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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Dalvinder Singh Grewal" data-source="post: 226814" data-attributes="member: 22683">CHAPTER VI ISI <ol> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Organisation</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Aims & Objectives</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Modus Operandi</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Funding System</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Role in India</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Role in Kashmir</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Analysis</li> </ol> OrganisationInter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan known as ISI is the most active covert as well overt agency of the world. ISI is an intelligence agency of the Defence Forces of Pakistan. The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] was founded in 1948 by a British army officer, Maj Gen R Cawthome, then Deputy Chief of Staff in Pakistan Army. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan in the 1950s, expanded the role of ISI in safeguarding Pakistan's interests, monitoring opposition politicians and sustaining military rule in Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deals with all problems bearing on the military aspects of state security and is charged with integrating and coordinating the three services. Affiliated with the committee are the offices of the engineer in chief, the director general of medical service, the Director of Inter-Services Public Relations, and the Director of Inter-Services Intelligence who is incharge of ISI. Staffed by hundreds of civilian and military officers and thousands of other workers, the agency's headquarters is located in Islamabad. The ISI reportedly has a total of about 10,000 officers and staff members, a number which does not include informants and assets. It is reportedly organized into between six and eight divisions: <ul> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Joint Intelligence X (JIX) serves as the secretariat which co-ordinates and provides administrative support to the other ISI wings and field organisations. It also prepares intelligence estimates and threat assessments. </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">The Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), responsible for political intelligence, was the most powerful component of the organisation during the late 1980s. The JIB consists of three subsections, with one subsection devoted to operations against India. </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">The Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB) is responsible for field surveillance of Pakistani diplomats stationed abroad, as well as for conducting intelligence operations in the Middle East, South Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union. </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Joint Intelligence / North (JIN) is responsible for Jammu and Kashmir operations, including infiltration, exfilteration, propaganda and other clandestine operations. </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM) conducts espionage in foreign countries, including offensive intelligence operations. </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">The Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB), which includes Deputy Directors for Wireless, Monitoring and Photos, operates a chain of signals intelligence collection stations along the border with India, and provide communication support to militants operating in Kashmir. </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Joint Intelligence Technical <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a> </li> </ul> In addition to these main elements, ISI also includes a separate explosives section and a chemical warfare section. Published reports provide contradictory indications as to the relative size of these organizational elements, suggesting that either JIX is the largest, or that the Joint Intelligence Bureau is the lrgest with some sixty percent of the total staff. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) is the ISI's main international financial vehicle. Aims & Objectives The ISI is tasked with collection of foreign and domestic intelligence; co-ordination of intelligence functions of the three military services; surveillance over its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited to Pakistan and Pakistani diplomats serving outside the country; the interception and monitoring of communications; and the conduct of covert offensive operations. The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is of particular importance at the joint services level. The directorate's importance derives from the fact that the agency is charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan -- whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or farther afield. The ISI supplies weapons, training, advice and planning assistance to terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir, as well as the separatist movements in the Northeast frontier areas of India. Modes Operandi:<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn2" target="_blank">[2]</a> In the early 1990s, when local recruits were not hard to motivate, the ISI relied on Pakistan trained militants (PTMs) for organising ambushes of security forces convoys and