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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Dalvinder Singh Grewal" data-source="post: 226815" data-attributes="member: 22683">CHAPTER VII                                         MILITANCY General<ol> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Genesis of the Pak sponsored Militancy in India</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Aims & Objectives</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">The operating groups</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Stages of Development: Recruitment, Training, Arming</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Finances</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Organisation</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Militant Methodology of Operations</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">India’s Response</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Achievements & Failures</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Impact</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Analysis</li> </ol>General:It is well known that one cannot shake hands with a mailed fist; similarly can India have a dialogue with a neighbour who was concealing his lethal weapon while extending the olive branch? In fact, Nawaz Sharif has taken India for a ride even as his army was perfecting its diabolical plans for Kargil. Any truce with Pakistan now or in the near future will not necessarily ensure peace in the subcontinent. ”Not withstanding repeated mutual assurances that there is nothing for others to worry about, the fighting in Kashmir between India and Pakistan becomes steadily more dangerous. The action in the high Himalayas, already more serious than it has been for decades, is relentlessly sharpening the question of whether the two South Asian rivals, both now nuclear-capable, can maintain control. This time around in often-contested Kashmir, the Pakistanis are plainly to blame for having started the fighting. If it was not the elected government of the country that was responsible, then -- perhaps worse -- it may have been a sort of Pakistani military-fundamentalist axis that the government is not in a position to know fully about, let alone to subordinate. In an evident act of provocation, hundreds of Islamic guerrillas from Afghanistan and elsewhere and perhaps also some Pakistani soldiers infiltrated across the "line of control" -- the temporary or unofficial border -- separating India- and Pakistan-held Kashmir. The evident military purpose, beyond political challenge to the Indian government, was to put at risk the strategic Kargil highway by which India asserts its military presence in that mountain fastness. To this Pakistan-inspired initiative, the Indians responded vigorously by sending warplanes with precision-guided weapons against guerrilla positions. The Indians have so far been careful, however -- this to the Clinton administration's praise -- not themselves to cross the line of control. In this high-altitude confrontation, the infiltrators have the higher ground, but powerful India would seem to have the military edge over time. The danger the confrontation poses arises from the newly achieved nuclear status of the two South Asian countries. In particular, the reaction of Pakistan or its headstrong generals or its struggling civilian leadership to a prospective humiliation at the hands of India makes for a pervasive nervousness. In the year after India kicked off nuclear tests by itself and Pakistan, the United States launched a diplomatic initiative intended to deepen the two neighbors understanding of the implications of joint nuclear status for peace and stability in their countries and in their region. With the now month-old Kargil crisis, the emphasis of American diplomacy necessarily has shifted to cooling down the military inflammation -- Washington calls on Pakistan to withdraw support for the guerrillas -- and drawing the combatants back into the so-called Lahore process of talks and a few tentative but resonant acts ("bus diplomacy") between the South Asian rivals. From President Clinton on down, the administration has been promoting the Lahore option in order to impart to it a momentum of its own and to help South Asia rise above the deep distrust otherwise drenching the subcontinent. Divided Muslim Kashmir, already the cause at the center of two wars between India and Pakistan (when they were both much less lethally armed than they are today), remains the hard case. It is the single issue that most stirs strategic anxieties as well as nationalistic passions on both sides. In the past, other countries could, and generally did, regard that hot spot chiefly as disagreeable and dangerous but as a piece of business falling mostly between India and Pakistan. But with the two now having declared themselves nuclear powers, and showing themselves not in full respect for the cautionary rules of the nuclear road, then the circle of the concerned expands. Fortunately, not all the signs in South Asia point the same way. American officials take heart that both sides are listening to their cautions. The officials hold out some hope for a diplomatic resolution of the Kargil crisis. But that's much the lesser part of it. If the Kargil crisis is calmed there must come a serious address to the Kashmir question. Pakistan needs to stop blowing on the fires of armed revolt in India-held Kashmir; this is basic. But India has its own responsibilities. The Indians want it both ways: to keep a tight grip on Kashmir and at the same time to deny Pakistan's effort to "internationalize" the issue; the Indians would confine it to exchanges between India and Pakistan. India can sustain this rigid posture, if at all, only by systematically and credibly widening the openings for democratic self-government in the part of Kashmir that, with two-thirds of a million troops, it holds. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a> Pak Role In Fostering TerrorismiIn Kashmir: Some Facts & Figures Number of terrorist camps in Pakistan: 37 Number of terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir: 49 Number of Pakistani-run terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir: 2300 Total number of foreign mercenaries operating in Jammu & Kashmir: 900 Number of Pakistani terrorists killed by Indian forces: 291 Number of Indian civilians killed by Pakistani terrorists: ov 29,000 Number of firearms recovered from Pakistan-trained terrorists in India: 47,000 Number of explosions carried out by Pakistan-trained terrorists in India: 4,730 Amt of explosives recovered from Pakistan-trained terrorists;60 tons(30,000 kg) Nationalities of foreign mercenaries operating in Jammu and Kashmir; Pakistan, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Afghanistan, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq. Major Pakistani Supported Terrorist Groups Active In Jammu & Kashmir: 1.Harkat ul-Ansar (renamed Harkat ul-Mujahiideen) - Hqs: Muzaffarabad (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) 2.Lashkar-e-Tayyiba - Hqs: Muridke (Pakistan) Number of people in Jammu and Kashmir killed in violence waged by Pakistan-supported terrorist over the last decade: over 20,000 Ethnic Cleansing in Kashmir: Nearly 300,000 Kashmiri Pandits (original Hindu inhabitants of Kashmir valley) driven out of their ancestral homeland by Pakistan-supported terrorists. Pakistan's response to charges of terrorism support: "It only provides diplomatic and moral support to the terrorists". This is refuted in "credible reports of official Pakistani support of Kashmiri terrorist groups…" in the US Sate Department 1997 report on global terrorism. 70% of Pakistan's budget goes to support the military and debt servicing. A large portion of the military spending goes towards its operations in J&K including underwriting Kashmiri terrorists. (NY Times, Aug. 30, 1998, The Tribune, Oct 10, 1998. Terrorist Organisations Active In Jammu And Kashmir: Al Faran-(Front organisation of Harkat ul-Ansar) - Al Jihad - LET -Lashkar-e-Tayyiba-(Hqs in Pakistan) - JuM -Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen - HuM -Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Leadership in Pakistan) - MDA - Markaz-al-Dawa (Hqs in Pakistan) - HuA -Harkat ul-Ansar - IIM - Islami Inqulabi Mahaz - Bul - Bait-ul-Islam - AB - Al Barq - JKLF - Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (Amanullah Khan Faction, Hqs in Pakistan) - Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen - Hizbullha - Jaanbaaz Force - HkuM Harkat ul-Mujahideen - Jamiat-e-Islami - Allah Tigers - Tehrik ul-Mujahideen - Tehrik ul-Jehad-e-Islami - Pasdaran-e-Islam - Ansarullah SOME OF THE MAJOR RECOVERIES Weapons 1. 12.7 MM Anti Air Craft Machine Guns - 04 2. Heavy/Utility Machine Guns - 46 3. Rifles (G3/AK/Chinese/M-16/Sniper) - 198 4. Grenade/Rocket Launchers - 19 5. 81/120 MM Mortars - 12 6. 37MM Twin Barrel AD Gun - 01 7. Stinger Missile with launcher - 01 8. 23 MM Gun - 01 9. 14.5 MM KPVT - 01 10. 105 MM Howitzer less barrels - 03 Total 286 AMMUNITION 11.Anti Personnel Mines - 1406 12.Artillery/Mortar Bombs - 1200 13.Chinese Rockets - 32 (Plus large quantity of small arms ammunition, grenades and explosives amounting to approximately 35 tonnes). Equipment & Clothing 15. Night vision devices - 06 16. Communication sets (All types) - 22 17. Bullet-proof jackets - 17 18. Gas masks - 39 19. Telephone cable - 05 KMs 20. Sleeping bags - 33 21. 3-4 Men/Igloo tents - 25 Note: Besides above, sizeable quantity of bunker construction material, Pak military literature, Pak currency, marked maps and personal items of Pak soldiers were also recovered. Genesis of Militancy in Kashmir Ever since Pakistani raiders and razakars invaded J&K in October 1947 and the state acceded to India, Pakistan has been unable to accept what it perceives as a wrongful oss. The state remains a bone of contention between the two countries even after over 50 years of independence. The Pakistan Government calls it the 'core' issue and says that the eventual merger of J&K with Pakistan is the only acceptable solution to the problem and that it is the 'unfinished agenda of partition'.2 Having failed to annex J&K by force in the several wars initiated by it against India over the last 50 years, and emboldened by its acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1987,3 Pakistan hatched a new conspiracy for the annexation of J&K by waging a covert 'proxy war' against India through a strategy of 'bleeding India by a thousand cuts'. Operation 'Topac', under which Pakistan launched its proxy war against India, was brilliantly conceived and skilfully executed. Pakistan's President, General Zia ul Haq's concept was to exploit the religious sentiments of the Kashmiri people, whip up passions on communal and sectarian lines, fan the flames of religious fundamentalism and, in the process, gradually create conditions for waging a jehad. Before launching its proxy war in Kashmir, Pakistan also initiated measures to exploit the disgruntled elements among the youth of Punjab to fight for the creation of an independent Sikh state of Khalistan. The intention was to destabilise India by creating conditions of insecurity in two contiguous front-line Indian states and to tie down the Indian security forces, particularly the Indian Army, in internal security duties. It was expected that prolonged employment in internal security duties would weaken the Indian Army and degrade its conventional superiority over the Pakistan Army. All this was to be achieved through a low-cost option, without getting directly involved. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan was entrusted with the responsibility of executing the plan. The ISI had gained immense experience in organising guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, with sabotage and terrorism as the weapons of choice, while working together with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The ISI had also surreptitiously siphoned off nearly 60 per cent of the small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives supplied to it by the CIA for onward despatch to the Afghan mujahideen.4 It has been reported that arms and ammunition worth US $5 billion had been pumped into Afghanistan by the US and its allies. In addition, the erstwhile Soviet Union had supplied arms and ammunition worth US $5.7 billion.5 Large numbers of these weapons became available to the ISI for equipping Kashmiri militants when the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Profits from the clandestine sale of freely available narcotics from Afghanistan, "donations from Muslim zealots in other countries"6 and profits from large-scale smuggling activities across the Indian border, provided adequate funds to finance an uprising in J&K. Massive rigging of elections to the J&K Assembly in March 19877 and the Kashmiri people's disillusionment with Mr. Farooq Abdullah's allegedly corrupt and inefficient administration,8 led to spontaneous protest and a call for azadi (independence). Thus the situation was ripe for exploitation and the ISI, which was ready and waiting, stepped in to fan the flames. The strategic design of Operation Topac was to launch a proxy war against India in a phased manner.9 The salient aspects of Pakistan's plan were as under :-10 * Initiate a low-level insurgency to interdict communications networks and subvert the police and financial institutions. * Subsequently, exert direct pressure along the Line of Control (LoC) by large-scale sabotage and infiltrate mercenaries and Special Forces to attack vital targets in rear areas. * At an appropriate stage, using religion as a motivating and binding factor, give a nudge to the jehad to peak and, if necessary, be prepared to exercise the military option to liberate J&K. While J & K was to remain the focus of all ISI activities, Operation Topac also envisaged the provision of support and encouragement to insurgent and militant groups in the north-eastern states of India and thespread of terrorism progressively to other parts of India, in keeping with the strategy of bleeding the country through a thousand cuts. It is axiomatic that for the Pakistanis, a continuing crisis in Kashmir and tensions along the LoC with India provide an excellent diversion from frustrations at home. These are time-tested methods for mobilising the masses, for gaining the support of fundamentalist Islamic parties and the mullahs within Pakistan and in other Islamic states. It also enables the civilian rulers and the bureaucracy to keep the Pakistani Army gainfully employed in directing and supporting the slickly packaged 'just cause' of the Muslim brethren of Kashmir and, as a corollary, away from harbouring thoughts of another military coup. Another major aim is to internationalise the Kashmir issue, contrary to the spirit of the 1972 Shimla Agreement, by raising the bogey of the denial of the Kashmiri people's right of self-determination. It is conveniently ignored that Pakistan itself had impeded the process of the holding of a plebiscite in J&K by not vacating its illegal occupation of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), which is called Azad Kashmir in Pakistan. The playing up and highlighting of trumped up human rights violations in the international media is also part of a well-orchestrated campaign. Pakistan's proxy war campaign is carefully calibrated to ensure that India's perceived 'threshold of tolerance' is not transgressed. Though Pakistan would