brigade (in charge of Drass) put it, “There are signs of panic among the Pakistanis. They are beginning to creak now because they are being hit very hard.” A change of strategy by the IAF also helped in the recapture of Tiger Hill and important locations in Jubar in Batalik. The success of air strikes till then had at best been average. Not surprising, since there were complusions not to cross the Line of Control (LoC) and fly not less than 9 km above enemy positions lest the aircraft be targeted by surface-to-air missiles (SAMS). The strategy was then revised. Nocturnal air raids were carried out to break the spirit of the intruders. And the more accurated but expensive laser-guided bombs (each costs Rs. 1 crore) were used to cut off enemy supply lines. Indian thrust in Tololing had destroyed the troublesome Barbad post. With the fall of Barbad Post the Tiger Hill area became vulnerable and the battle for Tiger Hill intensified. About 80 -100 infiltrators could still target the Srinagar-Leh highway from Tiger Hill. The army had inducted para commandos to seal the southern side of the hill which was within reach of ground troops from other sides. No troops were immediate available to clear the position hence the 8 Sikh battallion which was busy in CI operations, was inducted into the battlefield on 15 May. It was tasked to clear a few mujahideens perched on Tiger Hill. With this information, it isolated the Tiger Hill by 21st May ’99 from three directions. As the assault began in the shape of an initial probing action along the Southern approach, intense fire, both direct and indirect, was opened by the enemy. The information given was scanty and wrong Notwithstanding the lack of information and inadequate warning period coupled with inadquate resources like high altitude equipment, shortage of clothing and controlled stores did not deter the bravadoes of 8 Sikh to flush out the enemy from Indian soil in a a befitting manner. During the capture of Tiger Hill, the unit commanded by CO. S.P.Singh amply demonstrated the leadership traits in accomplishment of the mission in the rigours of weather and rugged terrain at an altitude ranging from 13500 feet to 16000 feet. Subedar Joginder Singh was tasked to gain a foothold at the base of Western Spur leading to the top. Undeterred by the intense, direct and aimed fire of the enemy, Subedar Joginder Singh and his platoon continued its march forward and successfully reached the base of the spur. Subedar Joginder Singh, who alongwith Lance Naik Ranjit Singh spearheaded the retaliatory fire, made the supreme sacrifice. The crucial foothhold gained by the Subedar proved critical in the ultimate capture of the Tiger Hill later. The commanders having realised their weakness in assessing the enemy strength, asked the Battalion to maintain the foothold, contain the enemy and gain maximum information about the enemy so that the Tiger Hill could first be isolated and then assaulted. This was achieved by 8 Sikh by May 21 after dare-devil actions by Sepoys Rashwinder Singh, Sukhwinder Singh and Jaswinder Singh in occupying key heights to neutralise enemy fire. In utter disregard to their personal safety, these gallant men succeeded in occupying key positions. The strength of enemy and its fortifications was so srong that additional battalions were needed to capture the features. However, the other battalions not immediately available and whatever were the reinforcements, were acclimatising. Between May 31 and July 2, the men and officers of this battalion continued to cause heavy damage to the enemy by both direct and indirect fire and continued their progress forward so as to close in on the enemy. Each night, they would burrow through the snow, create a crawl trench and set up a new post—moving towards the peak slowly but steadily. Unmindful of the extremely harsh weather conditions, with rain, sleet and snow coming upon them along with the enemy fire everyday, the brave soldiers dared their enemy to show up and get ready for their final “kalma”. A number of casualties were inflicted. The wins started a fortnight ago with the army recapturing the key Tololing peak and the surrounding ridges that overlooked the vital Leh-Srinagar highway. By last week, the Indian Army had taken back vantage points on Tiger Hill close by. And for the first time since the war began in May, the highway was re-opened to civilian traffic. It was an indication of just how successful the army has been in thwartling one of the Pakistan’s main objective of paralysing the lifeline between the state capital and the major distict headquarters. In a major offensive, Indian troops re-captured Point 4700 and Black Rock heights close to the strategic Tiger Hills in Drass-Mushkoh sector, killing 40 Pakistani soldiers but suffered 21 casualties, including three officers. A report from Dras, quoting Col A S Chabbewal, said the troops engaged in hand-to-hand combat with Pakistani intruders advanced within two kilometres of the Line of Control and the fighting was still on. Briefing newspapers, an Army spokesman said the attacks on the enemy positions, west of the Tololing ridge, recaptured on June 20, were launched on Monday night. He said the recapture of these two positions would remove the domination of the intruders on the crucial NH 1A linking Srinagar with Leh, besides providing a firm base to further operations aimed at evicting the infiltrators. “Softening up of other enemy positions both in Batalik and Drass sectors are continuing,” he said, adding that a Pakistani column comprising 15 personnel alongwith 30 mules had been effectively engged by artillery guns on Monday. This has precluded the enemy possitions from getting replenishments in the Drass sector,” he said. An Indian Air Force spokesman said combat jets carried out effective strikes in Drass and Batalik sectors on Monday night. Indian Air Force launced an attack on Tiger Hill with Mirage-2000 paving the way for the complete eviction of intruders in Dras. Now, the entire highway between Srinagar & Dras across Zoji La Pass would be secured. Intruders had occupied Tiger Hill area and the entire Tololing Ridge. The Mirage-2000 planes used laser Guided Bombs against two key posts of Tiger Hill and 500 pound bombs were also dropped during the strike in Tololing Ridge Area. At least 15 intruders were killed in the Tiger Hill area and their makeshift bunkers and other related infrustructures were demilished. Ealier, around 60 people were occupying the area. The Barbad Post was offiering resistance on route to Tiger Hill was cleared. The IAF spokesman said, “It has been confirmed by the Army units in the field that air strikes by night against targets in Batalik sector were extremely effective.” He said,“The bottomline remainstarget acquisition, as the targets are very difficult to spot. In all cases where the targets have been spotted, a high rate of success has always resulted, irrespective of theaircraft orweapon used.” Meanwhile, the cabinet committee on security meet here under he chairmanship of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and reviewed the situation in Kargil. An Army spokesman said the Pakistan army continued unprovoked artillery and mortar firing in Keran, Poonch, Krishanghati, Bhimbergalli, Nowshera, Palanwala and Akhnoor sectors. “We have responded in a befitting manner,” he said. To a question on the recent operations in southern Siachen glacier, he said the situation there is “absolutely stable” and asserted that Chorbat La in Turtuk sector had never been captured by Pakistani forces.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn10" target="_blank">[10]</a> As the Indian Air Force (IAF) continued with its round-the-clock strikes at the infiltrators poisitions, Indian troops after a fierce fighting, on June 29 recaptured the Army recaptured Point-4070, called Phialong and "Black rock" close to strategic Tiger Hill, With these occupations eventually, the capture of Tiger Hill will be easy. The Indian troops launched an all out attack at the enemy positions late night on 28-29 Jun night and captured these in an overnight attack. In the close hand-to-had battle with the infiltrators heavy casualties had been inflicted on them. In this battle, 21 soldiers were killed, while 40 Pakistani troops were killed in the assault. The Indian Army soldiers were killed by an "air-burst" of an artillery shell while the assault was in progress. Before take over, air and artillery strikes were made to soften the target for the advancing troops. The Indian troops also wiped out another animal transport column of the enemy ensring that their supplies were cut off. At least 15 enemy personnel were said to have been killed in this attack. Col Singh said there were 30 mules and 15 personnel in this column. A similar animal column had been effectively engaged by the artillery guns a few days ago. He said although the column may sound small but even 30 mules could carry a significant weight of arms and armunition in this region. Regarding the infiltration in the South Siachen area, he said the Pakistanis had made similar moves in Rajouri area in May which had been repulsed.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn11" target="_blank">[11]</a> By June 99, Army lost 175 men, 364 wounded while nine were missing. From the Pakistan side, 389 soldiers and 123 militants had killed while 50 soldiers were missing. Pakistani intruders were still getting reinforcements from depth areas across the Line of Control. With the capture of these two features, the Army recovered heavy weapons including 12.22 mm Machine guns. Security forces recovered huge {censored}nal of weapons from 25 subversives who infiltrated to internally destabilise the Turtuk and Achina Thieng areas of Ladakh. In combing operations, 11 AK rifles, one Machine Guns, One Rocket Launcher with three rockets, one Rifle 15 Grenades and 3000 rounds ammunitions besides 7 kg explosives were recovered. These insurgents were pushed on Indian side to create havoc of bombings, political assassination and civilian massacres. The IAF continued round-the-clock bombings on enemy strongholds in the Dras and Batalik Sectors. The Army confronted intruders on the Jubar Feature. The IAF spokesman said that operations were continuing in entire Kargil sector in co-ordiation with Army. Pakistani shelling continued on the fringes of the Line of Control. The enemy continued with unhooked artillery and mortar firing in Keran Sector and morter firing in Poonch, Krishnaghati, Bhimbergali, Naushera, Palanwala and Akhnoor Sectors. We responded in a befitting manner. In the last 24 hours, effective air strikes were carried out against enemy positions in the Dras and Batalik Sectors. It has been confirmed by the Army units in the field that airstikes by night against targets in the Batalik sector were extremely effective. The other positions that were attacked were in the Dras sector and Mashkoh valley. The bottom line remains target acquisition, as the targets are very difficult to spot. In all cases where the target has been spotted, a high success rate has always resulted, irrespective of the aircraft or the weapon used. In the Kupwara sector of the Kashmir