patrols (using AK-47s and machine guns). PTMs were also employed for executing hit-and-run raids on the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) bunkers and pickets inside urban areas (for which hand grenades and rocket propelled grenades were used). For low-risk tasks such as the planting of anti-personnel land mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and to act as couriers of arms, ammunition and messages, locally trained militants (LTMs) wre generally employed. The ISI had declared 1994 as the year of 'barood' (explosives). Though a fairly large measure of autonomy was given to the area and district commanders of militant outfits such as Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Harkat ul Ansar (HUM—banned as a terrorist organisation by the US State Department) to conduct operations, overall control was retained by the ISI as it held the purse strings and was the single largest source of supplies of arms and ammunition. Orders to the various outfits used to be relayed over a clandestine radio station located in POK. However, the Kalashnikov culture that swept Kashmir Valley soon extracted a predictable toll. The power of the gun gradually corrupted the PTMs and they soon began to indulge in extortion, loot, rape and murder for petty jealousies. Operations Conducted After its steller role in creating, training, motivating, inducting, guiding and assisting Taliban in recapture of Afghanistan successfully, the top agenda of this agency remains dismemberment of India to revenge creation of Bangladesh.. Separation of Kashmir from India is its commitment. Pak Army remains its base, Islamic fundamentalism its strength, Islamic fanatics and terrorists its tools, madrasas and military firing ranges its training centers, narcotics money and foreign Islamic funding agencies its source of funds proxy war through terrorists and mis-information its main tactics and Afghanistan achievement its encouragement. It has been very active in Afghanistan and India. Recently it has spread its wings in Nepal and Bangladesh as well. The ISI has been deeply involved in domestic politics and, has kept track of the incumbent regime's opponents. Prior to the imposition of Martial Law in 1958, ISI reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (C-in-C). When martial Law was promulgated in 1958 all the intelligence agencies fell under the direct control of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, and the three intelligence agencies began competing to demonstrate their loyalty to Ayub Khan and his government. The ISI and the MI became extremely active during the l964 presidential election keeping politicians, particularly the East Pakistanis, under surveillance. The ISI became even more deeply involved in domestic politics under General Yahya Khan, notably in East Pakistan, where operations were mounted to ensure that no political party should get an overall majority in the general election. An amount of Rs 29 lac was expended for this purpose, and attempts were made to infiltrate the inner circles of the Awami League. The operation was a complete disaster. Mr. Bhutto promoted General Zia-Ul-Haq in part because the Director of ISI, General Gulam Jilani Khan, was actively promoting him. General Zia, in return, retained General Jilani as head of ISI after his scheduled retirement. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established the Federal Security Force and gave it wide-ranging powers to counter the influence of ISI, but the force was abolished when the military regime of Zia ul-Haq seized power in 1977. When the regime was unpopular with the military and the president (as was Benazir Bhutto's first government), the agency helped topple it by working with opposition political parties. The ISI became much more effective under the leadership of Hameed Gul. The 1990 elections are widely believed to be rigged. The Islami Jamhoori Ittehad [IJI] party was a conglomerate formed of nine mainly rightist parties by the ISI under Lt General Hameed Gul to ensure the defeat of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the polls. Gul denies this, claiming that the ISI's political cell created by Z.A. Bhutto only 'monitored' the elections. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country of paramount geostrategic importance. In a matter of days, the United States declared Pakistan a "frontline state" against Soviet aggression and offered to reopen aid and military assistance deliveries. For the remainder of Zia's tenure, the United States generally ignored Pakistan's developing nuclear program. Pakistan's top national security agency, the Army's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, monitored the activities of and provided advice and support to the mujahidin, and commandos from the Army's Special Services Group helped guide the operations inside Afghanistan. The ISI trained about 83,000 Afghan Mujahideen between 1983 to 1997 and dispatched them to Afghanistan. Pakistan paid a price for its activities. Afghan and Soviet forces conducted raids against mujahidin bases inside Pakistan, and a campaign of terror bombings and sabotage in Pakistan's cities, guided by Afghan intelligence agents, caused hundreds of casualties. In 1987 some 90 percent of the 777 terrorist incidents recorded worldwide took place in Pakistan. The ISI continues to actively participate in Afghan Civil War, supporting the Talibaan in their fight against the Rabbani