prefer to avoid escalation of the present low intensity conflict (LIC) situation to conventional war, it has apparently vectored in the risks involved in pursuing its proxy war strategy into its operational plans. Yossef Bodansky writes that, "Pakistan knows that the active pursuit of the current Kashmir strategy may lead to an escalation of the face off with India. Islamabad is ready to deal with this eventuality while increasing its all out support for the Kashmiris." In mid-February 1995, a Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that 'if India carries out another aggression and war breaks out between Pakistan and India, it would not be a war of a thousand years or even a thousand hours, but only a few minutes and India should not be oblivious to the potential destruction.' Pakistani officials add that "Pakistan is really in a position to strike a heavy blow against India through its nuclear capability."11 Pakistan also believes that its nuclear weapons and missiles provide the cheapest option for peace. Gen Mirza Aslam Beg writes: "The nuclear and missile deterrence have helped maintain peace in the sub-continent for over two decades."12 However, it is self-evident that a foreign power can sow the seeds of insurgency only when discontentment and dissent are already widespread among the people and the situation is ripe for exploitation. Due to decades of poor governance13 and neglect, compounded by rampant corruption, cynical nepotism, alienation from the national mainstream and political mismanagement, the situation in J&K was as bad as it could possibly have been in 1988-89.14 It is only belatedly that true realisation has dawned regarding the various sins of omission and commission with which the post-independence history of J&K is replete. J&K Governor, Mr. Girish Chandra Saxena, recently told Prakash Nanda in an interview that, "We are considering the situation on the political, administrative and democratic fronts. We realise that maladministration, corruption and unemployment have also been responsible for the growth of militancy in the past."15. Aims & Objectives Militants Groups: The militant groups operating and other parts of India are given out as under: Foreign Militant Groups:<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn2" target="_blank">[2]</a> Lashkar-e-Toiba: The biggest centre of Pak trained militants is at Markaz-e Dawat-ul-Irshad. The centre is spread over several acres outside lahore. The top, armed wing of the Markaz happens to be the Lashkar-e-Toiba, whose members in turn receive arms training in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan as well {censored} Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Toiba is a 300- strong force, all of them Pakistanis and Afghanis; the group co-ordinates its militant activity through local groups. Dominant in Kupwara, Baramullah and Badgam. Osama Ben ladn , the saudi billionnairre-turned-terrorist kingpin has visited the Markaz in the past and maintains close links with it. Indeed he is one of the pattern of the markaz. Lashkar-e-Toiba:- On the sprawling 200-acre complex that is the Markaz-e-Toiba at Muridke near Labore, over 30,000 Muslim militants gathered to reaffirm the waging of a jehad against the wold, parpticularly India and the US. The Taliban delegates from Afghanistan vowed never o hand over Osama bin Laden, the most-wanted FBI figitive. The occasion was the three-day annual congregation- from November 3 to 5-of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the military wing of its patron religious body, the Dawatul Irshed. While locals usually go to the Markaz for arbitration of their disputes and sometimes of murders, the tented village that sprung up midway between Lahore and Gujranwala functioned like an Islamic state. Even passing vehicles weren't allowed to play music; TV, smoking and photography were entirely prohibited. The premises were heavily guarded by Lashkar soldiers armed with sophisticated assault rifles, machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. In fact, the high point of every such congregation is the presence of highly trained and motivated Lashkar soldiers and fiery speeches by various Lashkar commanders who narrate their battle experiences in places as far afield as Bosnia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Burma and Kashmir. The congregation concludes with a display of the soldiers' military skills, including field craft, strippling assembling weapons, assault techniques and training. Founded in '89 by Prof Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the religious university of Dawatul has 500 offices in Pakistan, 40 teachers and around 800 students, from ages eight to 20, who are educated to propagate Islam and prepare for jehad. The dawatul project was originally initiated by a group of traders; now funds come through small donations from ordinary Pakistanis. Jehad, in fact, was the leitmotif in the speeches of the Lashkar leaders this time too as also was the fact that more than ever before, it is incumbent upon Muslims today to wage the holy war till all of God's earth is turned into darul Salam (the land of peace). Expalaining the philosophy to the assembled mujahideen, Adbul Rehman Al-Dakhil, the Lashkar chief in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, said;"Islam permits the killing of {censored} (infidels) while terrorists kill for establishing their own rule. If jehad is terrorism, we're terrorists." Also attending the congregation was the nawab of Junagarh, Mohammad Jahangir Khanji, whoclaims that his grand-father, Sir Nawab Mahabat Khanji, had announced Junagarh's annexation with Pakistan on September 15,'47 but the Indian army forcibly occupied the territory on November 9,'47. The Nawab is reported to have said (during a private meeting with Prof Saeed) that Junagarh was still a part of Pakistan and that Lashkar militants should strive for its independence as well. The Lashkar high command does not believe in democracy and understands-ironically, better than Pakistan's political parties- that true democracy is underpinned by the twin concepts of secularism and constitutional liberalism in Pakistan. Its leadership had been vocal in its opposition to the Nawaz Sharif government for first inviting the Indian prime minister to Pakistan and later withdrawing the Pakistani troops from Kargil where Lashkar militants were fighing alongside the regulars. "We reject democracy: the notion of people's sovereignty is anti-Islam," declared Saeed at the Lashkar congregation. "Only Allah is sovereign." Another prominent Lashkar leader, Qazi Abdul Wahid, praised Gen Musharraf's military takeover, saying they had been fearing a major crackdown from the deposed regime. The second day of the Lashkar congregation was marked by fiery anti-India speeches following three bomb blasts within the span of an hour, close to Muridke on November,4. The Pakistan intelligence agencies held RAW responsible, claiming that two dozen RAW agents including 14 women and 12 men were present at Muridke on the day of the blasts to create disturbance. The blasts (that left one dead, 35 injured) were seen as India's avenging the November 3 killings of eight Indian soldiers during a Lashkar attack on the 15 Corps headquarters in Srinagar. The explosions in Muridke, the first of their kind under the new regime, took place 33 days after the October 12 military takeover. They were seen as a repeat of the blasts that took place at exactly the same place on the same day last. A powerful bomb had exploded in the Muridke main market on the second day of the Lashkar's '98 gathering, leaving six dead and 22 injured. The agencies also claimed the arrest of four RAW agents involved in these blasts and allegedly recovered sensitive material and documents from their possession. Prof Saeed called these explosions a cowardly retaliation by the Indian governemtn. "The world should witness that while we targeteda military installation, the coward Indians responded by targeting civilian," he observed. "The blasts were aimed at scarig mujahideen but Indians should know that such cowardly acts would neither bring down their morale nor their spirit of jehad." He hailed as a big success the Lashkar's Srinagar attack, saying:"This ws a very effective strike and a big success in responding to the crackdown by Indian forces on unarmed Kashmiris". He said two of the four fidai attackers from Lashkar were killed nd two others returned to their hideout. Saeed in fact claimed that theif fighters could even strike the Indian prime minister's office. "Lasten Vajpayee," he said,"if you do not withdraw your forces from Kashmir, if you do not stop atrocities in Kashmir, then we have given you a message by attacking the corps commanders' office in Srinagar. Whenever we want, we will storm your office too. The decision on Kashmir will take place on a battlefield and will be made by the mujahideen."<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn3" target="_blank">[3]</a> Hizbul Mujahedin: The largest in terms of numbers, this 4,000- strong outfit is known to operate throughout the Kashmir Valley. An avowedly pro-Pakistan outfit, it has about 1,500 foreigners. Since 80 per cent of its strength is still drawn from the local cadre, it regularly clashes with other outfits in its efforts to gain supremacy. Led by Sayed Salahudin in Pakistan, has been virtually controlled by ISI as was seen in the tapes produced on Zee TV. It offered cease fire in July 2000, but later retracted on the advise of ISI controllers. It depends not only on ISI but also on Jamaat-e-Islami for its supply of funds and weapons. Its claim on 10 May 2001 for having planted bomb near Army HQs and for its capability to strike anywhere in India, cannot be taken lightly, though its teeth are not as sharp as LeT. Jash-E-Mohammad: Set up in April 2000, by Maulana Azhar who shot into limelight when he was released from prison in the Kandhar hijack deal., this group has made its mark in the urban areas. Known for its contacts, the Maulana has established a strong local network. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen: The lauch of the Jaish-e-Mohammadhas weekened the position of this group led by Fazlue Rehman Khalil. Most of its members who have close contacts with the Maulana have crossed over to his fold. Al-Umar-Mujahideen: A small local group led by Mushtaq Zardar- who was also released along with the Maulana in the hijack deal-it backs the Jash-e-Mohammed and LeT Harkat-ul-Ansar: Of an estimated strength of 1,000, at least 750 are believed to be foreign militants, all fighting for Kashmir’s accession to ‘Islamic Pakistan’. Area of operation: Anantnag and Doda. Harkat-ul-Ansar: Of an estimated strength of 1,000, at least 750 are believed to be foreign militants, all fighting for Kashmir’s accession to ‘Islamic Pakistan’. Area of operation: Anantnag and Doda. Kashmir Groups Muslim Mujahedin: With an estimated strenth of 1,000, the group confines its operations to parts of Baramullah and Anantnag. Muslim Mujahedin: With an estimated strength of 1,000 the groups confines its operations to parts of Baramullah and Anantnag.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn4" target="_blank">[4]</a> Al Umar: With an estimated strength of about 600, it is the military arm of the Qaumi Action Committee, the political party which supports Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, chief of the All Party Hurriyat Conference. Area of operation: Srinagar. Al Umar: With an estimated strength of about 600, it is the ilitary arm of the Qaumi Action committee, the political party which supports Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, chief of the All Party Hurriyat Conference. Area of Operation : Srinagar.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn5" target="_blank">[5]</a> AlBarq: Comprising about 1,000 militants, the group is the military wing of the People’s League headed by Abdul Ghani Lone who is kno part of the Hurriyat Conference. Area of operation: Kupwara, Baramullah and parts of Srinagar. Al Barq: Comprising about 1,000 militants the group is the military wing of the People’s League headed by Abdul Ghani Lone who is now part of the Hurriyat Conference. Area of operation: Kupwara, Baramullah and parts of Srinagar.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn6" target="_blank">[6]</a> Muslim Janbaz Force: Now supporting Shabir Shah, this group of about 300 is in a process of consolidating itself in Doda, Poonch, 0Rajouri and parts of Srinagar. Muslim Janbaz Force : Now supporting Shabir Shah, this group of about 300 is in a process of consolidating itself in Doda, Poonch, Rajouri and parts of Srinagar.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn7" target="_blank">[7]</a> Ikhwan-e-Muslimoon: Headed by Koka Parray and reportedly backed by the Indian Government, the group has ousted the Hizbul Mujahedin from Sonawari and Kangan which are now considered its domain. Ikhwan-e-Musalmeen: Headed by Koka Parray and reportedly backed by the Indian Government, the group has ousted the Hizbul Mujahedin from Sonawari and Kangan which are now considered its domain.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn8" target="_blank">[8</a>] JKLF:Split between Javed Mir and Yasin Malik, it is now an above-ground group and has recently returned to the Hurriyat<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn9" target="_blank">[9]</a>.- JKLF: Split between Javed Mir and Yasin Malik, it is now and above-ground group and has recently returned to the Hurriyat.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn10" target="_blank">[10]</a> Militancy Area of influence:- India Today Nov 30,1995, p. 56 Militants Operatoions in J&K Inter Group Rivalaries Militants gunned down 15 persons belonging to three Muslim families at Morha Bachhi village in Poonch district’s sensitive Surankote tehsil on Monday night. The area has seen a renewed spurt in militant activity, coinciding with the stepping up of Pakistani shelling along the district’s border. Those slain included six women and four children. One woman was wounded. Before receding, the militants set afire two of the houses where they had struck. Reports said the three targeted families were related to one another. In another incident in the same district on Monday night, militants gunneddown two persons at Gursai village in Mendhar tehsil. Identified as Mohammad Iqbal and Liaquat Ali, both Gujjars, the victims are believed to have been killed on the suspicion of being informers of the security forces. Reports said that the Surankote massacre was the result of intergroup differences between Hizbul Mujahideen militants caused by territorial jealously anddisagreement over style of functioning. The Hizb group, dominated by locals, resents the foreign-dominated Harkat assuming a “super-boss” role. Sources said that the “gang-rivalry” had once again peaked in the wake of fresh brief from Pakistan. The Surankote massacre is said to have been perpetrated by the Harkat group led by Qaisar Mehmood and the victims belonged to the family of Khalid Mohmmed of the Hizb. The people of Morha Bachhi on Tuesday carried the bodies to the Dudok bridge, laid them along the road andstarted a vociferous dominstration against the massacre, reports said. They even blamed the security forces for the carnage. UNI adds from Barmula: “At least four Pakistani infiltrators and as many security personnel were killed in a night-long encounter at Hilmatpora in the frontier district of Kupwara. Official sources said the security forces, on a tip-off that some militants from Pakistan occupied Kashmir were hiding in Halmatpora village, sealed the area on Monday evening. In the encounter that ensued four infiltrators and an equal number of security personnel, including a deputy commandant, one inspector and two jawans were killed.