Valley during counter-insurgency operations Lt. Col NV Raghavan was killed. According to army spokesperson the Army lost 82 soldiers and 201 were wounded. For the last one year 404 militants had been killed and 721 wounded. Pakistan had been continuously shelling across the Line of Control - Kanjalwan, Kupwara, Keran, Rampur, Poonch, Krishnaghati, naushera, Sundarbani and Palanwala. Meanwhile the Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes visited defence locations in Poonch, Rajouri, Jammu and Samba sectors and reviewed the situations along the Line of Control and the international border. June 25 : Assault on Tiger Hill Tiger Hill is a dreaded height that looks like a conical feature but actually has scores of spurs and ridges. It was proving lethal for the Indian Army. The army inducted para commandos to seal the southern side of the hill which came within reach of ground troops from other sides.15 km inside Indian 0territory. About 300 heavily-armed intruders pounded the vital Srinagar-Leh highway in order to cut off Ladakh. The Indian Air Force (IAF) mounted pressure and raided the Tiger Hill, while ground troops prepared themselves for a final assault on the peak. IAF dropped laser-guided bombs to hit targets from a distance of 20 km, from Mirage 2000 planes. This was mopping-up, "an operation to flush out the intruders from the remaining pockets of various stands". During the raid, MiG-29 planes kept a vigil against the likely possibility of the Pakistani counter strike. The air strikes were effective The infiltrators suffered heavy casualties in the raid. The desired results were not achieved however.This was because of the sheer steepness of the features and the strong fortifications and spread of the enemy. The intention of carrying out these attacks was to take advantage of certain meteorological conditions to increase the pressure on the enemy by wearing him out and denying him rest and the opportunity to recuperate. The effect of lack of sleep and the resulting pressure applied at random round the clock will soon become apparent in due course. These attacks, like all other operations, were in coordination with the Army. Meanwhile, ground troops began to take positions for a final assault along the main ridge line of the Tiger Hill. The occupation of the Tiger Hill was to secure the road between the Kashmir Valley via Zoji La pass and Dras in Ladakh. The intruders who had occupied Tiger Hill and Tololing heights were in a position to accurately direct artillery fire on vehicles on the road. Battle was also going on in Guttari, Shaqma along the Shingo river across Line of Control after clearing of the Dras ridges.. On 4th July, the Sikh Regiment was tasked to gain a foothold on the Western Spur of Tiger Hill with a view to cut off from the west, and provide firm base for its subsequent capture. Western spur extends approximately 1.5 to 2 Kms in length comprising of features Rhino Horn, Rocky Knob, Helmet and India Gate. The feature was heavily held by the enemy, and was totally dominated by Tiger Hill, Trig Height and Charlie features. The appproach was extremely steep with a gradient of 75-80 degrees and was under total enemy domination. It was not only a very formidable objective to capture, but even more difficult to hold with limited space available and enemy occupying the heights on both sides. The plan was to capture the India Gate and Helmet through western approach with surprise as the vital ingredient. Major Ravinder Singh and Lieutenant Sehrawat accompanied by four JCOs and 52 ORs took up the challenging assignment of capturing the Western Spur. It was on the night of July 4/5 that this group of gallant soldiers of 8 Sikh left amidst the war cries of Bole So Nihal to capture Rhino Horn, Rocky Knob, Helmet and India Gate. These positions had been heavily fortified and were dominated by the enemy from Tiger Hill on the east and Trig Heights on the west. The task was challenging as the approach was from a slope with a 75 to 80 degree gradient. For the marjivre Sikhs, the extremely bad weather and the steep gradient hardly mattered. Subedar Nirmal Singh, Naib Subedar Karnail Singh and Naib Subedar Ravail Singh established a firm base. Lieutenant RK Sehrawat was to coordinate the assault by three teams. By midnight, all he three teams were suitably poised for the capture of India Gate, Helmet and Rocky Knob. As the war cries of Bole So Niharl, Sat Siri Akal rent the air, the men got going and all hell broke loose. Intense enemy shelling and direct firing opened up. A “{censored} fight” ensued during which bunkers were cleared one after another. By 4 am, India Gate and Helmet had been captured. The assault party lost Lieutenant Kanad Bhattarcharya in a brave patrolling encounter. In all, 10 jawans were killed and 48 others were woulded. These casualties notwithstanding, they closed on and isolated Tiger Hill from three directions. It was imperative that the Western Spur was also captured to bottle up the intruders at Tiger Hill top. The attacking troops, in the meanwhile, had firmed up defences in an area 700 metres by 500 metres. Construction of protective sangars was immediately taken up. Apprehending a violent retaliations for repulsing any attack were made. In fact, two major attacks were repulsed in which Major Iqbal of SSG, and Capt Karnal Sher of 12 NLI were killed along with 30 others. Three JCOs- Sub Nirmal Singh, Karnail Singh and Naib Subedar Rawail Singh - and 18 ORs made the supreme sacriifice. The wounded included Major Ravinder Singh and Lieutenant Sherawat besides 18 ORs. The capture and defence of the Western Spur facilitated the caputre of Tiger Hill top on July 7. The unit lost a total of 35 men. About 70 were wounded- a high price. But by sheer grit of 8 Sikh won the day at Tiger Hill.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn12" target="_blank">[12]</a> Despite extreme climatic conditions, stiff opposition and heavy shelling, by the enemy, the brave Khalsas of 8 Sikh held ground until 3rd July “99, suffered 2 Officers and 11 ORs killed and one Officer, one JCO and 48 ORs wounded. Accordingly on neight 04/05 July, the Company under Major Ravindra Singh traversed the difficult terrain amidst enemy shelling and automatic fire to the base of the objective. The Company negotiated the steep slopes undetected with mountaineering skills. The Company established fire base behind a rock approximately 200 metres away from the objective. Three teams under three JCO’s namely Sub Nirmal Singh, Nb Sub Karnail Singh and Nb Sub Ravail Singh, under overall co-ordination of Lt. R.K.Sehrawat probed forward towards the objective. The enemy was totally surprised with the sudden assault of these teams on India Gate and Helmet area. The enemy opened up with UMG’s. Our teams retaliated with rocket launcher fire and forced the enemy to flee. India Gate and Helmet were captured at 0400 Hrs on 5th July and Tiger Hill was completely cut off. However due to heavy and accurate enemy fire, 8 Sikh troops cut off enemy telephone communication by snapping a carrier cord and WD cable running towards the top of Tiger Hill. They took up defences on the objective in an area of approx. 500 metres. Enemy was desperate to keep the western route of maintenance open for survival at Tiger Hill and mustered all its resources to recapture it. Heavy artillery shelling, RPG fire alongwith incessant automatic fire pounded on own troops with effect from 0400 hours on 06 July. Enemy launched counter attack at 0715 hours initially with about 20 personnel from Rocky Knob. Heavy and accurate fire from own troops dissipated the assault. It was followed by a desperate and firece country attack by about 40 to 45 personnel at approximately 0800 hours from two different directions. The gallant Sikhs, held on to the objective and repulsed the two counter attacks by 0930 hours inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. The enemy suffered more than 30 killed including two officers. They left behind the dead bodies of three soldiers including officers and fled. A large number of weapons, radio sets and ocuments were recovered from the dead bodies. The documents revealed that Major Iqbal, probably of SSG, and Captain Karnal Sher of 12 NLI were leading the counter attack and were killed. It also established that SSG men were also included in the operation. However, during this epic battle, three JCOs and 14 OR of 8 Sikh made the supreme sacrifice fighting the enemy. Two officers and 18 OR were wounded. Own casualties were mainly due to heavy enemy shelling including air bursts, and RPG and automatic fire from enemy. Firm bases were established on dominating positions at Tiger Hill, Rocky knob and Trig Height. It was their resolute defiance against all odds, exceptional devotion to duty which enthused them to hold on to the objective at this great cost. This gallant action and the great sacrifices of the Khalsas, paved the way for subsequent capture of Tiger Hill with little resistance from enemy on 07 July’ 99. It was indeed a saga of valour and sacrifice in the glorious tradition of SARAGARHI. On the launch pad prepared by the gallant 8 Sikh, jawans of the 18th Batallion, the Grenadiers, launched an attack late evening next day along three unexpected approaches to take the enemy, which had been holed up on Tiger Hill, by surprise. Colonel Khushal Thakur, Commanding Officer of the 18 Grenadiers, knew the assault on Tiger Hill was a daunting task. In early May, the 8 Sikh, on a mission to assess the enemy's strength, had returned with six dead, 40 injured and a lieutenant missing. Thakur, who had already lost 25 men at Tololing, had to find a way to minimise casualties. After studying maps and aerial photographs and a thorough recce of the target, he decided on the most difficult route -- the eastern slope. A sheer cliff that the intruders would have least expected the troops to climb. For three days beginning July 1, the Grinders (as the 18 Grenadiers are called) lugged arms and ammunition up the slopes -- flame throwers, high explosive bombs, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, lmgs and more. Such was the volume of their {censored}nal that it took 270 men just to carry 540 mortars of the 81 mm variety. By July 3 evening, it was time for action. Soon after sundown, 136 artillery guns started a 30-minute pounding of enemy positions. The objective: to stun the intruders and force them to lie low. At the same time three companies began their climb, two from the eastern slope and one from the south-eastern side. The relatively easy gradient on the south-eastern side brought the troops in front of an enemy bunker at a point called Tongue. The bunker was neutralised with rocket launchers, but the exchange left one soldier dead and four injured. The other two companies had to use mountaineering gear to inch their way up. By the time 10 of them made it to Tiger Top, they had lost five of their colleagues. After an 11-hour close hand to hand fierce battle, the soldiers from the Grenadiers ensured that the enemy was evicted from the Tiger Hill top, situated almost at a height of 5000 metres. Indian jawans hoisted the ‘Tricolour’ atop the strategic Tiger