government. The 1965 war in Kashmir provoked a major crisis in intelligence. When the war started there was a complete collapse of the operations of all the intellience agencies, which had been largely devoted to domestic investigative work such as tapping telephone conversations and chasing political suspects. The ISI after the commencement of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war was apparently unable to locate an Indian armoured division due to its preoccupation with political affairs. Ayub Khan set up a committee headed by General Yahya Khan to examine the working of the agencies. Role in Jammu & Kashmir: In J&K, the ISI provides comprehensive support to five major militant groups. These include Hizbul Mujahideen (approximate strength 1,000 militants), Harkat ul Ansar (350), Lashkar-e-Toiba (300), Al Barq (200) and Al Jehad (150). In all, about 2,500 militants, mostly foreign mercenaries, belonging to these and other smaller militant groups are operating in J&K at present. The ISI spends about Rs. 60 to 80 crores every year for prosecuting Pakistan's proxy war against India in J&K alone, that is Rs. 5 to 6.5 crores per month.22 It is quite obvious that Pakistan's doddering economy can ill afford such expenditure. As the ISI's links with the narcotics trade in Afghanistan and the agency's active participation in the illegal arms trade flourishing in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province are well known, it can only be assumed that funding for its nefarious activities in India is being generated by the ISI itself, with the active connivance of the Pakistan government and the Army. ISI is currently engaged in covertly supporting the Kashmiri Mujahideen in their fight against the Indian authorities in Kashmir. Reportedly "Operation Tupac" is the designation of the three part action plan for the liberation of Kashmir, initiated by President Zia Ul Haq in 1988 after the failure of "Operation Gibraltar." The designation is derived from Tupac Amru, the 18th century prince who led the war of liberation in Uruguay against the Spanish rule. According to a report compiled by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of India in 1995, ISI spent about Rs 2.4 crore per month to sponsor its activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Although all groups reportedly receive arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani groups are reputed to be favored by the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. As of May 1996, at least six major militant organizations, and several smaller ones, operate in Kashmir. Their forces are variously estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000 armed men. They are roughly divided between those who support independence and those who support accession to Pakistan. The oldest and most widely known militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), has spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir. Its student wing is the Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation Front (JKSLF). A large number of other militant organizations have emerged since 1989, some of which also support independence, others of which support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. The most powerful of the pro-Pakistani groups is the Hezb-ul-Mujahedin. The other major groups are Harakat-ul Ansar, a group which reportedly has a large number of non-Kashmiris in it, Al Umar, Al Barq, Muslim Janbaz Force and Lashkar-e Toiba, which is also made up largely of fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to press reports, several hundred fighters from Afghanistan and other Muslim countries have also joined some of the militant groups or have formed their own. The Harakat ul-Ansar group, a powerful militant organization which first emerged in 1993, is said to be made up largely of non-Kashmiris. ISI is reported to operate training camps near the border of Bangladesh where members of separatist groups of the northeastern states, known as the "United Liberation Front Of Seven Sisters" [ULFOSS] are trained with military equipment and terrorist activities. These groups include the National Security Council of Nagaland [NSCN], People's Liberation Army [PLA], United Liberation Front of Assam [ULFA], and North East Students Organization [NESO]. ISI is said to have intensified its activities in the southern Indian States of Hyderabad, Bangalore, Cochin, Kojhikode, Bhatkal, and Gulbarga. In Andhra Pradesh the Ittehadul Musalmeen and the Hijbul Mujahideen are claimed to be involved in subversive activities promoted by ISI. And Koyalapattinam, a village in Tamil Nadu, is said to be the common center of operations of ISI and the Liberation Tigers. The criminal activities of the militants soon alienated the Kashmiris. "Even political leaders aligned with militant groups have acknowledged that the abuses undermined the militants' support in Kashmir."16 At the same time, counter-insurgency operations by the security forces also gained momentum and a large number of militants were killed in action or apprehended. Kashmiri families soon became wary of sending their sons for what they realised was a futile jehad. The result was that, beginning around 1994-95, the ISI's recruitment base in Kashmir Valley gradually dried up, though recruitment by force continued for some more time. The ISI then placed its reliance for further operations in Kashmir predominantly on foreign mercenaries. The ISI's