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn11" target="_blank">[11]</a> There is hardly a militant group in the Valley or in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that does not claim that it is their ‘freedom fighters’ inflicting casualties on the Indian army. But highly-placed sources in the civil and military establishment shared their assessment that the mercenaries/militia who have been pushed into Indian territory belong primarily to three extremist groups: the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Al Badr. Of the three, though, Lashkar-e-Toiba is the most prominent, it is the militant wing of the Lahore-based Markaz-e-Dawat-ul-Irshad (MDI), or the Centre for Religious Studies, started in ’80. Indoctrination plays a large part of the MDI’s recruitment process. Young boys-usually from border villages - are picked up and sent for religious “briefing”. The first task set them is to return to their homes and smash TV sets, as it spreads western and decadent culture. Once convinced of their commitment and ability to fight, they are then sent to training camps in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir PoK, and also to advanced training camps in Afghanistan run by Bin Laden. These youngesters serve as replenishment forces to the intruders. The core groups of the infiltrators, again mostly drawn from the Lashkar-e-Toiba, are a battle-hardened lot. Most have entered India after a tough tour of duty in Aftghanistan. Official estimates are that while a few of these Afghan “mujahideen” may have been part of the force that took on the Russians, others are thought to have fought with the hardline Taliban militia which now rules Afghanistan. The most effective of these seem to be from Gilgit, Baltistan and the higher regions of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. They are acclimatised to the high altitudes, and are also used to actual warfare in those conditions. That’s the reason the ISI has been relying heavily on these men. Bin Laden’s hand was revealed when he told reporters last year that Pakistan should allow the setting up of military camps and open up its borders so that volunteers could launch a “jehad” to liberate Kashmir. Bin Laden was even suspected of having moved to the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir area at about the time the Indian Prime Minister was in Lahore However Taliban version was that Laden was very much in Afghanistan, primarily because of his threatened capture and/or elimination by the US if he ventured out. The Indian estimate is that a significant portion of the finances for the infiltrators are coming in from the ISI and other foreign agencies at the behest of Bin Laden, especially for the Harkat and Lashkar, while military support and training is a “distinct possibility, in some cases a certainty”. In fact, the money being handed out to the infiltrators for the Kargil intrusions, say sources, “is five to 10 times what they were getting for a tour of duty (lasting three to six months) in the Valley”. The figure being quoted is $20,000 but there is no way to ascertain the exact amount being paid. ; it varies from militant to militant. The incentives for Pakistani Army regulars-primarily from the Northern Light Infantry (NLI)-are obviously different in nature. It was reported that some intruders were observed performing their prayers even while the IAF was strafing their bunkers. This would indicate that not money alone, it is an almost fanatical degree of religion-inspired commitment. In fact, the “leader elements’ among these organisations are said to have trained for the Kargil operation alongside NLI personnel on the slopes of K2, the world’s second highest mountain. Just how motivated they are can be gauged from the fact that scaling and then occupying bitterly cold, windswept, mountain-tops for an indefinite period only to confront the might of the Indian army has not demoralised all of them. It is, however, clear that the only reason for this is that the Pakistani army is providing them artillery cover and a large presence of Pakistani regulars among them is directing operations and providing the crucial logistical support-supply lines et al. But even as the army battles it out on the front, there is the threat of a simultaneous increase in pressure from militants within the Valley, most of them from the same groups active in Kargil. In fact, it’s already started. A confidential report points out that since the launch of the air-strikes in Kargil, there have been over 20 IED (imporvised explosive device) explosions across the state in which army and paramilitary personnel have been among those killed. What is worrying the state administration is that the strikes have not been commensurate with the known strength of the militants; so, they could be planning something big. This apprehension was heightened by the middle of the week when senior officials were tipped off that a Pakistani explosives expert had managed to slip into the Valley. To prove their fears, a policeman was shot dead and another injured by militants in the crowded Batamloo area of Srinagar in the middle of the afternoon on Wednesday. 1999 is the tenth year of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Despite vociferous denials to the contrary, Pakistan continues to finance, train, equip and support Kashmiri militants and actively abet their ttempts at infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC). As the initial recruitment base in the Kashmir Valley has very nearly completely dried up, Pakistan is increasingly resorting to sponsoring Islamic mercenaries to let loose a reign of terror in J&K. A suo motto statement made by the Defence Minister in the Lok Sabha on August 5, 1998, explained Pakistan's frustrations and its desperation to raise the ante in Kashmir. Extracts from the statement are reproduced below.29 "Pakistan has always resorted to firing along the LoC to facilitate infiltration by Pakistani and foreign militants who are organised, trained equipped, financed, armed and finally infiltrated with active covering fire and support from Pakistani Army deployed along the LoC. In recent months, especially since May 1998, our security forces have been able to intercept and reduce the level of infiltration, thereby frustrating Pakistan's designs. As if to give vent to its frustration, Pakistan has started targeting not only our Army posts but also civilian inhabited areas, with Batalik, Kargil, Kanzalwan, Tangdhar, Karen and Uri becoming the main targets. "These actions by Pakistan are in consonance with its calculated design to obstruct and stall peaceful bilateral dialogue and to create a sense of alarm by orchestrating incidents on the border which will project Jammu and Kashmir as a 'flashpoint'. Pakistan's desperation is becoming acute in view of the fast declining Kashmiri support in the Valley to militancy, control of which has passed into the hands of Pakistani militant organisations, patronised by Pakistani political figures; and foreign mercenaries directed by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence." With the Indian security forces in almost complete control of the security situation in the Kashmir Valley, the centre of gravity of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)-controlled and directed mercenary activities is gradually shifting to new areas south of the Pir Panjal Range which separates the Jammu region from the Kashmir Valley. These include Doda (Kishtwar and Bhadarwah), Punch and Rajouri. Sporadic acts of wanton terrorism were also perpetrated in and around Jammu City and Udhampur during 1997-98. Serious attempts are also being made to widen the arc of militancy to areas in the states bordering J&K such as in the Dalhousie-Chamba area of Himachal Pradesh. As most areas south of the Pir Panjal Range in Jammu region are predominantly Hindu majority areas, unlike the Kashmir Valley, which is a Muslim majority area, the aim is clearly to create a communal and sectarian divide. Acts of terrorism targeted primarily against Hindus are designed to engender mass migrations by whipping up a fear psychosis on the pattern of the exodus of Hindus from the Kashmir Valley in 1990-93, with a view to gradually changing the demographic pattern in the Jammu region and adjacent areas. Tables 1 and 2 show the brutal and savage acts of terrorism perpetrated in the Kashmir Valley and the areas south of the Pir Panjal Range in 1996-98, masterminded by the ISI and executed with ruthless precision by foreign mercenaries.30 Since the setting up of the Unified Command in J&K in December 1996 (after elections to the State Assembly in September 1996), with the Chief Minister of the State as the Chairman and the General Officers Commanding 15 and 16 Corps as Security Advisers, there has been much greater co-ordination between the State Government, the Army and the CPOs in the fight against militancy. The re-vamped Jammu and Kashmir Police (JKP) and the better trained, equipped and motivated Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police (JKAP)34 have begun to operate in close co-ordination with the central security forces and greater synergy has been achieved in counter-insurgency operations. The intelligence network has also been strengthened. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has become more effective in co-ordinating intelligence acquisition, collation, analysis, synthesis and dissemination. The Army has enhanced its vigil over the LoC to further reduce infiltration through a three-tier, static-cum-mobile deployment plan combined with vigorous patrolling in the rear areas, particularly during the hours of darkness and poor visibility. Equipment and technology deficiencies of the past are now being redressed to improve and further enhance the quality of surveillance. Sophisticated electro-optronic observation and surveillance equipment, including hand-held battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs), is gradually being inducted to further enhance the quality of surveillance over the LoC. The long-standing requirement of passive night vision devices (PNVDs—based on the principle of thermal imaging), for the troops deployed on the LoC, is also being addressed. Unattended ground sensors (UGS), which can detect the movement of human beings through the generation of acoustic, magnetic or electrical signatures, are also likely to be acquired and emplaced in difficult terrain through which infiltration can take place. However, no amount of hi-tech gadgetry such as BFSRs, PNVDs and UGS, can completely eliminate infiltration. The rugged mountainous terrain, covered by dense forests in the Punch and Rajouri areas, comprises innumerabe deep ravines, nullahs and re-entrants and is tailor-made for infiltration as the initiative for deciding on a route for infiltration, from among the numerous choices available in a given area, lies with the militants. Even if the number of infantry battalions deployed on the LoC could be doubled, it would not be possible to stop infiltration altogether. Hence, the present emphasis is on making the villagers capable of fending for themselves through the establishment of village defence committees (VDCs). The members of the VDCs are being provided elementary training, light weapons and limited communications equipment. In Doda district alone, 800 VDCs have been established.36 Simultaneously, the number of police posts is being increased to enhance the presence of the civil administration in the affected areas in Punch, Rajouri, Udhampur and Doda districts. The aim is to instil confidence among the people, deter terrorist strikes by denying the militants the capability of unfettered movement in the area, gain intelligence, identify harbourers and sympathisers who provide shelter to the militants, exercise command and control over the VDCs and for quick reaction against the terrorists when they mange to launch strikes. This JKP scheme is called 'Police Security Grid' and involves the setting up of 90 border posts (on the likely routes of infiltration behind Army posts in Punch and Rajouri districts), 385 defence posts (inside selected villages) and 118 operational posts (to launch active counter-insurgency operations against the militants) in the four districts.37 When finally implemented, these measures will help to prevent forced migrations of members of the minority community and enable the JKP and the people of the affected areas to play a more effective part in eliminating militancy in J&K. In Punjab, the tide had turned only when the local people stood up to the militants and the Punjab Police, under the able guidance of the State's outstanding Director General, Mr. K P S Gill, took the lead in rooting out the scourge of militancy and terrorism from the State with the active support of the people. India's Military Response: Paying a High Price If the situation in Kashmir Valley has been brought under control despite the viciousness and ruthlessness of the ISI-sponsored campaign to wrest Kashmir from India, the credit must go to the Indian Army and the other central security forces such as the BSF and the CRPF. The Army's relentless effort in conducting counter-insurgency operations under the most trying circumstances, while resolutely adhering to the application of the principle of 'minimum force', is indeed commendable and possibly unparalleled. "In contrast to similar situations elsewhere in the world, where tanks, aircraft, artillery and mortars have been freely used with attendant non-combatant casualties, the Indian Army has conducted no more than a police operation in Kashmir. In keeping with its training and style, it has carried this out in a methodical fashion, ferreting out and arresting individuals rather than punishing a community, seeking combat with the militants, rather than waiting to be attacked in places where civilians could be hit."38 Tables 3 and 439 show the enormity of the task involved in bringing about normalcy in J&K. The large number of militants who have been killed, apprehended or have surrendered and, the huge quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives recovered, point both to the scale and viciousness of the campaign launched by Pakistan by proxy against India and the magnitude of the immense effort expended in successfully defeating that campaign. Table 3. Militants Neutralised by the Army <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Year </td><td>Killed </td><td>Apprehended </td><td>Surrendered </td></tr><tr><td>1990 </td><td>466 </td><td>3,267 </td><td>37 </td></tr><tr><td>1991 </td><td>632 </td><td>2,973 </td><td>138 </td></tr><tr><td>1992 </td><td>637 </td><td>4,089 </td><td>226 </td></tr><tr><td>1993 </td><td>1.042 </td><td>3,405 </td><td>73 </td></tr><tr><td>1994 </td><td>1,228 </td><td>3,197 </td><td>128 </td></tr><tr><td>1995 </td><td>1,102 </td><td>3,541 </td><td>657 </td></tr><tr><td>1996 </td><td>902 </td><td>1,826 </td><td>224 </td></tr><tr><td>1997 </td><td>888 </td><td>1,257 </td><td>235 </td></tr><tr><td>1998 </td><td>825 </td><td>475 </td><td>118 </td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL </td><td>7,742* </td><td>24,030** </td><td>1,836 </td></tr></table> Including foreign