Hill in the wee hours of the following morning to give India the all important advantage in the battle against he Pakistani intruders holed up at various heights in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir. In their resolve to hoist the “Tricolour” on the strategic The 18 Grenadiers won a citation from the Chief of Army Staff for this exceptional gallant and sterling performance and for the recapture of Tololing on the night of May 27-28 and Point 4590 on June 28-29. During this overnight operation, reports said at least ten Pakistani army regulars had been killed in the battle. India is said to have lost two jawans. Though they had seized Tiger Top, both 8 Sikh and 18 Grenadiers realised the spurs and ridges were still flush with infiltrators putting up a stiff resistance, just as they were at Collar, India Gate and Helmet on the western slope. This was also the intruders' supply route, and had to be cut off. The attempt to do so at Helmet on July 7 left the 8 Sikh with 15 dead. It took over a month's planning to recapture one of the most strategic heights in Dras. Tiger Hill may have been tamed, but the clearing up operation around it proved to be a bloody exercise Meanwhile, having gained the strategic Tiger Hill top, the Indian troops were now engaged in mopping up operations in the region. The infiltrators were still holed in some pockets along the periphery of Tiger Hill. Although there were still some pockets in the other sectors from where the infiltrators could keep a watch on the movement along the National Highway 1A, but this strategic win ensured that the Indian troops could keep them under check in the other pockets. Tiger Hill Top being the highest and the most dominating feature in the region, placement of Indian troops and artillery guns on top ensured regular pounding of enemy positions. Following the Indian victory on the Tiger Hill Top, the area came under heavy artillery fire from Pakistani troops stationed in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir. But by afternoon the artillery shelling had stopped after Indian jawans responded with adequate firing. The Indian troops had now surrounded the Tiger Hill feature and adjoining ridges from three sides. The recapture of Tololing and Tiger Hill changed the course of the war. Tiger Hill for a while the Indian Army was like a limbering elephant at Kargil-slow to react and retaliate. But by July 8, at least to the Pakistani infiltrators, it must have resembled a juggernaut as it notched up several key victories in the battle for the heights. It was a major reason that forced Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to rush to Washington DC to seek a way out of the conflict. From there, the well-entrenched intruders were directing precise artillery fire on the Srinagar-Leh highway just 8 km away, restricting movement of army convoys carrying ammunition and supplies. Though the capture of Tiger Hill on July 4 came as a major victory for the army, the operation has so far left over 30 soldiers dead and another 65 woundedThe final preparations for attack started with air operations on Tiger Hill and other surrounding localities in Dras Sector. From left to Right (Top row) Sub Joginder Singh, Hav Surinder Singh, Nk Bahadur Singh, Nk Ranjeet Singh, Sep Jaswinder Singh (Bottom row) Sep Buta Singh, Sep Rashwinder Singh, Sep Sukhwinder Singh, Sep Major Singh and Sep Manjeet Singh The capture of the Tiger Hill feature along with the Tololing Hills took Indian troops closer to the LoC, with this lone conical feature being just about a kilometre away from it. It gave the Indian troops almost a complete control over the heights and movement of the infiltrators in the Dras sector. The control over the Tiger Hill Besides, with its slopes running down to the LoC and its ridges connecting other heights in the close vicinity of the Mashkoh valley and Kaksar, it provided a launching pad to carry out attacks on enemy positions in adjoining sub sectors in Kargil. The Indian troops were now in a position to block the supply routes to the infiltrators running across from the LoC in Mashkoh and the Kaksar sectors. From these heights, they were able to observe all movement from across the LoC and take adequate measures to stop it. Attack on Tiger Hill repulsed Pakistan did not relent. It lauched fierce counter attacks to recapture Tiger Hill. Pakistani intruders were seen moving towards Tiger Hill, backed by artillery shelling by Pakistani Artillery. The Army repulsed the attack. Army reinforcements were rushed to the area. Indian armed forces effectively repulsed a fresh attempt by Pakistani intruders to capture the strategic Tiger Hill in Dras even as troops exchanged artillery fire after a nine-day lull. The Indian Air Force also, rightly, took credit for the victory at Tiger Hill. It carried out some devastating air strikes on two enemy camps located on top of Tiger Hill which severely degraded the capability of the intruders to sustain their forces on the dominating hill feature. The Group Captain said, "Air strikes were carried out against a supply camp of the infiltrators in Kaksar area this afternoon, the first attack in the past two days. The Air Force once again devastated an enemy supply camp just 2.5 km west of Tiger Hill, Group Capt D.N. Ganesh, Joint Director of Air Operations, said at the briefing. He said one of key factors of air operations in the mountains was that the effect of relentless air strikes took time to manifest itself on the ground. “The fall of Tololing ridge was one such example when three weeks of coordinated air strikes and ground action resulted in the joint aim being accomplished with eviction of the enemy from the area. Today, with the fall of Tiger Hill this achievement underscores, once again, the essence of joint Army-Air Force operations”. He said the crippling effect of these attacks was apparent in the success achieved by the jawans on the ground who in the face of stiff restance by the enemy continued to achieve the objective.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn13" target="_blank">[13]</a> Junior Leadership-examples of extreme valour Late Havaldar Vikram Singh - Havildar Vikram Singh hailing from Ropar District in Punjab with his section was deployed on forward slope of Helmet on Tiger Hill. At 0400 hours on 06 July 99, they came under heavy enemy fire from Tiger Hill, Rocky knob, Charlie feature and Trig Height. Enemy opened fire from three directions and followed up with a counter attack with 15/16 Intruders on Havaldar Vikram Singh’s section. He readjusted aiutomatics and started engaging the enemy. Heavy hand to hand fight ensured between him and the enemy. Havaldar Vikram Singh and his men kept fighting with extreme bravery and courage. During the ensuing fire fight , Havaldar Vikram Singh got seriously wounded and his men inspired by his personal example continued fighting till counter attack was beaten back. The enemy launched second counter attack with 40/45 intruders, despite being seriously wounded, he charged with bayonet and killed two Intruders, inflicted heavy casualties in close combat and forced them to flee. He kept the enemy away till he succumbed to his fatal injuries. Havildar Vikram Singb by displaying indominatable spirit, courage and bravery, exceptional devotion to duty, thereby beat back enemy counter attack, making a supreme sacrifice of his life in the highest tradition of Army. Late Naik Nirmal Singh - Naik Nirmal Singh hailing from Sangur District (Punjab) alongwith his section was deployed on India Gate. At 0400 hours on 06 July 99, they came under heavy enemy fire from Tiger Hill, Rocky knob, Charlie Feature and Trig Height. Enemy launched a counter attack with 15/16 Intruders and intense fire fight ensued between naik Nirmal Singh ‘and the intruders. In the process, Naik Nirmal Singh got seriously wounded. With utter disregard to personal safety, he kept on firing incessantly inflicting heavy casualties on enemy. He effectively engaged, confronted enemy boldly and finally repulsed counter attack. Enemy launched second counter attack with 40/45 intruders. Despite being seriously wounded in previous counter attack, he kept engaging the enemy and inflicted heavy casualties, thereby forcing enemy to flee. Naik Nirmal Singh in the face of enemy fire and counter attack, held on to this post till he succumnbed to his fatal injuries. Naik Nirmal Singh displayed indominatable spirit, most conspicuous courage and bravery, exceptional devotion to duty, thereby beat back enemy counter attack, making the supreme sacrifice of his life in the highest tradition of the Army. On night 6/7 July 1999, during an attack on twin bumps of Point 4875, Captain Jerry Prem Raj was forward Observation Post Officer of 158 Medium Regiment (SP). Point 4875 and surounding features were pounded with tonnes of TNT by the blazing artillery fire on 6/7 July night. As the attack went in the heavy mmg fire from the top ridges held the advancing Nagas. The day light was drawing near. The expose of the troops during day light would have created havoc from the enemy sitting right at the top. From the protecting rock Jerry was not able to observe. He came out of the protection for directing observed fire better. That was what the enemy was waiting for. A round of a sniper's bullet hit Jerry's chest. Bleeding profusely, he refused to be evacuated and continued passing orders through his operators directing fire onto the enemy. He continued engaging enemy by shifting positions, but the enemy had an eye on him. A mchine gun burst pierced through his legs and arms. Gravely injured, he still refused to be evacuated, knowing that these were very crucial minutes of the final assault. His fire directing continued till he breathed last exactly at the time of unfurling the tricolour at the top Point 4875, the feature which immediately deidcated to him and is now known as Gun Hill. Thus he did the proud not only for Gunners but also the Indian Nation.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn14" target="_blank">[14]</a> Junior leadership can effectively lead in battlefield only when they get ready for war. It is the imaginative, progressive, intensive training and management of men during peace time which can save the blood during war. The intake of raw men with traditional agro based outlook, attitude and values have to be transformed in to a cohensive, well motivated and highly trained outfit which can place the National interests above all, even at the cost of making supreme sacrifice. 8 Sikh Bn led by Col S.P. Singh and his able team of junior leaders have proved beyond doubt all these trait. In the entire operation from 15 May to 06 July 99, four officers, two JCO’s and 73 OR were wounded. Two officers, four JCO’s and 30 OR bravely sacrificed “Their Today For Our Tomorrow”.