USP (unique selling point) was that Islam was in danger in India, in general, and in Kashmir, in particular. Mercenaries from POK, Pakistan, Afghanistan, several Gulf and West Asian countries including Saudi Arabia and Iraq and many African countries including Egypt, Libya and Algeria, were hired, trained and inducted into the Kashmir Valley. In addition, criminals undergoing long imprisonment sentences in Pakistani jails were also enticed into participating in the so-called jehad. They were told that their sentences would be reprieved if they successfully completed a tenure of ISI ordained duty in J&K. Gradually, the presence of foreign mercenaries among the militants went up from 15 per cent in 1994 to 40 per cent in end-1998.17 The modus operandi was to give the mercenaries some rudimentary military training and knowledge about using explosives, arm them with an AK-47 with four magazines of ammunition and give them a few thousand Rupees in Indian currency. At an opportune moment, they were infiltrated through the porous LoC with the support of the Pakistani Army. The Army provided a safe passage through its own defences, guidance by hired gujjars and bakkarwals (Kashmiri shepherds) and covering fire from small arms, machine guns and even artillery, to draw away the attention of Indian troops on the LoC. The command and control set up was loose and flexible. The mercenaries were usually assigned to operate in specified areas and co-ordinated their operations with each other and the remnants of Kashmiri militants. The mercenaries soon found that the people in Kashmir Valley enjoyed an unfettered right to practice their religion. Namaz was performed by the devout five times a day and the mosques were functioning without any kind of interference. In fact, the mullahs were quite used to and rather fond of spewing venom and inciting the people to rise in revolt. Though the local population tolerated them as 'guest militants' the mercenaries did not get the promised support from the Kashmiri people, contrary to what they had been briefed by their masters in Pakistan. Food and shelter were hard to come by and the constant flight from the security forces was tiresome and most inconvenient. Also, they found that the security forces, particularly the Indian Army, were a tough force to reckon with and discovered that a militant's life span in Kashmir was a maximum of four to six months before he was hounded out and killed or apprehended. In 1998, as many as 320 foreign mercenaries were killed.18 All this disillusioned the mercenaries very quickly. The story of extortion, loot, rape and murder was soon played out aain. Some of them even began to run their own harems. While the people of Kashmir had initially actively participated in a struggle for azadi (independence) and had even encouraged their sons to join the movement, they were not willing to put up with the errant and domineering ways of the foreign mercenaries with whom they did not identify in any manner whatsoever. They soon began to give real-time intelligence— euphemistically called 'actionable' intelligence—about the whereabouts of the mercenaries to the security forces. From then onwards, the days of the foreign mercenary in Kashmir Valley were numbered. The tide finally turned around the summer months of 1996 when the ISI found that it was no longer profitable or even cost effective to persist with the induction of additional mercenaries in the Valley sector. At this stage, the ISI, in conjunction with the Pakistani Army, appears to have decided to shift the focus of its activities to the areas south of the Pir Panjal range. It was also apparently decided at this time to rely more on terror tactics to discredit the Indian administration, incite a communal and sectarian divide among the people and, by simultaneously raising the ante in Siachen glacier and along the LoC, project Kashmir as an international 'flashpoint'. Role in India The ISI also enlarged the sphere of its diabolical activities to other areas in India. South India soon became a new front in the covert war against India, as evidenced by the incidents of terrorism in 1997-98. In December 1997, there were three bomb explosions in trains in Tamil Nadu. On February 14, 1998, simultaneous bomb blasts in Coimbatore, at the venue of the Bhartiya Janata Party President's election meeting, the bus stand, the railway station, near a hospital and in a bazaar, mimicked the Mumbai bomb blasts of March 1993. The obvious objectives were India's democratic and secular values, political stability and economic growth. The sea route was followed to smuggle explosives to India's west coast for the serial explosions in Mumbai. A new dimension was added to the ISI's relentless effort to spread terrorism in India when, "On December 17, 1995.... an AN-26 aircraft flew into India from Karachi, refuelled at Varanasi in broad daylight, airdropped about 400 AK-47s and thousands of rounds of ammunition over Purulia in West Bengal, and the flew on to Thailand.... The aircraft was intercepted five days later on December 22, just as it was about to leave Indian airspace near Gujarat."20 Only two months later, an Iranian and a Swiss national drove a truck full of weapons through the Wagah border check post between Lahore and Amritsar to New Delhi and were caught purely fortuitously. On February 11, 1998, a gang of international gun runners was intercepted in the Andaman islands with a consignment of 145 rifles and