mercenaries :-* 888. * * 127. Weapons such as RPGs (rocket propelled grenade launchers), infantry mortars and anti-aircraft missiles, have been recovered in smaller numbers. In addition, 1,403 radio sets, most of them extremely sophisticated, have also been recovered. The above mentioned figures are in respect of militants neutralised and recoveries made during Army operations. The success achieved by the CPOs and JKP/JKAP would make the tally much higher. Table 4. Weapons Recovered by the Army up to December 1998 <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Sr. </td><td>Type of Weapon/ Equipment </td><td>Quantity </td></tr><tr><td>1 </td><td>Assault Rifle AK-47/56 </td><td>13,675 </td></tr><tr><td>2 </td><td>Light/Universal Machine Gun </td><td>779 </td></tr><tr><td>3 </td><td>Sniper Rifles </td><td>498 </td></tr><tr><td>4 </td><td>Sten Guns </td><td>27 </td></tr><tr><td>5 </td><td>Pistols </td><td>4,891 </td></tr><tr><td>6 </td><td>Single/ouble Barrel Guns </td><td>797 </td></tr><tr><td>7 </td><td>Anti-personnel Mines </td><td>5,422 </td></tr><tr><td>8 </td><td>Anti-tank Mines </td><td>354 </td></tr><tr><td>9 </td><td>Hand Grenades </td><td>35,557 </td></tr><tr><td>10 </td><td>Explosives (kgs) </td><td>11,865 </td></tr><tr><td>11 </td><td>Ammunition (rounds) </td><td>2,693,520 </td></tr></table> In reply to Dr. Jayanta Rongpi's Unstarred Question No. 205, answered in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) on May 28, 1998, the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes stated the following:-40 "At present, 72,000 defence personnel are directly deployed in counter-insurgency/internal security in J&K, while about 47,000 are deployed in north-eastern states. In addition, there are also personnel of supervisory and other formations who are involved in supervisory roles whose number is not included in the above figures. "Prolonged employment of Army for such duties, besides adversely affecting the Army's preparation for its main task also imposes an extra burden on the defence budget which, in turn, affects Army's modernisation programmes. In addition, casualties suffered by the Army in peacetime affect the morale of the Army personnel. "The maintenance of law and order is basically the responsibility of the State Governments and the defence forces are deployed for counter-insurgency/internal security duties only against a specific requisition by the State administration and/or when they are statutorily required to render such duties under the provisions of the relevant laws such as Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, etc. "The consistent policy of the Government in this regard has been that the defence forces should be deployed for internal security duties very sparingly and only if the State Government is not in a position to handle the situation and the deployment of defence forces becomes absolutely necessary. The Rashtriya Rifles was sanctioned by the Government to relieve the Army, to the extent possible, form counter-insurgency duties. This has, however, helped only to a limited extent in view of the increased commitment of the Army in counter-insurgency operations." It emerges from the Defence Minister's statement that a total of 119,000 Army personnel were deployed for counter-insurgency and internal security duties in J&K and the north-eastern states of India in May 1998. Since the number of supervisory and supporting personnel is over and above this figure, it could be concluded that approximately 132 infantry battalions were committed for such duties. (The approximate strength of an infantry battalion may be taken as 900 personnel.) Of these units, 36 battalions are of the Rashtriya Rifles.41 Hence, about 96 infantry battalions were employed for such duties. As the situation has not changed substantially since 1993-94 (except that while militancy has come militarily under control in the Kashmir Valley, the security situation in the areas south of the Pir Panjal range has deteriorated), it could be assumed that about 90 to 95 battalions are being employed continuously for counter-insurgency/internal security duties. In addition, for the last five years, five to eight infantry battalions of the Territorial Army42 and about 25 battalions of the Assam Rifles, a para-military force funded by the Ministry of Home Affairs but officered by and under the operational control of the Army, have also been employed for active operations within the country. Hence, overall 162 to 165 regular Army and Army-led para-military battalions are actively engaged in counter-insurgency/internal security operations and duties. To this list, details of the units of Central Police Organisations (CPOs) which are being employed for similar tasks, need to be added to get an overview of the enormity of the effort involved in combating militancy which is mainly Pakistan-sponsored, aided and abetted. These details are given in Table 5. Table 5. Units of CPO Forces Employed for Counter-insurgency/Internal Security Duties <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Type of Force </td><td>J&K </td><td>North-Eastern States </td></tr><tr><td>Border Security Force (BSF) Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) Jammu and Kashmir Armed Police (JKAP) </td><td>70 43 4 11 </td><td>  7 37 - - </td></tr></table> Besides the casualties being suffered almost on a daily basis and their adverse impact on morale, the Army's prolonged involvement in counter-insurgency operations has several other major disadvantages. The financial costs of sustaining a successful counter-insurgency campaign are staggering. It has been estimated that the Army spends approximately Rs. 2,500 crores (US $600 million) out of its annual budget on counter-insurgency operations.45 This is about 13 per cent of the Army's 1997-98 budget of Rs. 19,000 crores approximately (Revised Estimates). The outcome is that the Army spends almost 57 per cent of its budget on pay and allowances, about 40 percent on the maintenance of equipment and the replenishment of ammunition and other essential stores being consumed for counter-insurgency operations, and is left with only three per cent for modernisation, including capital acquisitions. Even the expenditure on the Rashtriya Rifles, amounting to approximately Rs 500 crores annually, is incurred from the Army's budget. It is obvious that the Army can ill afford an expenditure of 13 per cent on counter-insurgency operations from its budget without its operational efficiency for its primary task being significantly impaired. As the Defence Minister informed Parliament (see text of the Minister's statement above), the Army's modernisation programme has been adversely affected by its prolonged and continued involvement in counter-insurgency duties. This situation needs to be redressed as early as possible. As most of the additional battalions required for counter-insurgency operations have been inducted from peace stations, the peace time tenures of infantry battalions have consequently had to be reduced correspondingly. This affects the Army's preparation for conventional war since intensive training at individual, section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade and divisional levels requires a systematic and methodical approach and stability of tenure is an important pre-requisite. Also, the requirement of serving tenures for counter-insurgency/internal security is over and above the existing requirement of serving in field/high altitude areas along the LoC and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL, on Siachen Glacier) with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. This results in peace station tenures not only being shorter but also more spaced out. Once again, training and preparedness for conventional war are bound to be affected. The wear and tear caused to first line weapons (small arms and light crew-served weapons), equipment, vehicles, extreme cold clothing (ECC) and camp items such as tentage due to excessive usage in counter-insurgency/internal security operations, results in a reduction in their life cycles. As it is not always possible to procure replacements due to the inadequacy of funds, replacements have to be provided from the available war reserves which results in their depletion. Some units are inducted for operations temporarily during the summer months only or to fill emergent operational voids till new units can be brought in. The weapons and equipment that temporarily inducted units leave behind in cantonments, deteriorates due to inadequate maintenance. Regarding the effect on the morale of the Army, given the fact that approximately 119,000 personnel are involved in exacting and sometimes exasperating and psychologically unsettling counter-insurgency/internal security duties, it can be stated that the Army has borne the rigours of prolonged employment in these operations stoically and resolutely. The nature of LIC is such that it exacts a heavy mental toll due to the absence of a clearly defined uni-directional threat and the assumed omnipresence of armed militants who may suddenly open fire form the least expected direction. The abundance of anti-personnel mines and remotely controlled IEDs and, the lurking fear of a hand grenade being hurled without warning from around a corner on a passing vehicle, also add to the pressures on a soldier's mind. Odd hours of duty and long marches through inhospitable terrain, while braving the vagaries of the weather (which in J&K comprises rain, snow, sleet, fog and blistering winds capable of chilling even a well-clad soldier to the bone marrow), exact a heavy physical toll as well. By all accounts, personnel of the CPOs have also withstood the challenges of internal security operations commendably well. However, the long-term implications of prolonged employment are not yet clear. Maj Gen Arjun Ray writes : "Troops who operate for protracted periods under stressful conditions are bound to suffer from psychological problems as well as disorders." Recently there have been reports that a number of CRPF personnel deployed in J&K have been afflicted by mental disease. These need to be taken note of as the reported incidents may be advance indicators of a larger malaise.48 During an interview with the Times of India on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Army Day, General V P Malik, PVSM, AVSM, ADC, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) stated that, "With increasing involvement in counter-insurgency and internal security operations, the operational preparedness was getting diluted.......Prolonged and large-scale deployment is neither good for the Army nor the country."49 The COAS was only reiterating what he and his predecessors have said on a number of occasions in the past. In the ultimate analysis, it is clear that the prolonged and continued employment of a large number of Army units in counter-insurgency/internal security operations, is likely to result in the reduction of the Army's combat potential and, consequently, in the degradation of India's conventional deterrence, particularly against Pakistan. The Rashtriya Rifles force was raised to act as the Army's counter-insurgency strike force so that regular infantry battalions would remain available to train and prepare for their primary task even during periods when the Army's employment for counter insurgency/internal security operations is unavoidable. However, under the present circumstances, 36 Rashtriya Rifles battalions have proved to be grossly inadequate for the purpose as the requirement appears to have stabilised at approximately 130 to 135 battalions, including the Rashtriya Rifles battalions. It is imperative that the employment of regular infantry battalions of the Army for counter-insurgency operations be reduced to not more than 30 to 40 at a time so as to overcome the drawbacks of prolonged employment, if it cannot be stopped altogether. Various options could be considered to find a solution to this problem. Firstly, the number of Rashtriya Rifles attalions could be increased to about 60 and the force given permanency as the counter-insurgency component of the Army, to be funded preferably by the Ministry of Home Affairs to avoid a heavy strain on the Army's budget or through an additionality to be given to the Army budget. Simultaneously, the strength of Assam Rifles could be increased to about 60 battalions (from the present 31). Secondly, a new national level counter-insurgency strike force could be raised with Army leadership and ethos, based on the existing Rashtriya Rifles as a nucleus. Such a force, to be financed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, could comprise about 100 battalions, to be raised gradually in a phased manner over the 9th, the 10th and the 11th plans. Thirdly, the CRPF could be designated as the national counter-insurgency strike force. (The BSF must go back to its border guarding role which is not being performed with optimal efficiency at present as the force is heavily committed in counter-insurgency/internal security operations. Effective border management is a mandatory pre-requisite if the induction of weapons, ammunition and explosives, as well as foreign mercenaries and foreign trained Indian militants is to be checked and reduced.) The CRPF will need to be re-vamped for this new role and its leadership and training standards will need to be immensely enhanced. The lateral induction of volunteer Army officers with experience of counter-insurgency operations and trained Army instructors in the rank and file will go a long way in re-vamping the CRPF. Each of the options discussed above has several merits as well as many disadvantages. These need to be analysed in detail by a specially constituted joint Army and CPOs study group whose findings should be evaluated by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of the National Security Council (NSC). Recommendations made by the NSAB should be examined by the NSC and approved for early implementation. A Solution Remains Elusive Clearly, India's patience has been stretched almost to the limit and the strain is now showing. Demands for a more pro-active Kashmir policy are becoming vociferous. "The country has exercised restraint against Pakistan's proxy war and shown enough tolerance. We must make the costs unbearable for Pakistan. Why is the nation shying away from exercising the military option? Is there not provocation enough?50 In a sharply critical article in September 1998, Mr. K Subrahmanyam wrote: "It would appear that the Government of India has no policy about a possible solution to the Kashmir issue but hopes that so long as the issue is kept out of international attention and the insurgency and terrorism are contained through attrition, the problem will go away."51 Mr. Farooq Abdullah, the Chief Minister of J&K, a long-standing advocate for recognising the LoC as the international border between India and Pakistan, is now of the view that the Kashmir issue should be frozen for 25 years and that the two countries should build bridges on other aspects like trade, tourism and cultural exchanges.52 Mr. K.P.S Gill, former Director General of Punjab Police, is critical of the country's reliance on 'the niceties of diplomacy' to resolve the Kashmir problem and says that, "No nation in the world would have displayed the restraint and the patience that we have in the face of the scale and intensity of violence that has been unleashed upon us. It is time, now, to cry halt."53 However, he acknowledges that "the overwhelming