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn15" target="_blank">[15]</a> 12 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry: Batalik sector (battles of Point 5203 and Point 4812 11 Gorkha Rifles: Batalik sector (battle of Khalubar) The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a 2nd Battalion, The Naga Regiment recvespecial instant award of "Unit Citation" to for their meritorious and gallant performance during the battles of Twin Bump on night 06/07 July and raid on enemy mortar position North West of Point 4875 on 08 July 1999, in Dras Sector. During Operation "Vijay", the unit has performed with distinction and displayed indomitable resolve and valour in the face of the enemy The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 2nd Battalion, The Rajputana Rifles for their meritorious and gallant performance during the battle of Point 4590 on night 13/14 June 1999 and Three Pimples area on night 28/29 June 1999, in Dras Sector. The unit has displayed exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemy wherein, four Officers, two Junior Commissioned Officers and 17 Other Ranks made the supreme sacrifice in the highest traditions of the Indian Army and 70 all ranks were wounded The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 8th Battalion, The Sikh Regiment for their meritorious and gallant performance during the isolation of Tiger Hill, which facilitated the capture of Tiger Hill top and for the battles of Helmet and India Gate, features on the Western Spur of Tiger Hill, on night 06/07 July 1999, in Dras Sector. During Operation "Vijay", the unit has displayed sterling performance marked with exceptional valour and grit in the face of the enem The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 13th Battalion, The Jammu and Kashmir Rifles for their exceptionally gallant and sterling performance during the battles of Hump (Tololing Ridge) on night 15/16 June, Point 5140 on night 19/20 June and Point 4875 on night 04/05 July 1999. The overall performance of the battalion during Operation "VIJAY" has been exceptional and marked with exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemyThe Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 18th Battalion, The Garhwal Rifles for their meritorious and gallant performance during the battles of Point 5140 on night 28/29 June and Point 4700 on night 27/28 June 1999, in Dras Sector. The unit has performed with distinction during Operation "VIJAY" and displayed exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemyThe Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 18th Battalion, The Grenadiers for their exceptionally gallant and sterling performance during the battles of Tololing on night 27/28 May 1999, Hump on night 13/14 June 1999. Their most significant achievement is the capture of Tiger Hill top on night 03/04 July 1999, in Dras Sector wherein, the enemy was completely surprised. The overall performance of the battalion during Operation VIJAY has been exceptional and marked with exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemy The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 108 Medium Regiment, for their valour and indomitable resolve during Op VIJAY. This unit provided accurate and devastating fire relentlessly, round the clock, inflicting very heavy damage and casualties on the enemy. The shock effect, casualties and destruction caused on the enemy positions by 108 Medium Regiment significantly facilitated the infantry operations in the capture of Tololing Ridge, Point 5140, Tiger Hill and Point 4875 in the Dras Sector. The over all performance of the unit has been exemplary and professionalism displayed by all ranks of the unit in the face of the enemy fire is highly commendable in the highest traditions of the Gunners and the Army The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 17th Battalion, The Jat Regiment for their meritorious and gallant performance during the battles of Whale Back & Pimple I on night 04/05 July and Pimple II on 08 July 1999, in Dras Sector. The unit has performed with distinction during Operation "Vijay" and displayed exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemy The Tibune, Thursday, June 24,1999 Tricolour hoisted atop Tiger Hill :- BATALIC SUB-SECTOR [ATTACH=full]23468[/ATTACH] HEIGHTS - FROM 14000 - 18000 FEET AREA-GLACIATED - ALMOST LIKE SIACHEN Heights : Jubar Heights, Marpola Heights, Knoll, Lone Hill, Pt 4700. Three Pimples, Pt 4,268, Pt 5203, Pt 5608, Pt 5140, Pt 5295, Pt. 5,287 (summit of Khalubar),. Pt. 4,812 (called Dog Hill by India), Banju, to Points 4,924 and 4,927, Dharu Hill Rivers/ Streams : Jubar langpa stream. Urdas Langpa stream Localities: Kharba, Shaqma, Channigund, Kaksar, Marpola, Kukarthang, Muntho Dhalo, Yaldor, Gorkhum, Judi Roads/ Tracks : Pakistan's instrusion in Batalik sector was detected on May 3, when Tashi Namgyal, Morup Tsering and Al raza Stanba, the three shepherds, residents of Gorkhum and Judi villages. On the morning of may 3, Namgyal had moved up some 5 km along Jubbar Langpa stream, when he used his binoculars, purchased from Leh, to look around. He saw groups of men in Pathan attire digging bunkers. Some were armed. Numbers could not be counted. He alongwith his friends returned and reported the matter to a detachment of 3 Punjab Regiment. Their version was not taken seriously. However, a patrol was sent later on May 5. Lt Saurav Kalia of 4 Jat Regiment went out of communication range on reaching 12,000 while proceeding to Kaksar 16,000 ft. The enemy captured them. Their badly tortured and mutilated bodies were returned to the Indian Army a month later. Two more patrols were sent on 7th and 9th. Soldiers of patrol sent next day were injured and on May 9, a third patrol was ambushed. Then came the realisation of the Indian commanders that there was something too serious. The army operation against intruders started on 14 May as it did in Dras sub- sector. However, troops not being sufficient, Dras sub-sector got priority over Batalik sub sector. Capture of Point 5203 The major operations in this sector started with an attack on Point 5203. Pakistan army had heightened artillery and mortar shelling in this area for the past 10 days, the Indian forces had earlier smashed the entire Pakistani communication network operating on “point 5203’ which was then under the control of intruders. Close on the heels of achieving success in Dras sector with the capture of Point 5140, Indian troops made significant gains in the Batalik sub-sector. Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry and Para Commandos recaptured a strategic height, the North-West spur of Point 5203 in Batalik Sub-Sector on the night of June 10 inflicting heavy casualty on intruders in the last 24 hours of Operation Vijay under way in the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. In this joint operation the infiltrators had been evicted from the point in which they had been well entrenched and had also built a number of sangars. The operation for ‘point 5203’ gained momentum on Monday night and lasted over 24 hours leading to the killing of a large number of Pakistan Army regulars and mercenaries before the troops occupied the strategic hill-top. This was the first major gain in this sector ever since the operation started here on May 14 but added that the operation in the Batalik sub-sector was incomplete without the recapture of “Jubar hills”. Marpola Heights: After taking Tololing, on 16 June, the Army moved along an assault corridor towards Marpola, north-west of Dras and on Line of Control to separate Dras from the intruders' stronghold of Mushkoh valley. Strategically very important feature, the Marpola Heights situated at almost 19,000 ft. along side theTololing Hills, runs almost abreast to the LoC and its recapture was to give the Indian troops a strategic advantage over the infiltrators. IAF strike and heavy artillery battle preceeded the attack on infiltrators. Indian Air Force launched an intensive air strike in the north east of Kargil to evict the Pakistani intruders. The plan was to isolate intruders along the eastern and western flanks in tandem. 14600 foot high Munthodhalo in north-east of Kargil in the Batalik Sector was the logistics base of the entire Batalik Sector. From June 15 to June 17, the IAF planes attacked the with a recaptured height in Batalik Area. Mirage-2000 planes of Indian Air Force pulverised by bombing Munthodalo Supply Camp. In the attack estimates were that 150 Pakistani intruders and regulars were killed. Accurate delivery of 5000 bombs by Mirages caused most of the destruction. Munthodalo strikes demonstrated the cutting edge of Air Force in modern combat. Massive air strikes had a detrimental effect on the morale of the intruders. A Pay book of a Pakistani soldier identified as Sepoy Adbul Rauf of 5 Northern Light Infantry Battalion was recovered by the Indian troops during operations in the Batalik sector. With this recovery it has now been established that in addition to the sub units of 3, 4 and 6 Batallions of the Northern Light Infantry, some units of 5 Northern Light Infantry were also operating in the pockets of intrusion. The Idian Army advanced towards the Line of Control in north-westerly direction. In Munthodhalo area, the Mirage-2000 planes were providing cover to the IAF's ground attack aircraft. June 17: Batalic Sector Jubar Heights: Batalik Continued to be a problem area. The crucial 4,924 -metres high point of Jubar and Kukarthang remained elusive. He is now called the Hero of Batalik. Commissioned into the Bihar Regiment just four years ago, Major M. Saravanan was on a difficult mission. In the high mountains of Batalik in the Kargil range he led a platoon of 30 men to try and cut the supply lines of the Pakistani infiltrators who had entrenched themselves on the Jubar ridge at 14,000 ft. Approaching them was a treacherous task. If they tried climbing up the steep slopes they were easy targets for the enemy. A few weeks earlier, before the war over Kargil intensified, Major Rohit Gaur and three of his patrol party were caught by surprise and killed by the intruders while moving up the slopes. So the platoon had to take a tortuous route using rocky outcrops as cover to stealthily approach the Pakistani picket at the top. On May 29, as the platoon closed in on the enemy picket at Point 4268, a coordinate on the map, Saravanan moved up ahead of the others. He literally stumbled on the infiltrators and engaged them in a gun battle. Some of Saravanan's men say they saw him fell four infiltrators before he went down to a deadly burst of machine-gun fire. Coming under heavy attack from the other intruders, the Indian platoon had to withdraw to a safe position. Almost a week after Saravanan died fighting valiantly on May 29 leading 30 men on a difficult mission to the Jubar ridge at 14,000 feet, Indian troops have tried to recover his body but with little success. The intruders continued to rain heavy fire. On reachiong Pt 4,268 Sharvanan went ahead of the troops and engaged the enemy in long gun battle. Four men from the enemy side fell before he and 10 soldiers fell prey to the bullets. There were a growing number of such heroics and lives lost as, what Lt-General H.M. Khanna, the Northern Army commander, calls the "near conventional war" in Kargil enters its third week. On June 3, the Indian toll stood at 57 killed, including four officers and three Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs), and 203 injured. Death toll rose to 98 by June 11, with over 317 