machine guns and 40,000 rounds of ammunition meant for insurgent groups in the country's north-eastern states. "Thus today we have a situation where land borders, sea coasts and now island territories have become porous and vulnerable to infiltration of weapons and terrorists alike (sic)."21 The Pakistan-sponsored terrorist violence has taken a toll of 9,151 civilians and 5,101security personnel besides inflictingan estimated damage worth Rs 2,000 crore to private property. According to a detailed presentation made by the Ministry of Home Affairs the role of Pakistani agencies, including Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and their surrogates at a meeting of chief ministers of seven northern states here, 61,900 weapons were smuggled into India for rise by terrorists. A total of 4,730 explosions were caused while 2.78 lakh people were rendered homeless. Estimated security related costs including compensation to victims, raising of local counter-terrorist forces has been put at Rs 18,500 crore while expenditure on deployment of army and paramilitary forces on anti-terrorist duties was estimated to be Rs 46,000 crore. Over 51,810 kgs of high explosives including RDX was sent to India to cause explosions out of which 43,000 kgs was seized. An estimated 7,125 Pakistanis and foreign mercenaries were sent by Pakistan into India for sabotage of whom 1,120 were killed and 140 arrested, while 4115 returned. There were 1,750 foreign mercenaries still active in, India. About 19,000 Indian nationals were trained in sabotage by ISI in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Pak-occupied Kashmir, the estimates said. The major incidents involving ISI or other Pakistani agencies this year alone, included foiling of attempts on the life of former Haryana chief minister Bhajan Lal at Karnal (March), arrest of smugglers associated with Pak-based Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) chief Paramjit Singh Panjwar (August) at Ludhiana and the nabbing of a hawala operator and two of his Afghan associates in Delhi (August) who was responsible for transfer of over Rs 1.75 crore to militants. Security forces also arrested five Lashkar-E-Toiba activities in Delhi in July and thwarted their plans to attack military installations here. A module of Harkat-Ul-Ansar was broken up in Delhi last month with the arrest of three of its activists, while a Hizb ul Mujahedeen leader was caught in July collecting money brought in through hawala channel.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn3" target="_blank">[3]</a> A key Kathmandu-based Babbar Khalsa international militant was caught this February near the Indo-Nepal border while he was escorting a foreign-based militant. Security forces shot six members of ISI-backed Abdul Latif gang in Ahmedabad in March. Just before the Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan, held at New Delhi in November 1998, Indiaome Minister, Mr. L K Advani called Pakistan a 'terrorist state'. During the talks, the Indian team submitted the following four proposals to the Pakistanis:-23 * Give up state sponsorship of terrorism in India and dismantle the terrorist camps in Pakistan for arming and indoctrinating militants. * Close down more than 30 training camps functioning in the so-called Azad Kashmir. * Deny use of Pakistani territory and facilities to fundamentalists and militant organisations to fuel religious violence. * Hand over to India 32 terrorist and underworld operators of Indian origin currently in Pakistan. White Paper on ISI Operations24 The ISI wishes to float and sustain an 'overground conglomerate' to project itself as the 'third party' to the dispute representing the 'wishes and aspirations' of the Kashmiri people. To sustain the Kashmir movement at minimal cost, the ISI plans to cause disaffection and alienation, play the Islam-in-danger card, highlight the non-performance of the elected government and atrocities allegedly committed by the security forces. Pakistan wants to pursue the 'Qurban Ali Doctrine' or the inevitable balkanisation of India by sending intensively trained and motivated Pakistani agents to carry out acts of sabotage and subversion. The objectives of Pakistan's covert action plan against India are to: Sustain the Kashmir movement at minimal cost. Force a settlement of the Kashmir problem on terms acceptable to Pakistan. Weaken India's potential strength and national will by hitting at its perceived 'fault lines'. Prevent India from emerging as a strategically dominant power in the region. Make Indian borders porous and India's border states vulnerable to exploitation. Pakistan wishes to embarrass India by internationalising the Kashmir issue, projecting India as a violator of UN resolutions and accusing it of human rights violations. In pursuance of its objectives, the ISI is engaged in spreading the tentacles of terrorism not only in J&K but also in Punjab, Assam and Nagaland by carrying out subversive propaganda on fundamentalist and communal lines. The ISI has established operational links with drug syndicates and fundamentalist Islamic groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. In response to demands made by members of the Parliamentary Consultative Committee attached with the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Government of India has proposed to bring out a White Paper on ISI activities in the budget session of Parliament. Details of some of the issues which are likely to