reality is that the people of the sub-continent do not want conflict." It is axiomatic that there can be no military solution to an insurgency. The security forces can only restore functional normalcy so that the law and order situation is under control and the writ of the civil administration runs in the state. The level of violence can be curtailed to a large extent and the number of incidents can be considerably reduced by co-ordinated operations. However, the security forces cannot eliminate the insurgency. To do that, the root causes of the insurgency have to be identified and tackled and the people's perceived grievances redressed. That is a task which only the civil administration and elected political leaderscan undertake. The security forces can assist by carrying out 'civic action' on behalf of the civil administration, 'show the flag' by virtue of their presence in the area, particularly the villages in the interior, and provide security cover to civil officials to enable them to perform their duties without fear. Exemplary state and national level leadership and a resolute and unwavering political will are necessary to root out insurgency. A lasting solution to the Kashmir issue can only be found if both the external and the internal dimensions of the problem are successfully addressed, as both are inextricably interlinked. Unless Pakistan 'turns off the tap' of infiltration, no amount of effort, both military and civilian, will succeed in eliminating militancy from J&K. By now it should be clear to Pakistan that its proxy war will not succeed under any circumstances and that it would be in its own interest to renounce this path and seek mutually beneficial co-operation with India. However, George Santayana's classic definition of a fanatic is that he is a person who re-doubles his effort on losing sight of his goal. The fanatics in the Pakistani Army and the ISI can only be expected to re-double their efforts. It is difficult to believe that the Pakistani Government does not understand that its sponsorship of insurgencies and its support to virulently fundamentalist organisations such as the Taliban militia, will eventually boomerang on Pakistan itself. It does not require great prescience to predict that the Taliban backlash is eventually bound to create unmanageable problems for Pakistan. Perhaps, having created a Frankenstein monster, the Pakistanis now find it difficult to regain control; or, they have deluded themselves into believing that they can get away with it lightly. Either way, Pakistan is apparently set on a course of self destruction. In case the present proxy war leads to conventional or, even the unthinkable, nuclear war, it should be obvious to the Pakistanis that they will suffer much more than India. During an address to the National Defence College, New Delhi, General V P Malik, the COAS, warned that, "Pakistan's proxy war is dangerous not only for India but for the entire region. If militancy grows too big, both the initiator and the affected nation are tempted to use conventional means of war."54 Perhaps, the civilian rulers of Pakistan have already gone too far with the latitude given to the ISI and the Pakistani Army to wage a proxy war against India and are now unable to control the Frankenstein monster. The February 1999 massacre in Rajouri and Udhampur districts, masterminded by the ISI to coincide with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's bus ride to Lahore, could not possibly have been timed to send a message to the Indian Government as such incidents often have been in the past. This time, clearly, the message was from the Pakistan Army-ISI-Jamaat e Islami combine to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and its essence was: "Shake hands, play cricket and hockey, open up trade and encourage people-to-people contacts if you wish; however, lay off Kashmir—that is our agenda and it is non-negotiable." Nevertheless, India should continue to strive to achieve normalcy in its relations with Pakistan and must keep all channels of communications open. Mr. K Subrahmanyam recommends that: "India should put forward a whole series of confidence building measures (CBMs) to reduce tension and restore peace in Jammu and Kashmir to enable meaningful negotiations between India and Pakistan. This should include an open skies plan along the border, international observers to check on Pakistani camps of terrorist organisations and agreed mining and fencing of borders." However, as long as Pakistan remains intransigent and believes that holding bilateral talks with India is futile, as advocated by the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, prior to the Colombo summit meeting between the two Prime Ministers in July 1998,56 India should remain aware that not much is likely to be achieved by India's continued pursuance of the diplomatic option. Pakistan's efforts to secure third party mediation are irreconcilable with India's approach hat the problems between the two countries be resolved bilaterally in the spirit of the Shimla agreement. India must project the Kashmir issue as one of international fundamentalist Islamic terrorism with widespread adverse ramifications, including for the western nations. Osama Bin Laden's terrorist training bases in Afghanistan which were hit by US cruise missiles in August 1998, were also training terrorists for operations in J&K. Mr. Naresh Chandra, India's Ambassador to the US, recently highlighted the convergence of Indian and US interests on terrorism : "Both India and the United States have been victims of terrorism perpetrated by individuals trained and equipped in the same schools of crime near India's borders."57 It would be in India's interest to further highlight through diplomatic channels and by launching a concerted public information/awareness campaign that Pakistan is the 'mother nation' of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. The US State Department has so far been reluctant to list Pakistan as a sponsor of international terrorism "because of warnings by Pakistani Prime Ministers that such action would unravel the country's fledgling democracy and drive it into the hands of the virulently anti-American extremists." The US needs to be convinced that turning a blind eye to Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism neither augurs well for peace and stability in the Southern Asian region, nor is it in the US' own long-term interest. Regarding the internal dimension of the Kashmir problem, there is a lot more that can still be done. The first and foremost is the issue of the general consensus within the country to initiate talks with the militants. Mr. Prem Shankar Jha, a noted columnist, is of the opinion that the Muslims in Kashmir are not prepared to go back to the way things were before 1990. He writes: "Needless to say, India cannot offer independence to J&K, but if the Government wants a peaceful settlement in Kashmir, it must drop its insistence that it will hold talks with the militants only under the Constitution. This position......... is a non-starter.........The Government should have the courage to drop its insistence and agree to hold talks with the militants without pre-conditions."59 Mr. Muchkund Dubey, a former Foreign Secretary, recommends "opening a broad-based dialogue embracing all sections of society and evolving an acceptable package containing, among others, a cast iron guarantee that the experience of the recent past will never be repeated."60 While consenting to hold talks with the militant groups is undoubtedly desirable, the issue raises several questions with major practical implications for ongoing counter-insurgency operations. Firstly, who represents the militants? The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is a fractured coalition of disparate political parties with discredited leaders. Surely, the Indian Government cannot be expected to hold talks with leaders of Pakistan-sponsored and controlled militant outfits like the Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkat ul Ansar. Secondly, is a cease-fire to be declared, as in Nagaland? If so, what is the guarantee that it will be observed faithfully by the militants? Who will ensure that Pakistani-sponsored militant outfits also adhere to the cease-fire agreement, or are they to be left out of the talks process? Will it then make sense to pursue negotiations at all? Thirdly, can the Government of India agree to hold talks with the Kashmiri militants without pre-conditions till the unanimous resolution of Parliament on the Kashmir issue is rescinded? Is it not necessary to first build a national consensus on the issue, given the presence of ultra right wing elements in some political parties who have been vociferously demanding that Article 370 of the Constitution (which confers a special status on the State of J&K), be scrapped? Finally, how is it to be ensured that whatever agreement is reached with the militant groups will be acceptable to the Government of Pakistan? Obviously, it is difficult to see any light at the end of the tunnel as there are no easy answers to this intractable problem. The most pragmatic way ahead appears to be to further synergise counter-insurgency operation in J&K so as to bring about functional normalcy all over the state as early as possible, while simultaneously stepping up the industrial development of the State and the socio-economic upliftment of the people. The creation of employment opportunities for the youth, including schemes for self-employment, should be a high priority point for action. The Sufi tradition of tolerance and liberalism, for which Kashmir is well known, should be encouraged to bloom unhindered by the diktats of radical Islam. A sustained political campaign must be immediately launched to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Kashmiri people, assuage their feelings of hurt and neglect and restore their bruised and battered dignity. The people of J&K need to be convinced that their future lies with India. However, J&K will need to be given a large measure of autonomy; indeed, this demand is entirely in keeping with the federal structure of the Indian Constitution and has been recommended strongly for all the states by the Sarkaria Commission. The hands of Mr. Farooq Abdullah's administration should be strengthened so that the Kashmir Government can further enhance the quality of its battle against militancy on all fronts. And, the Government must launch a sustained media campaign, both within the country and abroad, to highlight Pakistan's deep-rooted involvement in fostering terrorism and insurgency in J&K and other parts of India. International pressure must be brought to bear on Pakistan to desist from its nefarious interference in India's internal affairs and to stop sponsoring Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the Southern Asian region and other parts of the world. Above all, public opinion must be mobilised to express the nation's solidarity with the Kashmiri people in their long drawn out and courageous struggle against Pakistan-sponsored proxy war.Home Ministry in receipt of Intelligence Agency reportCasualities:As the level of violence has been consistently high throughout the last ten years of militancy in J&K, the casualty rates were bound to be high. Table 6 shows the casualties suffered by Army personnel and innocent civilian citizens in J&K during 1990-98.Table 6. Casualties in Jammu and Kashmir: 1990-98<table style='width: 100%'><tr><td> Year</td><td>Army Pers </td><td>Civilians </td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Killed</td><td>Wounded</td><td>Killed</td><td>Wounded</td></tr><tr><td> 1990</td><td>18</td><td>89</td><td>656</td><td>624</td></tr><tr><td> 1991</td><td>44</td><td>161</td><td>409</td><td>725</td></tr><tr><td> 1992</td><td>50</td><td>201</td><td>330</td><td>629</td></tr><tr><td> 1993</td><td>88</td><td>405</td><td>327</td><td>685</td></tr><tr><td>1994</td><td>139</td><td>426</td><td>137</td><td>702</td></tr><tr><td>1995</td><td>186</td><td>517</td><td>148</td><td>530</td></tr><tr><td>1996</td><td>150</td><td>359</td><td>456</td><td>794</td></tr><tr><td>1997</td><td>153</td><td>363</td><td>312</td><td>648</td></tr><tr><td>1998</td><td>133</td><td>377</td><td>471</td><td>669</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>961</td><td>2,878</td><td>3,237</td><td>6,019</td></tr></table>Table 6. Casualties in Jammu and Kashmir: 1990-98<table style='width: 100%'><tr><td> Year</td><td>Army Pers </td><td>Civilians </td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Killed</td><td>Wounded</td><td>Killed</td><td>Wounded</td></tr><tr><td> 1990</td><td>18</td><td>89</td><td>656</td><td>624</td></tr><tr><td> 1991</td><td>44</td><td>161</td><td>409</td><td>725</td></tr><tr><td> 1992</td><td>50</td><td>201</td><td>330</td><td>629</td></tr><tr><td> 1993</td><td>88</td><td>405</td><td>327</td><td>685</td></tr><tr><td>1994</td><td>139</td><td>426</td><td>137</td><td>702</td></tr><tr><td>1995</td><td>186</td><td>517</td><td>148</td><td>530</td></tr><tr><td>1996</td><td>150</td><td>359</td><td>456</td><td>794</td></tr><tr><td>1997</td><td>153</td><td>363</td><td>312</td><td>648</td></tr><tr><td>1998</td><td>133</td><td>377</td><td>471</td><td>669</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>961</td><td>2,878</td><td>3,237</td><td>6,019</td></tr></table>Till end-June 1998, the Army and CPOs together had lost 1442 men,44 compared with 1103 soldiers killed during the entire 1947-48 conflict with Pakistan in J&K. The nation is indeed paying a high price in combating Pakistan's proxy war in J&K to maintain its territorial integrity. As per the details reported to be contained in the White Paper proposed to be released by the Government in the budget session of Parliament, Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India has claimed the lives of 29,151 civilians and 5,101 security forces personnel. 