injured. As the army closes in on Pakistani pickets dotted all over the towering ridges, the casualties are likely to go up. The infiltrators were battle-hardened and trained in high-altitude warfare. Fighting was still intense in four major sub-sectors on the Line of Control (LoC) -- Drass, Kaksar, Mashkoh and Batalik. The army claimed it had successfully pushed back the intruders from their original positions 10 km within Indian territory along the 140-km Kargil-Leh stretch where the battle rages. It now estimates that most of the pickets are barely 3 km inside the LoC and only a dozen of them are "strongly held". But at many places the army is still 2,000 ft below Pakistani pickets and would take a while to reach them. In the Batalik sub-sector, which was seeing increased air operations, the army was concentrating on recapturing Turtuk, the link point to Siachen. But even as it inched its way up the mountains along the stretch between Mashkoh valley and Turtuk, there was concern about Pakistani buildup on the border. While gains were made in Turtuk and Yaldor, four regiments of the artillery were called in for increased artillery action to soften Jubar where Major Saravanan was killed on May 28. His body was yet to be retrieved The Infiltrators, after being evicted from Point 5203 had been hiding on the North-West spur of it, which the Indian soldiers recaptured during he operation on June 18.. In the face of intense machine gun firing, the troops from the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry and Para Commandos had scaled the height using specialised mountaineering techniques to evict the infiltrators. It was during this operation that Captain Amol Kalia along with 13 other ranks had been killed. Fierce hand to hand combat had continued for almost seven hours before the point was captured. However after being evicted from this point, the infiltrators had moved onto the North-West spur of it and had been engaging Indian troops with firing from there. The recapture of Point 5203 and its North-West spur had given the Indian soldiers strategic advantage over the infiltrators. Indian troops engaged the infiltrators in fierce gun battles forcing them to flee their sangars. During this operation, seven Pakistani army regulars were killed and wo of their sangars were destroyed at another position in Batalik itself. The sangars were destroyed by the artillery and mortar fire launched by the Indian troops. In this fire assault, another three of the enemy soldiers were killed and two wounded. On June 19, the fierce fighting was going on to capture Jubar heights, south of the river Indus. Dominance of Jubar could mean with troops from the south of the Indus can be switched over to another brigade and northern bank of the river. It will be of high tactical advantage. IAF was doing accurate air strikes with Mirage 2000 planes. The IAF continued with its reconnaissance missions in the battle zone. Earlier in Batalik line capturing over 16,000 ft heigh feature, Indian troops suffered serious casualties. Our seven Jawans were killed during an artillery attack on this segment by Pakistan. Pakistan itensified its artillery firing along Line of Control- Keran, Tangdhar, Uri, Poonch, Krishna Ghati, Bhimber Gali, Noushera and Palanwala. On June 23, the Chief of Army Staff, Gen VP Malik, said,"Indian Army could cross the Line of Control provided there was a political mandate to do so. "If necessary we can cross the Line of Control in the supreme national interest but the decision lies with the Cabinet." Gen Malik told newsman that the Army was restricting its operations to the Indian side of the Line of Control in accodance with the Cabinet's directive. Gen Malik said, "If war is thrust upon India, the Army will fight with all its existing equipments". The Pakistani Army had conceived, planned and executed Kargil incursions. ( By Ramesh Vinayak and Harinder Baweja) June 26: The Battle of Batalik A fierce battle was raged for the capture of Jubar Hills, Kokarthang and Barso peaks. The Indian artillery continued to shell the enemy camps providing logistical and aministrative support to the intruders.The Army lost five of its personnel and 23 others were wounded on 24-25 June. Casualties included Capt Aditya Mishra of the Corps of Signal. Troops engaged Pakistani infiltrators in a fierce gun battle to gain control over Jubar Hills, Kokarthang and Barso peaks in the Kargil sector on the 41st day of Operation Vijay. Pakistan continued artillery shelling and mortar fire in Knajalwan, Kera, Nogan, Uri, Poonch, Krishna Ghati, Bhimber Gali, Naushera sectors along the Line of Control. June 27: Media Update Ground operations progressed as per our operational plans in a steady and deliberate manner both in Batalik and Dras sectors. The softening up of enemy positions in the pockets of intrusion has continued through effective employment of artillery, mortar and direct firing weapons. <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td><table style='width: 100%'><tr><td> </td></tr></table></td></tr></table> <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td><table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>5287 </td></tr></table></td></tr></table> n the Batalik sector, two enemy Sangars were destroyed by artillery fire and in Dras sector five enemy Sangars were destroyed by Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL) and mortar fire. In these operations, four enemy soldiers were killed and many wounded. Our casualties in the last 24 hours have been two other anks killed and one dounded. The assessment of the casualties inflicted on the militants/ mercenaries, involved in the ongoing operations in Kargil sector, was carried out based on very reliable inputs. It was assessed that 123 militants/mercenaries from various Tanzeems had been killed and 50 reported missing. The Tanzeems these militants belonged to Laskhar-e-Toiba, Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen and Harkat Ui-Jehad-e-Islam. Relaible inputs revealed that the enemy moved the elements of the stategic reserves from Peshawar and Mangla to Pakistan occupied Kashmir and the Army medical facilities at Skardu were up graded to cater for the large number of casualties. The field hospital at Skardu has been upgaded to a combined military hospital and artificial limb centre has also been raised. Pakistan was in the process of pushing 700-800 militants in Gultari to the west of the Dras and 500-600 in Poonch. India took necessary precautionary measures. Pakistan took over the administrative control of the Gilgit and Skardu regions and stationed around 900 militants and Special Service Group personnel to launch clandestine mission on the Indian side. Pakistan had positioned 300 militants across the Kanjalwan and Gurez sectors and 500 militants along Line of Control near Poonch. The enemy continued with unpovoked mortar firing in Keran, Tangdhar, Uri, Rampur, Poonch, Krishnaghati, Naushera and Palanwala Sectors. India responded adequately and appropriately. June 27: Battle in Batalik & Dras The Indian Air Force today intensified round-the-clock operations by bombarding enemy positions in Batalik and Dras. Pakistan was engaged in defending its dominance. The Indian Armed Forces could not reach Line of Control. Army and Air Forces supply convoys were working day and night. Air Force launched night operations to create fear and uncertaintly along the intruders. India wanted to deny them even a good night sleep. An IAF spokesperson said, "we are technically equipped to undertake this kind of mission. Mirage-2000 can be cary out round-the -clock bombing." Army officials said tht continuous artillery and mortar attacks were launched on intruders' positions and to frustrate their attempts and to prevent them from regrouping and build new area of resistance. The intruders suffered four casualties and Army action destroyed a total of seven bunkers- two in Batalik and five in Dras. With these operations two army personnel were also killed. The army also directed artillery fire of the supply column in Dras. An assessment of the casualties revealed that 123 hard-core intruders have been killed and 50 were reported missing. Thease casualties were over and above the death of 383 Pakistan Army regulars including 17 officers and were from three militant outfit-Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddin and Harkat-ul-Jihad-islam. June 30: Battle of Knoll, Lone Hill and Munthodhalo Indian Armed Forces continued to attack the Tiger Hill area and engaged the Jubar height in Batalik Sector to secure these segments of National High 1-A along Kashmir Valley and Dras via Zoji La Pass. Indian Air Force attacked Jubar feature and foiled Pakistani attempt to isolate Indian Army formation in north and south of the Indus river in Batalik area. Two Indian brigades were located at either side of the river. In New Delhi, the army spokesman informed that the Army captured two positions in close proximity to the Jubar feature. The Indian Air Force targeted the Kaksar Thang supply camp in the Munthodhalo area. Kaksar is in close proximity to Kargil town and is the gate-way to the Dras-Zoji La area. Army continuously advanced in the Tiger Hill area. Troops of he Garhwal Rifles captured point 4700. The point 4700 was seized but in this assault 11soldiers were killed. Army recovered three AK Rifles, three Heavy Machine Guns, one Rocket Launcher on the spot. There, the Rajputana Rifles also attacked areas of Knoll, Three-Pimples and Lone Hill to the west of Point 4700. It was fierce fighting and under intense enemy fire. Knoll was secured in the morning and Lone Hill fell by the evening. The Grenadiers have been advancing and contributed to the battle of Knoll and Three-Pimples. In these battles Indian Army lost three officers-Major P Acharya, Lt Vijayant Thaper, Lt M Kenguruse and 12 Jawans while 15 other were wounded. On enemy side around 40 Pakistani regulars and militants were killed and 13 wounded. Two AK rifles, three Universal machine Guns, 50,000 rounds of ammunition and ration for 30 days for 30 persons were also seized. Elsewhere in Sandu village of Anantang district, 12 labourers were shot dead by militants. The slain labours belonged to Madhya Ppradesh and Uttar Pradesh and were working for locak brick-kiln owners. India's real progress in the Batalik area began in early July when soldiers from Garhwal Rifles, the Bihar regiment, the Gurkha rifles and the Grenadiers began pushing their way along the flanks of Batalik heights. The Pt. 5,287 summit of Khalubar, east of Yaldor, fell on July 2 and the entire mountain was cleared within three days by the Gurkhas. West of the Urdas Langpa stream, Pt. 4,812, called Dog Hill by Indian soldiers, followed rapidly. Holding these flanks, the troops could then begin to cut off Pakistani reinforcements making their way down from their rear baseat Munthod Dhalo, which had been hit by successive air strikes throught the previous fortnight. Fortune played a big role in the final assault. Troops succeeded in making their way up the Urdas Langpa to Banju, the minor peak, which guards the Jubbar ridge line. The assault up the ridge would have been murdeerous had a shell