2,78,601 persons have been rendered homeless. The loss to public and private property is estimated at Rs. 2,000 crores. The cost of compensation paid to victims, for border fencing and the amount expended on the raising of local anti-terrorist force, works out to Rs. 18,500 crores. The expenditure on the Army and para-military forces is approximately Rs. 46,000 crores. The casualties in terrorist affected violence are of Militants themselves, the civilian population and the security forces. The civilian casualities are either the massacres carried out by the militants or the civilians dying in cross firing between militants and security forces. Most of the massacres have been of the innocent people like the bihari laboureres, Kashmiri Sikhs or Hindus or the pilgrims to Amarnath. In addition there have planned annhiliation of certain civilians who were either offering resisitance to militants, aiding security forces or wre suspected informers, The entire families were massacred mercilessly in these militant attacks in some cases. Some of the massacres in Kashmir valley and south of Pir Panjal range are given in the tables below: Table 1. Massacres in Kashmir ValleyDate Place District Killed WoundedMay 6, 1996 Lasjan Srinagar 8 1July 7, 1996 Bakihakar Kupwara 11 5August 21, 1996 Ranbelpur Anantnag 9 1October 5, 1996 Sunderkut Baramula 7 -January 2, 1997 Musmilpur Baramula 7 -March 27, 1997 Sangrampur Badgam 7 1Jan 26, 1998 Wandhama Srinagar 23 - Table 2. Massacres in Areas South of Pir Panjal RangeDate Place District Killed WoundedJan 5, 1996 Barshala Doda 1 5 -April 18, 1996 Parankot Rajouri 2 6 -July 25, 1996 Hinjan Gali Doda 1 3 -May 6, 1998 Surankot Punch 4 2June 10, 1998 Phagla Punch 4 1June 19, 1998 Chapnari Doda 25 7July 27, 1998 Horna Doda 16 5August 3, 1998 Kalaban Chamba 36 -(Himachal Pradesh)August 3, 1998 Chandi Udhampur 5 -August 8, 1998 Sailan Punch 1 9 -In addition to the massacres enumerated in the accompanying tables, the killing of 20 Hindus on February 20, 1999, in three separate incidents, two in Rajouri district and one in Udhampur district, coincided with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's historic bus ride to Lahore in Pakistan to achievea breakthrough in Indo-Pakistan relations.31 In Doda, "the entire operational command has been handed over to foreign mercenaries belonging to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and Turkey, sidelining Kashmiri militants."32 Doda district comprises rugged mountainous terrain which affords ample opportunity to the militants to operate from well-concealed hideouts. The countryside is ideal for the mercenaries to establish their headquarters and radio communications centres and to stockpile arms, ammunition and explosives. Due to the lack of adequate surface communications, it is difficult for the security forces to respond in a timely manner to prevent incidents of terrorism, or to chase and eliminate militants after they strike. It is even more difficult to establish a viable intelligence network. In particular, the gaining of 'actionable' intelligence for launching surgical strikes against the militants is extremely problematic. As such, the ISI has succeeded in achieving major successes in killing members of the minority community in order to create a communal divide and force migrations from the area. It has also achieved success in blowing up bridges and culverts to further slow down the security forces and in targeting schools, government buildings and property. Even places of worship have not been spared. In a perceptive piece after the Prankot massacre in April 1998, Ved Marwah, former Police Commissioner of Delhi and former adviser to the Governor of J&K, Jagmohan, expressed the following views:-33 "The shift to Jammu is deliberate and is likely to continue. The number of foreign mercenaries is likely to increase in the coming months in the region, with more trained and experienced Afghan mujahideen being available for infiltration into the state. Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Toiba have been operating there since 1993 and many more such groups have entered the Jammu region since then...... What is called for is concrete action—an immediate strengthening of the security arrangements in the region with the active support of the state police and the civil administration." The Union Home Ministry has already received reports on several black deeds, inhuman activities and human violations committed by terrorists in Kashmir in the name of Islamic Jehad. The Vice-President of BJP, Mr. Krishan Lal Sharma, President of J&K unit of BJP, Prof. Chaman Lal Gupta and Mr. Vijay Kumar Malhotra, former Chief Executive Councillor, have demanded that the Government should place on the table of Parliament the report, prepared recently by Union Home Ministry, on the victims of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir so that the world came to know about the inhuman and black deeds of Pakistan and her agencies in Kashmir. This report carries details, submitted by the intelligence agencies and the police which confirm reports of direct involvement of Pakistan in sending foreign mercenaries and terrorists to Kashmir not only for loot and guerrilla warfare but also for mercilessly defiling the prestige and honour of the nationalist families. Mr. Dinesh Sharma, a journalist, has in his report, given a startling information. According to him activists of all small and big militant outfits, whose number is around 150, have raped girls and some of them have been tortured with weapons and with hot iron rods. This is a slap on the face of those human rightists who cry loud in the international political circles while accusing the security forces for human rights violations. It is worth maintaining here that while the Union Minister of State for Internal Security, Mr. Rajesh Pilot, who keeps on paying frequent visits to the valley, claims improvement in the situation in Kashmir, on the other hand the reports being received by his Ministry reveal that Kashmir is gradually becoming a hell. Muslim women too victim of repression The report of the intelligence agencies was presented a detailed account of the killing and rape of Hindu and Muslim girls by the terrorists. The report carries details of the gang rape and killing of one Sajda Hussain Sajda whose body was recovered from river Jehlum in Baramula. On September 17, 1991. Sajda, a Muslim girl, had been abducted by terrorists and after gang raping her, they killed her and threw her body in the river. There is mention, in the report, about a 17-year girl, Shamma Mufti, who had been kidnapped from Doda district. She had been taken to Anantnag by the kidnappers and she was rescued later by the security forces on December 19, 1991. In a similar way terrorists abducted Mohd. Sultan's daughter, Zarifa, and her brother, Bashir Ahmed, because they had pressurised Zarifa's parents to agree to marry their daughter to one of the militants. When Mohd. Sultan refused to marry his daughter to a militant, she and her brother were kidnapped. Her brother, Bashir Ahmed, was killed and later Zarifa was forcibly married to one of the terrorists. Another Sakeena of the same area, was abducted. After raping her for several days the tyrants cut her private parts. Later Sakeena's body was recovered from Pattan in Baramulla. Hasina of Bandipore too suffered the same fate. Her body was recovered by police from Iqbal Park Srinagar, on October 23. One militant belonging to Al-Umar outfit abducted one Muslim woman and her daughter from their house at Saja Kadal in Srinagar. The mother and her daughter had been charged with acting as informers leading to the arrest of Al-Umar chief, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar alias Latram. Their house was set on fire by the activists of this outfit on May 8, 1992. Similarly Dolly of Baramulla, Gudi of Miskeen Bagh (Srinagar), 18 year old Rafiqa, daughter of Asadullah of Kalashpora, Aisha Ameen, District Education Officer and 400 other women were abducted, many were raped and killed. This treatment had been earlier meted out to Kashmiri Hindu girls. One Pandit girl, Sarla Bhat, who was kidnapped, is still untraced. She was a nurse in Soura Institute of Medical Sciences. It is said that she was killed and her body was thrown on Srinagar road. But some informed sources say that she is being used to carry out illegal activities. In the same way one 33-year old Prana Ganjoo and her husband, Prof K.L. Ganjoo has been abducted from Sopore on April 19, 1990. Later, both of them were killed and their bodies were seen floating in the river. Not only this, one Babli Raina of Sopore was killed in front of her family members on May 7, 1990. Prior to her killing she was subjected to cruel rape as per the police records. On August 13, 1990, one Asha Koul of Anantnag was kidnapped and later her body was recovered from a deserted house in Srinagar. On March 30, 1992, militants entered into the house of one Mohan Lal in Srinagar where his wife and daughter were first raped and then all the three were shot dead. The abduction of Deepa, belonging to Batala in Punjab and later her sale to several insurgents and their supporters in Kashmir is no longer a secret. In a similar way abduction of a 12-year school girl, Shallu, and Girja of Dadipur in Kupwara is registered in the Home Ministry records. Girja was sawed to pieces. Militants love for luxury After the migration of Hindu families from Kashmir, militants started kidnapping girls belonging to Muslim families in order to satisfy their lust. It is learnt that thousands of Hindu-Muslim girls have migrated from Kashmir and have been staying with their relatives in Delhi, Jammu, Udhampur, Calcutta, Lucknow, Bombay, Bangalore. Some of them were pregnant. According to Government figures, while on one hand overone lakh Hindus migrated from Kashmir, on the otherover 40,000 Muslim families too have been forced to leave the valley by those very Pakistani agencies and Kashmiri militants who were proclaiming to liberate Kashmiri Muslims and are engaged in disinformation campaign against India in international circles. The unfortunate part of the situation is that militants have been encouraged by the crocodile tears shed by several world human rights organisations over the action of the security forces in Kashmir. Had these human rights organisations and Muslim fundamentalist leaders opposed activities of the militants, there would have been curbs on such ignominous acts ? The directionless policy of Government of India is also responsible for such despicable acts. The above mentioned acts of these colourful Muslim terrorists, which are ostensibly against the tenets of Islam, are being Preparated in the name of Islam. These acts have demoralised those foreign guerrillas who had been sent to Kashmir by the ISI. The foreign guerrillas have, after enraged, starting killing such Kashmiri militants. This information has been given by a Jammu-based known journalist, Mr. Harbans Nagokay, of a prominent newspaper, Dainik Jagran, after completing his tour of Kashmir. According to him, when these foreign mercenaries saw the luxurious and vivacious life style of Kashmiri militans they became highly annoyed and enraged. They could not see Islam in danger anywhere. These foreign guerrillas conveyed their impression to the ISI. These foreign mercenaries have sought full command of the operations against the security forces. These foreign mercenaries have come to know of the love for luxury and expected infirmity of Kashmiri terrorists. The foreign money, latest weapons and Islamic fanaticism have introduced gun culture among the Kashmiri youth, but they have not altered the inherent cowardice in them. That is why these foreign guerrillas are annoyed with Kashmiri militants. Recently these foreign guerrillas framed a plan with Kashmiri militants under which an attack had to be launched against the security forces. As per the plan a lone Kashmiri militant was assigned the task of hurling a grenade on an Army convoy. As the Army Jawans would come out from their trucks in search of the saboteurs, the six foreign mercenaries would open fire to register a big kill. It had been decided that the foreign guerrillas would kill all the Army Jawans. The Army convoy passed that side but the Kashmiri militant did not hurl the grenade. Enraged by this inaction, the Afghan guerrilla killed all the six Kashmiri militants. In a similar way, in village Kalaterbala in Baramulla when militants were challenged by security forces the former took to their heels after handing over their weapons to the Nambardar. And they finally surrendered before the Army. JK Armed Police In the context of the above events one thing becomes clear that if the security forces were given orders to act, the conspiracy of the militants can be foiled. But because of lack of solid policy and will this has not been possible. The policy of appeasement and vote is a hurdle in this direction, Kashmir police and administrative officials who usually belong to one community have taken advantage of the weakness of Government of India and support the terrorists. It is because of these officials that the Pakistan intelligence agency remains aware of all the activities in Kashmir. Not only the information but Pakistani Agency also holds the strings of insurgency in the valley. Many employees and officers of JK Armed police are working under the guidance of the ISI. According to a report published in the Sunday Mail, published from Delhi, about 500 jawans of the 11th battalion of J and K Armed police are working for the ISI which includes over two dozen officers. It is because of police officials, who are acting as ISI sources, Pakistan gets in advance information about all decisions and plans of the Indian administration. After the recent police strike the Union Home Ministry had told the State Government to screen all the men of the 11th battalion and dismiss and arrest pro-Pakistan elements in this battalion. It may be mentioned here that the police strike started on April 22, 1993, after one jawan of the 11th battalion, Riyaz Ahmed, got killed by the Army during cross firing. The Armed police jawans alleged that Riyaz Ahmed was killed by the Army in presence of SSP, Srinagar, Mr. K Rajender, Under the pressure of the striking policemen Rajender has been transferred outside Kaskmir. According to intelligence sources, some retired police officer's hand in precipitating the strike was evident. Even one former Director General Police is believed to have supported the strike. The Intelligence Department has alerted the State Government over the reports of recruitment of several pro- Pakistan elements and militants belonging to Hizbul Mujahideen outfit. Last year, during Id-ul-Zuha, about 500 police jawans had revolted in Kathua police training centre and later they had shouted pro-Pakistan and anti-India slogans. Recruitment of pro-Pakistan elements in the police had first started in 1971. Then one police offlcer had formed a police union and later engineered police strike for ensuring his promotion. One Police Inspector, Tabasum, and another Sub-Inspector, Drabu, were installed President and General Secretary respectively. This very officer, later, became the police chief and disbanded the same police union which he had formed. During his tenure as police chief many pro-Pakistan elements were recruited in J and K Armed police. The majority of these jawans belonged to Jamait-e-Islami party. The activists of Jamait-e-Islami are, these days, members of pro-Pakistan outfit, Hizbul Mujahidden. Some months ago one truck driver was arrested from the Srinagar police control room when it had been found that he was smuggling AK-47 rifles for militants from Kupwara sector. This driver confessed, during the interrogation that he was working for Pakistani Intelligence agency for which he was getting handsome amount. Kashmir University, a militant hideout Almost all the administrative departments, educational institutions, hospitals, religious places belonging to the majority community, have become and are becoming centres for militant activities in Kashmir these days. Kashmir University has become a centre of inspiration and a major hideout for militants. There is majority of separatist forces among teachers, students and employees in Kashmir University. Under a plan pro-Pakistan elements are being employed as teachers and employees. Several anti-India demonstrations and meetings receive full patronage and protection in the University. The Government of India has filll information about it. In May, 1993, a meeting was organised in Kashmir University, one bold woman journalist, Ms. Aasha Khosa, has captured, in the TRIBUNE, published from Chandigarh, the echo of the separatist slogans. She writes: "Srinagar, May 25 - Kashmir University is the latest entrant to the club of secessionist groups and organisations in the valley. "We want freedom" was the theme slogan at the picturesque Hazratbal Campus, which was addressed by the Vice Chancellor, Prof. Hamidi Kashmiri. The protest sit-in by around 1500 teachers and employees of Kashmir University against the "atrocities of Indian Security Forces" was preceded by a similar organisation to commemorate the conferring of the status of "prisoner of conscience" on the outlawed secessionist leader Shabir Shah by Amnesty International. The seminar was addressed by a number of heads of departments of the University. In their high-pitched anti-India speeches, the speakers accused India of embezzling IMF funds by diverting the same for suppressing Kashmiris. Prof A.A. Wani, head of the law department, offered a piece of advice to India "India must not waste money to retain Kashmir by force. Instead it should give us our right of freedom and utilise the money for its people". The campus has played host to scores of anti-India demonstrations by students esrlier. "It is an extremely serious matter and the Government must not view it with its characteristic indifference," said a senior secretary of the Government. Kashmir having set the dubious precedents of a 72-day strike by government employees in which top-ranking civil servants (like Chief Secretary Sheikh Ghulam Rasool) also participated and an appeal by bureaucrats (like present Advisor to the Governor Ashok Jaitely) against "atrocities" to the United Nations, action against teachers appears unlikely. Both acts went unchecked following the Centre's interference. The Government's policy of indifference towards such open anti-India activities by wings of government has encouraged such activities, sources said. At present a major section of Kashmir-based government employees are members of a union which along with all major banned secessionist groups is a constituent group of the all-party co-ordination committee, militants' platform. The university atmosphere, insiders say, had become vitiated since the killing of Prof. Mushirul Haq, Vice-Chancellor, by militants in 1990. The faculty members, some out of the commitment and others because of fear, have been dancing to the tune of militants," said a young university lecturer. Most of the university teachers, including the Vice-Chancellor, have not been paying their income tax for the past two years following the militants call for boycott of tax payments. However, sources said that senior government functionaries were much perturbed over the open pro-militant activity in Kashmir University and they are contemplating action". Resignation of VC, Prof. Hamidi Kashmiri The Vice-Chancellor, Prof. Hamidi Kashmiri, resigned under growing pressure from militants when he was helpless in fulfilling all their anti-national demands. His resignation has given rise to many doubts. One section of opinion is that as Vice-Chancellor Prof. Hamidi used to bless terrorists and now after relinquising his office has made up his mind to make available his services to the separatists. The other version is that Prof. Hamidi was unable to fulfil all genuine, unjust and unconstitutional demands of the militants. Militants were dismayed over such attitude of Prof. Hamidi. He, therefore, was scared of militants fearing that he too may meet the same fate as met by Prof. Mushir-ul-Haq, a former Vice-Chancellor, who was killed by the insurgents. Ms. Aasha Khosa's report in The Tribune of September 18, 1993 confirms it. She has written: "According to official and University sources, Prof. Hamidi has been under tremendous pressure from the growing lobby of the fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami, which is aiming at the total control of the university. Kashmir University has been converted into a virtual stronghold of militants. Certain gunmen, official sources said, were behind the holding of demonstrations, voicing demand for secessionism inside the campus. Even Prof. Hamidi, they say, was asked to participate along with other Eaculty members at the gun-point in the rallies. Insiders say at least seven Kashmir University teachers had been abducted during the past two years by militants and were forced to appoint militants in the University on an adhoc basic. Active leaders of Jamat-e-Islami, a banned outfit, are not only teaching various subjects in the University but also conduct "indoctrination classes" to lure youth into militancy. The Imam of the mosque inside the campus is allegedly a top ranking leader of a pro-Pakistan militant outfit and he has been appointed lecturer in the Arabic Department. He is also a member of the "supreme council" of that organisation. According to the reports, one teacher holds regular classes on "secession and freedom movement" on Sundays inside the campus. The Vice-Chancellor, Prof. Hamidi, himself has been kidnapped by militants twice. Prof. Hamidi had been giving advertisements in the local newspapers appealing to people (militants) not to approach him for appointments as no vacancy existed. The sources said that one Professor in the Commerce Department had attended Islamic conference abroad during the past two years in his capacity as member of the Jamat-e-Islami. The militants had been given special quota of 10 seats for each postgraduate course in all the departments for their nominees during the past two sessions. The University has witnessed pitched battles on a number of occasions among various groups for supremacy and share of power. Some militant organisations like student wing of the JKLF has been persistently condemning interference by militants in the campus. Meanwhile, official reports say that Dr. A.A. Illqaband, Principal, Srinagar Medical College, is also facing problems on account of increasing pressure from gunmen. Militants recently sent him a gun and two bullets, threatening to face the consequences if he chose to postpone the examination dates. Militants had also tried to kidnap him while he had gone to Kashmir University two weeks ago". The so-called secular Government of India, even being abreast of the dangerous activities, plans, intrigues, religious fanaticism and anti-national inclinations of the terrorists, continues to commit one blunder after the other which has further complicated the Kashmir problem. As a result of frequent changes in the Governors, issuance of contradictory statements, lenient attitude towards terrorists, demoralising security forces through constant accusations and failure an the part of the Government to adopt a definite and solid policy on Kashmir, are some of the dangerous mistakes which have been instrumental in converting our land of "Rishis" into a den of demons. There is growing evidence that fundamentalist groups in Pakistan are preparing to set off a new wave of terror across India. The operational strategy seeks to exploit communal fissures: fissures that the Hindu Right has had not a little to do with creating in the first place. On August 29, the Jammu and Kashmir Police announced the arrest of an 11-member Lashkar-e-Taiba cell, whose operatives were active in Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Delhi. Its top operative, Amir Khan, Pakistani national, was tasked to recruit Indians whose immediate family members had been killed in communal violence. At the time of his arrest, Khan was engaged in building a cover identity. Having obtained Indian educational documents and a driving licence from India, he planned to marry into a family living in Bhiwandi in Thane district of Maharashtra. The Lashkar-e-Taiba cell was busted after the Jammu and Kashmir Police and 5 Grenadiers regiment picked up Islam-ud-Din, a resident of Tirwara Ka Nangal village in Gurgoan district of Haryana, on the Samba border in Jammu while waiting for key a Lashkar-e-Taiba operative, Abu Ilyas. Islam-ud-din was not aware that Ilyas had been killed in an encounter while attempting to cross through Samba on July 31. Codenamed Abu Khalid, Islam-ud-Din told his interrogators that the cll had been ordered to carry out a series of explosions ahead of Independence Day. Amir Khan’s arrest, based on Islam-ud-Din’s interrogation, rapidly led to the arrest of toehr members of the cell the result of a coordinated operation between the State police and the Intelligence Bureau (I.B.). The most important operatives were based in Mumbai and Bhiwandi, placed hit hard by Shiv Sena terror and anti-Muslim pogroms. Bhiwandi residents Usman Khan and Mohammad Ismail had obtained for Amir Khan educational documents and a driving licence and even loaned him an autorickshaw. Abdul Salam, Ismail’s brother, arranged Khan’s wedding through a local moulvi. Another Bhiwandi resident, Mohammad Mobin, was engaged in finding accommodation for Khan, without knowing his real identity. Funds for this cell were routed through Jamal Ahmad, a resident of Mumbai’s Mazagaon areas. The rest of Khan’s recruits were scattered across the country. Abdul Adil, a resident of Kurnool in Andhra Pradesh, worked for the cell even as he studied at Jamia Milia Islamia in New Delhi. Muzaffarnagar resident Mohammad Mustafa and Baghpat resident Mohammad Mustafa were roped in too. Wali Mohammad Zahid, originally a resident of Islam-ud-Din. Zahid had been instructed to obtain fake travel documents to faciliate movement out of India when instructed to do so by the Lashkar-e-Taiba leadership. One of Zahid’s recruits, Mohammad Sharif, had been arrested three months earlier. Jammu and Kashmir Police officials say that Islam-ud-Din was trained at the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Abu Bashir camp in Bhawalpur, Pakistan. The Abu Bashir camp, one of five major Lashkar training centres, specialises in bomb-making. The Umar Kuka camp puts volunteers through a basic, three-month insurgency course, while the Abdullah bin Masood camp nearby offers more specialised training. The Taiba camp at Muridke engages in basic ideological indoctrination, after which recruits are sent for a rigorous six-month course, the Daura Khasta, in the mountains. Another Muridke camp, Aksa, focusses on training volunteers from several countries, including Afghanistan, Sudan, Nigeria and Pakistan, for the wr in Jammu and Kashmir. Islam-ud-Din left Pakistan in early 1999, with cash to help set up the cell. More money came from Ilyas. Both visited several cities to gather recruits, using the infrastructure of the revandhist religious organisation, the Tabligh-I-Jamaat. Islam-ud-Din also arranged for Khan to work at the clinic of a doctor in Punhana, Faqir-e-Alam, by introducing the Lashkar operative as his relative. Faqir-e-Alam, a recent migrant to Haryana from Bihar, did not know Khan’s real identity. The latest arrests affirm that the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s pan-Indian network is exploiting Muslim insecurities fuelled by the rise of a regime with no commitment to secularism. In the March 26 issue, Frontline had reported on the arrests of several important members of the Lashkar’s Abdul Karim ‘Tunda’ cell, including Pakistani nationals Mohammad Salim Junaid from Hyderabad and Abdul Sattar from Delhi along with Indian nationals Shoaib alam, Mohammad Faisal Hussain and Aamer Hashim Kamran. Saifullah Chitrali, a top operative of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and the Hizbul Mujahideen’s Ali Mohammad Dar had also set networks outside Jammu and Kashmir. Organisations such as the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front had even liised with Abdul Razzak Memon, a key accused in the Mumbai serial bomb blasts. The BJP’s pro-active policy, an ill-conceived militarist response to growing violence in Jammu and Kashmir, fails to address the changing character of terrorism and the forces that drive it. As long as Hindu revanchism continues to fuel tensions in India, any number of soldiers will not be enough to engage with the Islamic Right<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a>. Pakistan's ISI and Kashmiri Terrorists It has now become clear that Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) is actively supporting terrorism in Kashmir in order to further internationalise the issue and to carry out successfully the separatist campaign. The ISI has an important role to bringouer 100 terrorist organisations under one umbrella, dye them in the hue of Islamic bigotry and in equipping them with latest weapons. The Government of India has understood, beyond any doubt, that this organisation has attired the established slogans of Kashmiriyat with the garments of Muslim fundamentalism in order to indoctrinate the rebel youths of Kashmir. This very ISI has moulded Kashmiri youths in the name of "Islam is in danger" type emotional bigotry. And in order to give teeth to the so-called liberation struggle, the ISI has collected many foreign mercenaries from different Islamic countries in the world who are being infiltrated into Kashmir. Well versed and trained in subversive activities and guerrilla warfare these mercenaries have come from Afghanistan, Sudan, Behrin, Iran, Libya, Turkey and Saudi Arab. Big organisation of third world The report of the American Gongress, a special report prepared by the Union Home Ministry, Government of India, and the documents recovered from the arrested Kashmiri and foreign terrorists have confirmed reports that the ISI was spending one-fifth portion of Pakistan's budget on creating disturbances in Kashmir. According to a former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Mr. Jagmohan, in 1992 the ISI had three thousand million dollars which it had earned through drug narcotics trade. This amount is equal to five defence budgets of Pakistan. This boosted the morale of the ISI which succeeded in extending organised terrorism to Kashmir. In supporting and organising terrorism in Middle East, West Asia and Kashmir the ISI is the biggest organisation in the third world. About 20,000 people are getting monetary benefits from the ISI for intensifying terrorist activities and for supporting them. Some are on regular pay roll. The Task Force of the American Congress has, in its report, clarified that the ISI initially tried to kick up trouble in Kashmir with the help of Afghans present in Pakistan. Then it started supplying arms to Kashmir. In a clever way Pakistan secured services of Hizbe Islami Afghan leader, Gulbadin Hikmatyar. According to this report, abetting and promoting terrorism have become an essential part of Pakistan's political doctrine. Spread of terrorism A Kashmiri journalist, Mr. Gazanfar Butt has, in his recent report published through CNF feature agency, said that the agents of this intelligence agency of Pakistan are active in strengthening the struggle for liberation in Kashmir. The plan is to malign the name of the Indian security forces, especially the Army in Kashmir. In order to achieve this goal, the Pro- Pakistan Hizbul Mujahideen outfit has issued directions to people to register cases against the Army in local police stations wherever search operations are carried out and keep on tarnishing the image of the Army by accusing it of committing excesses and rape. Villagers have been warned against assisting the Army and defaulters have been threatened with death. The ISI has issued secret instructions under which all Kashmiri militants, trained in Pakistan and Occupied Kashmir, be pushed into the Valley. More arms and ammunition be supplied ta the rebels in Kashmir. Since infiltration and arms smuggling from the Line of Actual Control was not easy because of security measures adopted by the Indian troops, supply of weapons and sending of trained terrorists to Kashmir be done from Rajasthan and Gujarat, border where the routes were comparatively open. Under the ISI instructions Assembly elections in Kashmir have to be prevented at any cost. In this context any Kashmiri