not hit a Pakistani ammunition dump near the Jubar peak. An officer involved in the assault recalled, " The ammunition dump fire was the most amazing display of fireworks I had ever seen. I was like a hundred Diwali nights at once." The Pakistani troops were forced to retreat and the route up Jubar to Points 4,924 and 4,927 was then clear. Progress was rapid on the eastern side of the Garkha Langpa as well. The Garkha Langpa is flanked by Jubar to its west and the Kukerthang and Tharu heights to its east. The push from the village of Yaldor Langpa to Pt. 4,821 on Kukerthang was aprotracted one and claimed heavy casualities. But the mountain was taken and the 5,103-m Tharu fell next. With the heights intact, the troops dominated Garkha Langpa and the villages of baroro and Kha Baroro. Further, Pakistani troops movement down the Gargurdu, Garkhun and Yaldor Langpas, the three major streams that trisect the Batalik river area from west to east became near impossible. The spcial feature of enemy in this area was that they were not the mujaihideen, as suspected elsewhere they were the regular troops of Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry. The interrogation of naik Inayat ali of the 5 Northern Light Infantry, captured on the night of July 2, proved that the heights were occupied by his battalion and no irregulars were present there. Inayat Ali told the int errogators that his entire unit of 200 had been wiped out in sustained Indian ground and air fire. Even though Pakistan announced its retreat on July 11, the retreating Pakista troops reinforced Pt. 5,121 and 5,327- over a km inside the Line of Control from where their withdrawal eventcually commenced. Muntho Dalo, the 5,065-m pyramid in the east of Yaldor acted as Pakistan's principal supply point. Even though 105-mm field guns and pinaka rocket launchers pounded the position form Silmoo Langpa, until July 9, the final physical occupation. By July 8, the army had moved its might to the Batalik heights which Pakistan had occupied in the hope of severing Leh from the Valley. It recaptured major vantagepoints on the Jubar heights and was poised to take control of most of the ridges. If the war continues, it would still take several weeks, possibly months for the army to clear all the occupied territory. But last week it appeared confidence of ahieving its objective. As General V.P.Malik, chief of the army staff, told INDIA TODAY (see interview); “There is now much greater confidence both at the tactical as well as the stategic levels. We know what we have to do and we will achieve it.” After capturing height in Batalik, the Indian Army began expanding its role in the sector and they were perching on the 16,000 ft feature in Batalik. In Batalik sector two makeshift bunkers of the infiltrators were destroyed. Three Pakistani soldiers were killed and two other wounded in the assault. Indian gains in the Batalik sector, south of Indus are of prime importance. In the Batalik sub-sector hand-to-hand combat went on to recapture Jubar hills. After recapture of the posts, efforts were made to maintain a supply line to the posts as the two posts and supply line continue to be in the firing range of Pakistan backed intruders. Pakistani artillery continued to pound Dras, Kaksar, Kargil and Batalik areas.        The Indian Air Force could not carry out air strikes for the second day running today due to bad weather prevailing in the region. However this ws the fourth consecutive day that no air strikes were carried out. The joint plans of the Army and the IAF had not envisaged the need for air strikes on the earlier two days. The Indian Army informed that it had redesignated the Turtuk sub-sector as "sub-sector Haneefuddin" as a tribute to the Indian Lieutenant who was killed there on 7 June.        Meanwhile, the Prime Minister Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee told the press persons that India had no intention of crossing the Line of Control in Kargil. The Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes told a TV Channel that he hoped that Kargil intrusion would be cleared by September end.         In other operations in Batalik and Dras sectors during the past 24 hours, one officer, Capt M.K.Pandey of 11 Gorkha Rifles, and 11 jawans were killed taking the toll in the Kargil conflict to 252. A large number of casualties were also inflicted on the Pakistan army which was being assessed.          On July 4, Col. Bikaram Singh said fierce fighting was going on at two positions in the Batalik sector. One position had been cleared and arms and ammuition were recovered from there. The recoveries included one heavy machine gun, one universal machine gun and 5000 rounds, five G3 rifles, 36G3 rifle and AK rifle magazines, one PRC radio set, one VPS radio set, one solar plate battery charger, a binocular, one telephone, two bullet proof jacket, two pup tent, a large quality of rations and Rs.5548 in Pakistani currency. He said Pakistan continued with unprovoked artillery and mortar firing in Keran, Poonch, Krishanaghati, Bhimbergali, Naushera and Akhnoor sectors. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn16" target="_blank">[16]</a> The advance party of 14 Sikh led by Major Rohit Sehgal after airlifting from Leh on May 27, had already been moved to Channigund to contain the enemy’s intrusion in Kaksar area. This party occupied a defensive localty to prevent any further intrusion into the sensitive Batalik sector and provide a firm base for offensive operations which were to follow. June 18: Batalik Sector Operation in Batalik Area was also in process. After fierce fighting Indian Army recaptured some key positions from Pakistan backed intruders. The Government of India reiterated that India fully respected the Line of Control (Line of Control). Clarifying the Indian stand point the foreign office spokesman said that New Delhi respects the sanctity of the Line of Control and at no stage was crossing the Line of Control. The Army spokesman denied the report that Indian Army has targeted Pakistan's command and control hub Skardu in Pakistan occupied Kaskmir (PoK). The spokesman said that Skardu is located deep inside and Skardiu region is different.         Meanwhile, the IAF fighter planes spearheaded by Mirage-2000 and the MiG-27s continued their round-the-clock strikes on the infiltrators positions all along the Kargil sector. The IAF Mirages and the MiG-27s backed by the combat air patrolling by MiG-29s struck at the infiltrators positions at Tiger Hill, Jubar Hill and Dharu Hill with the improvised precision guided munitions (PGMs).         The IAF carried out the strikes in the Jubar and Dharu Hill of the Batalik sub sector last night. Another wave of strike was carried out in the Mushkoh valley this afternoon after giving a break in the morning. The IAF had also carried out strikes in the Dras sub sector last night achieving excellent results.        According to reports here, the IAF planes were now picking up the big camps during the  reconnaissance cee missions and then destroying them. Even in Jubar and Dharu Hill the strikes were carried out at the relative bigger staging cum supply camps of the infiltrators. This morning the IAF carried out air missions all along the Kargil region. He said Pakistan had moved elements of the strategic reserves from Peshawar and Mangla to the occupied Kashmir and the Indian Army had taken necessary precautionary measures.         The ground operations in the Kargil sector, he said were progressing in a steady and deliberate manner and the softening up of enemy positions continued through effective employment of artillery, mortar and direct firing weapons. The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 12th Battalion, The Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry for their exceptionally gallant and sterling performance during the battles of Point 5203 on night 10/11 June 1999 and Point 4812 on night 30 June/01 July 1999 in Batalik Sector. The overall performance of the battalion during Operation "VIJAY" has been exceptional and marked with exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemy. The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to Ladakh Scouts for their meritorious and gallant performance during the battles of Point 5000 on night 05/06 July Dog Hill on night 30 June/01 July , and Padma Go on night 09/10 July 1999, in Batalik Sector.     The unit has performed with distinction during Operation "Vijay" and displayed exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemy.         1 BIHAR has a glorious and distniguished history. The battalion was raised on 15 September 1941 at Jamshedpur, Bihar and took part in Burma Campaign in 1942 where it distinguished itself. The Battalion was awarded two battle honours viz, Haka and Gangaw during the Second World War. In addition, the unit also earned the following decorations and gallantry awards The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 1st Battalion, The 11 Gorkha Rifles for their meritorious and gallant performance during the battle of Khalubar in Batalik Sector. The unit has performed with distinction during Operation "VIJAY" and displayed exemplary valour and grit in the face of the enemy. Siachen-Chorbatla-Turtuk The information about enemy intrusion in Siachen-Chorbatla-Turtuk came in first week of May 1999. The sifting and analysing of the information and planning action was however delayed due to the constrain of terrain, logistics and troops availability. On May 26 Ladakh Scouts and 14 Sikh got their orders to move Chorbat la.          Major Sonam Wangchuk along with his platoon of 36 got orders to capture an 18,000 feet high ridge in the Indian side of CGL.Glacial and rocky with nights falling to 30 degree minus Celsius and days warming to minus 6 degrees Celsius, the mountain with 80 degrees gradient was a test even for skilled mountaineers. On night 31 Major Wangchuk advanced with his platoon towards the heights. At about midnight he heard the sound of picks and hammers on the other side of the ridge facing Pakistan. He quicklyflashed a wireless message to the rear. Wangchuk and his men made it to the ridge topin three hours under heavy fire from Pakistani troops from the flanks. But despite of all odds he succeeded in capturing the top raising Ladakhi war cry 'Ki Ki So So Lhargyalo" ( The gods will triumph). From there they spotted a group of intruders trying to scale the ridge from the Pakistani side.         Wangchuk told his men to hold on till the enemy came within firing range. Four intruders were killed in the gun battle. Wangchuk and his column had foiled a major infiltration attempt in time. The soldiers then retrieved the bodies of the infiltrators who turned out to be Pakistani Army regulars. Next day Wangchuk led the charge to clear the heights and take in control the heights which the Pakistani desperately wanted to occupy.         The Army wanted to ensure that 'Chorbatla' and Turtuk segments were not subjected to fresh intrusion. On May 27 the 14 Sikh Regt. was airlifted to leh. Immediately on arrival at Leh, 14 Sikh dispatched a Company column to Chorbatla, north-east of Batalik, to strengthen the lightly held position there. The Company moved to Hanuthang and on to Handanbrok covering 22 km at an altitude exceeding 15,000 feet. This was a feat in itself and reflected the physical and mental robustness of the brave Sikh soldiers. On May 27, the enemy brought down effective and intense fire on this defensive location. To neutralise enemy fire, Sepoy Buta Singh, in an act of exemplary courage and bravery, moved the Medium Machine Gun to an advantageous position and brought effective fire on the enemy for about four hours. The enemy concentrated its fire to neutralise effective MMG fire. Sepoy Buta Singh, hit by small arms fire of the enemy, contued to operate his MMG till he breathed his last and prevented the enemy from capturing the Company defended locality. On June 7, the balance of 14 Sikh was given the responsibility of Chorbatla. It moved and occupied the commanding heights along the Line of Control. The enemy activity in the sector was at a somewhat low key. Naib Subedar Jasbir Singh, in an exemplary effort, established a Section Post at point 5620 (approx. 19,000ft.). His drive and enterprise secured the eastern flank of Chorbatla. Subsequently, the enemy was totally dominated. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn17" target="_blank">[17]</a> OPERATION – 18 Indian jawans yesterday foiled another attempy by the Pakistani infiltrators to capture some posts in the Turtuk sub sector of the Kargil region and south of Siachen glacier in Jammu and Kashmir killing at least 15 of them as the Indian Air Force(IAF) continued its round the clock strikes on the infiltrators positions achieving positive results. Pakistan’s attempts to open more points of conflicts were foiled effectively by the Indian troops in the southern Siachen glacier region as the infiltrators were evicted from their positions by the para commandos specialized in high altitude warfare. Helicopter gunships were used to para drop the commandos of the Army to push the infiltrators back from the ridgeline they had occupied in the world’s highest battlefield on Saturday.        The presence of the infiltrators was noticed first on Saturday and by the time the Indian para commandos got into action yesterday, their number had swelled. The Army commandos engaged the infiltrators in close hand to hand battle killing 15 of them in the process and pushing the rest back beyond the ridgeline. Two more Pakistani infiltrators were killed in operations in the other parts of he region.         Reports said initially a group of about 10 infiltrators was noticed in the region on Saturday. The infiltrators were attempting to capture some of the Indian posts in the region. However by yesterday their number had swelled to about 40 forcing the Indian commandos to get into action.         During this operation the Indian troops also recovered three AK series rifles, two universal machine guns, one rocket launcher, an 82 mm mortar, a sniper rifles with electroscope and a passive night vision device. Indian troops were still carrying out mopping up operations in the region, reports said.         This was not he first attempt by the Pakistani army regulars to capture some posts north of the Turtuk region and south of the Siachen glacier. Earlier this month, with the arrest of 12 militants, the Indian Army had busted the plot of the Pakistani soldiers tograb the Turtok and adjacent areas.         Pakistan had planned to infiltrate militants into the area to subvert locals and initiate insurgency, launch operations to occupy critical areas to facilitate operations of ground forces and finally declare Turtuk and adjacent areas as part of their northern areas. Even then Indian troops had made a recovery of the large quantity of arms and ammunition from the militants.         Sources here said the second attempt made by the Pakistani soldiers to capture areas in Turtuk showed their resilience and the involvement of professionals. Despite having been pushed back once, they again attempted to capture the region, which was a serious indication of the Pakistani designs.         The Indian Army dispatched further reinforcements in the region to assist the already entrenched Indian troops. The concentration now was to ensure that the entire ridgeline was covered by the Indian forces and Pakistan could not attempt another such misadventure, sources said.         With the killing of 17 Pakistani army regulars in the past 24 hours, the casualty count on the enemy had risen to 398 soldiers klled and 123 militants killed. Besides 50 militants were also reported to be missing. Meanwhile the Indian casualties rose to 175 killed with the loss of two more jawans. 364 Indian soldiers have been wounded and nine were missing in action. June 28: Battle in Siachen and Chorbatla The Indian Army secured Chorbatla and effectively blocked a possible Pakistani attack in the Turtuk Sector of Ladakh. The army has now made it virtually impossible for Pakistan to surmount Ladakh along in line alignment with Shyok river.         Besides, Chorbatla Turtuk alignment the Pakistan Forces wanted to weaken the defences of the Siachen Glacier. Therefore, it wanted to block supply road to the southern Siachen Glacier. India and Pakistani troops clashed near the southern Siachen Glacier. According to the Army spokesman, 14 Pakistani soldiers were killed in fighting. A large quantity of arms including three AK-56 rifles, two Universal Launcher and large quantities ammunitions have been recovered from them. June 28: Media Update In an exceptionally gallant operation, our troops foiled the attempt of Pakistan Army soldiers to occupy a ridgeline in Southern Siachen glacier, on 27 June 1999, on our side of the Actual Ground Position Line. Enemy troops, who had occupied this area a day earlier, were evicted by our troops comprising of specialist high altitude warfare commandos. In this operation, 15 enemy soldiers were killed and the following weapons and equipments recovered: Three AK Rifles Two Universal Machine Guns One Rocket Launcher One 82 mm Mortar One Snipper Rifle with telescope One Passive Night Vision Device Mopping up operation was still on The contention of Pakistan Army that "if Pakistan manages to hold on to the intruded positions in Kargil for two more months, India would lost its hold over the entire Siachen" is baseless and a figment of imagination. It is clarified that National Highway 1A is being used and will continue to be used by our convoys. Interference by artillery fire on this road, has been going on even before the intrusions in Kargil area and therefore is not a new phenomenon. Besides, there are alternate routes and means also available to support our troops in Siachen.         Ground operations in Batalik and Dras sectors progressed as per India's operational plans. The Indian Army concentrated on clearing the enemy from remaining positions in very well planned and deliberate operations. The targeting of enemy positions in the pockets of intrusion aimed at degrading his fighting potential and will to fight continued through employment of air strikes and effective fire of artillery mortar and direct firing weapons.         In the past 24 hours, two more Pakistani soldiers were killed. With this, in the on-going operations, the enemy had suffered 398 Pakistan Army soldiers killed. In addition, 125 mercenaries/militants had also been killed. Three Other Ranks of India were wounded. Indian casualties in operation Vijay rose to 175 killed, 364 wounded and nine missing in action.         The enemy continued unprovoked mortar firing in Kanjalwan, Poonch, Krishnaghati, Bhimbe rgalli, Naushera, Sunderbani and Palanwala Sectors. We responded in a befitting manner. Mushkoh Valley Mushkoh valley is the valley along Zozila pass, providing deep gullies descending from the mountains of Pok into India from a new infiltration route into Kashmir through Sonmarg on to Srinagar and Doda. More than 300 intruders in fortified positions occupied the ridges of the valley.Pakistani shelling prevented any significant counter attack. Army spread intruders' strong-holds in the Mushkoh Valley in the West of Dras along with the Kharbu-Kargil alignment. June 19, Close to the Zojila Pass, the Mushkoh valley was subjected to intensive air strikes. Due to attack Pakistani regular troops abandoned positions which were becoming untenable in the face of Indian assault. Pakistani Artillery stepped up firing on Indian Logistic bases in this area. The spokesman in Srinagar said that a number of heights in Batalik have been captured and 12 Pakistani intruders have been killed near Dras in Mushkoh valley, three intruders were killed. On Indian side also two Jawans were killed and another one was wounded near Dras. So far during "Operation Vijay" casualities have gone up to 165 killed and 323 wounded while nine are missing. On Pakistani side 340 have so far been killed during the Kargil Operations. Heavy shelling was going on in Jammu and Gurez sector. .Army launched fresh assault in Mushkoh Valley. As a result, intruders were pushed to a distance of 2 2\2 kms from the Line of Control. Fierce battle was under way to dislodge the Pakistani army regulars from the strategically important Tiger Hills, which is the feature next to the Tololing Ridge in the Dras sector. Meanwhile, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s made a statement that Kargil-type front could be opened in other parts. India warned Pakistan that it would get a befitting reply if it tried to open Kargil-type fronts anywhere else. The Army spokesman said, “They will be waiting for a bloody nose.” OPERATION-20 Pakistan has moved an army division from Peshawar to Skardu to thwart Operation Vijay in the Kargil-Dras belt. Defence Ministry sources said the infantry division had been directed to fortify posts held by Pakistani troops and infiltrators in Batalik, Dras and Kartil.         Besides several hundred Afghan guerrillas have also moved from the Khyber Pass to Peshawar from where they have been directed to follow two routes- one connecting Peshawar with Skardu via Astor and another from Peshawar to Chitra. State government sources said the entry of members of the Taliban into the Kargil and Dras sectors for aiding the Pakistani soldiers in retaining several posts and positions in the Kargil-Dras belt could not be rules out. They said the way the infiltrators and soldiers had been playing hide and seek with Indian soldiers in the areas indicated the presence of he members of the Taliban, because of their experience in mountain warfare. The sources said Pakistan was making a desperate attempt to retain the strategic areas in the Kargil and Dras sectors to improve its bargaining capacity with India during any dialogue. Reports said as a result of a heavy military build-up across Kargil and Dras, the infiltrators and soldiers had succeeded in delaying India’s move to clear all heights in the area. In fact, Pakistan wanted to buy time to pave the way for international intervention. The sources said the Indian troops had already received additional supplies of long range and medium-range guns which were being used for dislodging the infiltrators. Reports from the Kargil sector said field commanders had been assured by the Defence Minister that spares for Bofors guns, other artillery guns, winter clothing and other accessories would be supplied soon so that the infiltrators were pushed back before the two sectors were covered by snow and the area was lashed by strong winds, making it difficult for carrying out air strikes. The reports said the decision of the Air Force to carry out air strikes at night had caused panic among he infiltrators whose Stinger missiles and anti-aircraft guns had failed to hit the Indian fighter planes.        