leader trying to talk about elections and the restoration of political process would have to be killed. Besides this, terrorists have to extend their activities to Jammu and Ladakh regions and later on rebellions be started in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, north-east region, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Foreign mercenaries in Kashmir: The ISI and Jamait-e-Islami of Pakistan have started recruitment of Pakistani citizens so that they too could participate in "Islamic Jehad" in Kashmir. Youths are selected and then recruited in Pro-Pak Hizbul Mujahideen militant outfit and other similar organisations. After this, they are sent into Jammu and Kashmir for indulging in bomb explosions in Srinagar, Rajouri, Jammu and other areas. They have been given instructions to kick up terror by blowing up passenger buses, trains, roads and bridges. After the end of Afghan war, Afghan Mujahideens and other terrorists and fundamentalists from Algeria, Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arab, living in Pakistan, are imparting arms training to Kashmiri terrorists. But the overall control, supervision, support and facilities to the terrorists are in the hands of the ISI. This intelligence agency sleuths summon Kashmiri terrorists to the Indo-Pak border for giving them new instructions and guidance. The Indian security forces had recovered some documents from Kashmiri militants at the time of their arrest. These documents shed enough light on Pakistan's involvement in terrorism in Kashmir. On March 25, 1991, one Ashfaq Hussain Lone was arrested in New Delhi and a letter was recovered from him. The letter had been written by Mohd. Yusuf Shah alias Salauddin of Hizbul Mujahideen to his college teacher Assan Dar. The letter contained information regarding arrangements made by Pakistan for training and for supply of sophisticated weapons and communication apparatus to Kashmiri terrorists. Salahuddin had instructed Assan Dar to recruit more youths and send them across Pakistan for training so that no area in Jammu and Kashmir was free from terrorism. Also, the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir should be in the grip of severe terrorism so that Lok Sabha elections could not be held in this northern State. The letter had informed Dar that Rs. 2.20 lakh had been made available through Ashfaq Hussain.References & Notes1. Yossef Bodansky, "Pakistan's Kashmir Strategy", from the monograph entitled "Pakistan, Kashmir & the Trans-Asian Axis" (Houston, Texas: Freeman Centre for Strategic Studies, Summer 1995).2. Inder Sawhney, "US-trained Militants Helping ISI in J&K— Proposed White Paper Lays Bare Pakistan's Designs" (New Delhi: The Times of India, October 30, 1998).3. According to a 1997 Rand Corporation study entitled "Stability in South Asia ", nuclear weapons have enabled Pakistan to support insurgencies within India as a means of settling outstanding political differences and wearing India down. The Pakistani strategy works on the premise that India cannot retaliate conventionally for fear of sparking a nuclear holocaust. The study has been authored by Mr. Ashley J Tellis and was sponsored by the US Army.4. Tara Kartha, Tools of Terror (New Delhi: Knowledge World, January 1999). See chapter entitled "War Through Terror" by Jasjit Singh, p. 14.5. Col G D Bakshi, VSM, Afghanistan: The First Faultline War (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1999), p. 14.6. Sreedhar and Nilesh Bhagat, Pakistan: A Withering State? (New Delhi: Wordsmiths, 1999), p. 16.7. Maroof Raza, Wars and No Peace Over Kashmir (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1996), p. 70.8. Lt Gen (Retd) V K Nayar, PVSM, SM, "Low Intensity Conflict : Jammu and Kashmir" (New Delhi: U.S.I. Journal, July-September 1998), p. 411.9. Lt Gen (Retd) C K Kapoor, PVSM, AVSM, "Proxy War" (New Delhi: U.S.I. Journal, July-September 1998), p. 396-397.10. "Proxy War by Pakistan in Kashmir" (New Delhi: Sainik Samachar, August 1-15, 1998), pp. 15-18. (Sainik Samachar is the official Journal of the Indian Armed Forces.)11. Bodansky, op cit.12. Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, "Defence Planning in the Era of Strategic Uncertainty", from the script of the Seminar Paper read on behalf of Gen Beg by Dr. S. M. Rehman during the Seminar on "Asian Security in the 21st Century" held at The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, on January 27-28, 1999. The script is available at the FRIENDS, Pakistan, website: HYPERLINK <a href="http://www.friends.org.pk" target="_blank">Home - Friends Welfare Association Pakistan</a> <a href="http://www.friends.org.pk" target="_blank">Home - Friends Welfare Association Pakistan</a>.13. During a lecture on 'Proxy War in Kashmir' at the United Service Institute, New Delhi, in September 1998, Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar, Vice Chief of the Army Staff, observed that "poor governance, poor administration and corruption had compounded the problem in the state". He attributed the major causes of proxy war to internal alienation, Pakistan's support to terrorism, the international community's tolerance of Islamabad's support to proxy war and the continued distortion of historical facts. (Reported in a news report entitled "Aggressive Diplomacy on Kashmir Need of the Hour : Army Vice-Chief" (New Delhi: The Times of India, September 5, 1998.)14. Lt Gen (Retd) D D Saklani, PVSM,AVSM, Kashmir Saga: A Bundle of Blunders (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1999), pp. 95-96. Lt Gen Saklani writes: "By December 1989, the die was cast in the militants' favour due to factors like drift, neglect.. indifferent approach to the J&K problem since 1972 resulting in total lack of grip of the ground realities and unawareness of the ensuing threat."15. Prakash Nanda, "Govt Responding to new Trends in Kashmir: Saxena" (New Delhi: The Times of India, February 3, 1999).16. Madhavee Inamdar, "Armed Militancy in Kashmir : The Pak Connection" (New Delhi: The Times of India, December 10, 1997).17. "Foreign Mercenaries Swell in J&K" (New Delhi: The Times of India, January 14, 1999).18. Ibid.19. K. Subrahmanyam, "South New Front in Covert War Against India" (New Delhi: The Economic Times, February 18, 1998).20. Dinesh Kumar, "Internal Security : A Drift into Disarray?" (New Delhi: The Times of India, February 20, 1998).21. Ibid.22. Man Mohan, "Pakistan Spends over Rs 60 cr to Fight 'Proxy War' in J&K" (New Delhi: The Times of India, July 6, 1998). The figures quoted by the journalist are purported to have been provided by the Army's Northern Command Headquarters.23. "Advani Asks Pakistan to Give Up Terrorism" (New Delhi: The Times of India, November 13, 1998).24. Inder Sawhney, op cit.25. Barti Jain, "Advani White Paper on ISI Will Wait" (New Delhi: The Economic Times, December 21, 1998).26. Bharti Jain, "Issue of ISI Base in Nepal Taken Up with King Birendra" (New Delhi: The Economic Times, January 28, 1999).27. Mahendra Vaid, "Significant Demographic Changes in Siliguri Alarm Govt Agencies" (New Delhi: The Times of India, February 15, 1999).28. Tara Kartha, Tools of Terror (New Delhi: Knowledge World, January 1999), pp 281-283.29. See "Defence minister's Statement on J&K" (New Delhi: Sainik Samachar, August 16-31, 1998).30. Ibid.31. "Militants Kill 20 in Jammu" (New Delhi: The Sunday Pioneer, February 21, 1999).32. A Press Trust of India feature entitled "Doda Has Become Launching Pad for ISI-backed Ultras" (New Delhi: The Observer of Business and Politics, August 18, 1998).33. Ved Marwah, "Jammu is Fast Becoming Kashmir" (New Delhi: The Times of India, April 26, 1998).34. Arun Joshi, "Kashmir Police Lost 54 officers Fighting Pak-sponsored Terrorism" (New Delhi: The Hindustan Times, February 11, 1999). Arun Joshi writes that "It was a suspect force accused of having its cadres working for militants and helping them in hiding and transporting their weaponry. The police lost its role and conceded the role of fighting militants to the Army and para-military forces A study of the police performance in 1998 reveals that it killed 132 militants, arrested 1,497 and recovered 420 AK assault rifles and explosives weighing 360 kilogrammes."35. Dinesh Kumar, "Equipment Crunch Bane of the Army" (New Delhi: The Times of India, June 30, 1998).36. "Militants Losing Local Support" (New Delhi: The Statesman, October 13, 1998).37. "3-Tier Plan to Check Infiltration in J&K" (New Delhi: The Hindustan Times, September 28, 1998).38. Manoj Joshi, "The Army in Kashmir" (New Delhi: The Times of India, July 12, 1994).39. See monograph entitled "Proxy War in Kashmir", released by the Army Liaison Cell, Directorate General of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters, New Delhi. The monograph was first released on July 15, 1998, on the occasion of the first public display of captured ISI-supplied weapons and has since been updated several times.40. Members of Parliament have been increasingly expressing their concern at the Army's continuing and increasing involvement in counter-insurgency and internal security duties in J&K and the north-eastern states. Heightened tensions along the LoC during 1997-98 and the increasing frequency and intensity of artillery engagements, particularly consequent to the nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan in May 1998, have also been noted with concern by the Members of Parliament.41. Captain Pratap Hoselas, "Rashtriya Rifles : Eight Glorious Years" (New Delhi: Sainik Samachar, November 16-30, 1998).42. "Territorial Army Celebrates 49th Anniversary" (New Delhi: Sainik Samachar, November 16-30, 1998).43. The CRPF is normally deployed in companies and not as a whole battalion under the operational command of the Commanding Officer. For example, four companies of a CRPF battalion, with its administrative headquarters at Calcutta, may be deployed in Assam and two companies may be simultaneously sent to Tripura. Hence, while the employment is actually in numbers of companies, for the sake of uniformity, the figures quoted are in numbers of battalions, @ six companies per battalion.44. Dinesh Kumar, "Pakistan's Proxy War is no Longer a Secret" (New Delhi: The Times of India, July 21, 1998).45. Dinesh Kumar, "Kashmir : Pro-active Policy Needed Along Line of Control" (New Delhi: The Times of India, July 21, 1998).46. Ibid.47. Maj Gen Arjun Ray,VSM, Kashmir Diary: Psychology of Militancy (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 1997), p. 199.48. A report in the Business India Index states that "the number out of every 100 CRPF personnel deployed in J&K who are suffering from mental illness is 13." The statement is attributed to Mr. Gautam Kaul, former Additional Director General, CRPF, Jammu and quotes a study undertaken by the Department of Psychiatry, Nair Hospital, Mumbai. (Mumbai: Business India, January 11-14, 1999).49. Dinesh Kumar, "Sound General Knowledge" (New Delhi: The Times of India, January 12, 1999).50. Dinesh Kumar, n. 39.51. K. Subrahmanyam, "A Pro-active Kashmir Policy" (New Delhi: The Economic Times, September 7, 1998).52. Bharti Bhargava, "Kashmir Issue Should be Frozen for 25 Years" (New Delhi: The Times of India, July 16, 1998).53. K P S Gill, "Pakistan and the Core Issue" (New Delhi: The Pioneer, November 14, 1998).54. "Army Chief Expresses Concern Over Pak-Taliban Nexus" (New Delhi, The Times of India, November 13, 1998).55. K Subrahmanyam, "Learning to Counter Media Savvy Pak" (New Delhi: The Economic Times, October 12, 1998).56. Muhammad Najeeb, "No Use Talking to India : Pakistan" (New Delhi, The Economic Times, July 1, 1998). Also see "UN resolution on Kashmir can't be Invalidated : Ashraf Qazi", (New Delhi: The Times of India, June 17, 1998).57. Vasantha Arora, "India Projects Convergence of Interest With US on Terrorism" (New Delhi: The Observer of Business and Politics, September 21, 1998).58. Aziz Haniffa, "Pak Support to terrorism : India Stand Vindicated" (New Delhi, The Observer of Business and Politics, August 29, 1998).59. Prem Shankar Jha, "Kashmir : A Strategy for Peace" (New Delhi: Indian Express, July 23, 1994).60. Muchkund Dubey, "Dangerous Drift : India's Stake in a Stable Pakistan" (New Delhi: August 13, 1998).Sources and Methods<ul> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb00-2.html" target="_blank">The ISI Role in Pakistan's Politics</a> - Dr. Bindanda M. Chengappa Strategic Analysis February 2000 Vol. XXIII No. 11 (pp.1857-1878)</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://dragon-tsunami.org/~sajal/" target="_blank">Inter-Services Intelligence</a> Model Homepage</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LANCER/idr00006.htm" target="_blank">ISI and its Chicanery in Exporting Terrorism </a>Maj Gen YASHWANT DEVA AVSM (Retd): The Indian Defence Review, © 1997 by Lancer Publishers & Distributors.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://ravi.lums.edu.pk/~b98008/MilitaryInPolitics.html" target="_blank">Role of the Military in Politics in Pakistan</a> Armughan Javaid</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/96jun-oct/si961007.html" target="_blank">The Aristocrat and the General</a> Indranil Banerjie SAPRA INDIA MONTHLY Bulletin Jun-Oct 1996</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://www.prakash.org/issues/jammukashmir/jnktoi19940716_00.html" target="_blank">The Game Of Foxes: J-K Intelligence War</a> Manoj Joshi Times Of India, July 16, 1994</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://rbhatnagar.ececs.uc.edu:8080/india_terrorism/it_pan_islamic" target="_blank">Pan-Islamic Fundementalism Exporting Terror</a> India Today, May 15, 1994</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="http://rbhatnagar.ececs.uc.edu:8080/~archives/hvk/articles/996/0113.html" target="_blank">Pan-Islamic forces funding militancy</a> Ritu Sarin The Indian Express September 28, 1996</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">"This Secret Agency's Name is Infamous" by Sunil Sharma New Delhi JANSATTA 27 Nov 94 page 1 -- ISI Said Behind Widespread Terror, Violence -- Infamous Past, Active Present : JPRS-NEA-94-059 : 27 November 1994</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">"How Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics" by Altaf Gauhar The Nation 17 Aug 97 p 4 [Pakistan: Writer Exposes ISI's Role in Politics : FBIS-NES-97-230 : 18 Aug 1997 ]</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">"In This Way, The Net of ISI is Spread" by Priyaranjan Bharati NewDelhi JANSATTA 27 Nov 94 page 1 [ISI Said Behind Widespread Terror, Violence -- Power, Influence Increasing: JPRS-NEA-94-059: 27 November 1994]</li> </ul>"How to retaliate against this proxy-war" by Kranti Kumar Sharma Delhi Jansatta 30 Jan 97 p 4 [Article Views Pakistani `Spy' Activities: FBIS-NES-97-021: 30 Jan 1997<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> Frontline, P. 39,Sept.10,1999<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> The Washington Post, 1999 AThe Tribune, August 8,1999[1] June 30,1999,The Times of India[1] India Today, Sept 15, 1995 p.147[1] Outlook, November 22, 1999, p. 52-3[1] H.Baweja Indian Today, September 15,1995 p.147[1] H.Baweja India Today, September 15,1995 p.147[1] H.Baweja India Today, September 15,1995 p.147[1] H.Baweja Indian Today, September 15,1995 p.147[1] H.Baweja Indian Today, September 15,1995 p.147[1] H.Baweja Indian Today, September 15,1995 p.147,[1] H.Baweja Indian Today, September 15,1995 p.147[1] The Washington Post, 1999. 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