Defence experts are of the view that Pakistan may ultimately accept a safe passage for the infiltrators in view of mounting pressure on it by world leaders.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a> MASHKOH: Troops still building up logistics for an assault. About 300-350 intruders well entrenched at nine different locations. Due to a paucity of troops and the preoccupation of artillery guns in other sub-sectors, Mashkoh remains a low-priority area. (The Tribune, June 29,1999) KAKSAR: Not much progress here where the infiltrators' supply lines are still intact. The army is now trying to exploit the ridge lines of neighbouring Tololing to move closer to the positions being occupied by the enemy. The month-long battle was being equated with the epic battle for the Haji Pir pass in the 1965 war. It was 32 days of hell. “It’s a suicidal mission” said the officer once they thought of the war. The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 197 Field Regiment, for their valour and indomitable resolve during Op VIJAY. This unit provided accurate and devastating fire relentlessly, round the clock, inflicting very heavy damage and casualties on the enemy. The over all performance of the unit has been exemplary and professionalism displayed by all ranks of the unit in the face of the enemy fire is highly commendable in the highest traditions of the Gunners and the Indian Army. The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation to 141 Field Regiment, for their valour and indomitable resolve during the Op VIJAY. This unit provided accurate and devastating fire relentlessly round the clock, inflicting very heavy damage and casualties on the enemy. The over all performance of the unit has been exemplary and professionalism displayed by all ranks of the unit in the face of the enemy fire is highly commendable in the highest traditions of the Gunners and the Indian Army. 141 Field Regiment was raised on 01 July 1971 at Talbhet and has participated in Operation 'Rakshak' in 1995 in Jammu and Kashmir. The unit also has an Army Commanders Commendation Card to its creditThe Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 663 Reconnaissance and Observation Squadron for their meritorious and gallant performance in facilitating reconnaissance by commanders, directing artillery fire, carriage of war stores and evacuation of casualties during Operation "Vijay". The unit has displayed sterling performance marked with exceptional valour and grit in the battle zone The Chief of Army Staff is pleased to make a special instant award of "Unit Citation" to 666 Reconnaissance and Observation Squadron for their meritorious and gallant performance in facilitating reconnaissance by commanders, directing artillery fire, carriage of war stores and evacuation of casualties during Operation "Vijay". The unit has performed with distinction and displayed exemplary valour and grit in the battle zone. Battle of Logistics Kargil was more of a battle of logistics than for holding and recapturing of ground. The aim of Pakistani infiltration was to cut off North Kashmir by cutting off supply route i.e., Srinagar-Leh road. The ridges occupied by the Pakistanis were with an aim to fire with direct weapons or to observe movements for direction of indirect fire on any movements on Srinagar-Leh road. The Indians found it difficult to attack well entrenched Pak posts on high ridges; it alternatively decided on catting off supplies to these troops. Pakistan's regulars were perched on tops while the mujahedeens were used to provide supplies to these regulars. Munthan Dhalo, the Pakistan's supply camp remained the key target of Indian Air Force and Artillery. Similarly any mule convoy coming to Pak occupied posts was targeted. A few instances are given here to substantiate these facts. Gen Malik further said, "Pakistan is also trying to severe the row between the Zoji La Pass and Leh and exerting pressure on Indian defence in Kargil, Batalik and Turtuk sector and it was the prime focus of the Pakistani operations. The Zoji La Pass connects the Kashmir valley to Ladakh being the life-line of the region. The details of the Line of Control alignment in the process of its delineation had been well documented and signatures to these records had been affixed by the top Army oficers of the two countries in 1972. Thus to dispute the Line of Control alignment was wrong, dangerous, unacceptable and full of mischief. In case, Line of Control was disputed India and Pakistan could have been in constant state of war." Before the Army Chief's briefing, the display of captured Pakistani Arms was also opened for the Press. This display included machine guns, AK-46, automatic grenade launchers, mortar used during Kargil incursions. Military Attaches from 28 countries witnessed the Arms display. Mirage-2000 plans spearheaded attack with MiG-27 and MiG 23, Ground Attack Fighter jets on June 25. Extensive use of the 500 pound bombs were made in these attacks. Nearly 70 intruders were killed in the Batalik and Das area. But the bulk of the casualties were in the air-raid on Munthodalo, with the supply-cum-administrative camp near the Line of Control (LoC). An IAF's western area command had evolved special tactics to maximize the impact of the ground attacks.        In consonance with our plan to administratively strangulate the enemy in the pockets of intrusion, an animal transport column of approximately 30 mules was effectively engaged by our artillery and mortar fire close to the Line of Control in Dras sector.        The assault up the ridge would have been murderous had a shell not hit a Pakistani ammunition dump near the Jubar peak. An officer involved in the assault recalled, " The ammunition dump fire was the most amazing display of fireworks I had ever seen. I was like a hundred Diwali nights at once." Air attack on Muntho Dhalo continued on 22 June. In the Air raid, two Pakistani Majors, two Captains and two Lieutenants were killed. The raids pulverised a cluster of buildings at the camp. With the Munthodhalo camp demolished in air strike and Army capturing some points in Batalik, Indian Army advanced, but the Jubar height in Batalik was yet to fall. With this strategic victory in “Operation Vijay”, the Indian trooops had also ensured that the Pakistani observation over the vital Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A in the Dras sector had been completely removed. The victory ensured a safe passage to the convoys going to Siachen earlier under threat of firing from the Pakistani infiltrators. As the war showed signs of drawing to a close, the Indian Army began looking “beyond Kargil”. But it is not a very happy sight. Already three divisions are stationed all along the LoC at Kargil. These troops will have to be stationed there through much of the winter. Besides, the recaptured heights would have to be manned round the clock. Expenses alone, one officer estimated, would amount to maintaining “three Siachens”. The Indian Army spends Rs.3.5 crore a day to retain its hold over the Siachen Glachier. India may be winning the Kargil war but at a heavy price. Unless it learns from its mistakes, like allowing the army’s preparedness to deteriorate precatiously by budget cuts, Ppakistan may be embodened to carry out its threat of creating more Kargils<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn2" target="_blank">[2]</a>. Army spokesman, Col Bikram Singh, briefing newsmen here said that the Indian troops used artillery shelling, automatic grenade launchers and mortar firing to destroy seven field fortifications of the infiltrators in the Batalik and Dras sectors. He pointed out that the militants and mercenaries who had been coopted into the fighting in the Kargil sector by the Pakistan Army, and had been described as “fighting porters”, belonged to the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harket-ul-Mujahideen and Harket-ul Jehad-e-Islam. Pakistani agencies, according to the sources, had engaged more than 1000 porters and activists of a number of fundamentalist organisations including the Jamaat-e-Islami, for carrying artillery and mortar guns, besides Stinger missiles and anti-aircraft guns to the posts held by the infiltrators. The sources said the Pakistan Army and Air Force authorities had approached several countries, especially China, for the supply of spares for T-69 tanks, 122 mm artillery guns and the Chinese built MiG-19, F-7 and MiG-21.<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> The Tribune, June 30,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref2" target="_blank">[2]</a> India Today, The Ghosts of War, "It's a suicidal mission" July 19,1999, p.29-31,<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> Parveen Swami, War in Kargil, Frontline, June 18, 1999, p.5-6[2] Parveen swami, War in Kargil, Frontline, June 18, 1999 , p.4<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref3" target="_blank">[3]</a> The Tribune June 14,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref4" target="_blank">[4]</a> The Tribune, Monday, June 21,1999, India Today July 5, 1999 p27-33<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref5" target="_blank">[5]</a> War’s little irony: India Today. July 5,1999 p.27<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref6" target="_blank">[6]</a> TheTribune, June 23,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref7" target="_blank">[7]</a> The Frontline, The Final Assault and the With<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref8" target="_blank">[8]</a> The Tribune, June 22,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref9" target="_blank">[9]</a> The Tribune Sept 10, 1999 p.9.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref10" target="_blank">[10]</a> June 30,1999,The Times of India<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref11" target="_blank">[11]</a> The Tribune June 30,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref12" target="_blank">[12]</a> The Tribune, August 7,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref13" target="_blank">[13]</a> The Tribune, July 5,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref14" target="_blank">[14]</a> Sainik Samachar, Jerry, The Gunner, A Tribute, 16-30 Sept 1999, p10.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref15" target="_blank">[15]</a> North Plus, August 15,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref16" target="_blank">[16]</a> The Tribune, July 5,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref17" target="_blank">[17]</a> The Tribune, August 7,1999</blockquote>

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