be included in the proposed White Paper have appeared in some sections of the Indian press.25 The growing ISI presence along the Indo-Nepal border is another cause for concern. India has taken up the issue of ISI's anti-India activities, which include the infiltration of militants and agents and the smuggling of arms, explosives and narcotics through Nepal into India, with the Nepalese Government at the highest level.26 The increasing influx of Bangladesh nationals in the strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor in north Bengal has changed the demographic pattern in the area. The population of Muslims has increased from 15 per cent in 1971 to 70 per cent at present. The ISI is using the Siliguri Corridor for smuggling arms and narcotics from Bangladesh into the north-eastern states of India. Along the Rajasthan border also, the ISI is actively involved in setting up madrassas (Islamic schools) inside Indian territory and in smuggling arms, explosives and narcotics.28 These developments are pointers to the larger Pakistani gameplan to further extend the areas in India in which internal security is not fully under the control of the civil government and, consequently, to dissipate efforts to fight the menace of militancy and terrorism Over a period the ISI has become a state within a state, answerable neither to the leadership of the army, nor to the President or the Prime Minister. The result is there has been no real supervision of the ISI, and corruption, narcotics, and big money have all come into play, further complicating the political scenario. Drug money is used by ISI to finance not only the Afghanistan war, but also the proxy war against India in Punjab and Kashmir. Even though it is part of the Defence Forces and its operations are directed and controlled by a regular army officer of the rank of Lt. General, the Chiefs of Defence Staff or Chief or Army Staff or civil administration have no direct control over it. It is answerable only to the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister but at times it appeared to be Independent of these masters as well. Its no denying the fact that its operations are a part of the national strategy and any action of ISI in India needs to be dealt with as an operation by one country against the other, yet the Indian Government has failed to project all ISI Operations as Pakistan Government operations. ISI operations in India are the key to Pakistan’s proxy war which have caused immense damage to Indians, their property and morale. India should have declared any operation by ISI as a war crime by Pakistan against India and should have projected and retaliated suitably for every action but the slackness of Indian Government in this regard has cost the Indians and the Indian Forces very dear. Passing blame on ISI and sparing Pakistan’s government of the terrorist actions assisted , guided and directed by ISI is the biggest blunder the Indian Government has done so far. It has also failed to bring pressure of foreign forces and media on Pakistan to control ISI. As a result, ISI is ever expanding its operations and has virtually taken over the role of proxy war against India from Pakistan Government. Funding System of ISI: The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan has been pumping in crores of rupees to sustain the proxy war unleashed on India is a well-known fact. But how is the huge fund generated? How does it reach the militants fighting the undeclared war in the Kashmir valley? The following report discloses all. According to information collected from various agencies and individuals, the ISI is working in collaboration with the All-Party Hurriyat Conference and its component Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir, the United Jehad Council and the Markaz al-Dawah al-Irshad for raising funds to keep up militancy in the valley. Even the money received as "zakat" — a kind of religious tax which Islam enjoins upon a certain category of the believers for the welfare of the needy — is used to fund this nefarious scheme. If the ISI has its own funds earmarked for the dirty game, the militant outfits operating from both sides of the border have set up their front organisations for collecting money to pay the "mujahideen" engaged in "jehad". The most dependable — from the ISI's point of view — network is being run by the Hurriyat. The Jamaat has set up a memorial trust to attract donations mainly from abroad. The Markaz al-Dawah has its headquarters at Lahore and collects huge sums to fight the so-called "holy war" in Kashmir. Surprisingly, militants are not the only people to benefit from these funds received mainly as donations. Certain politicians too have had their share. However, donations are not enough to lubricate the proxy war. There are certain other ways also to ensure an uninterrupted supply of money. These include: (1) sale of narcotics on a large scale (the United Nations Drug Control Programme has it that the ISI annually makes around $ 2.5 billion through this source and it must be spending anything between Rs 537.5 crore and Rs 1,075 crore on fuelling militancy every year); (2) printing of fake currency notes by the National Jehad Council at its printing press at Muzaffarabad in occupied Kashmir; (3) collections made in West Asia and European countries for the Jehad Fund; and (4) extortions from traders, contractors and other moneyed people. Money from foreign sources is received through the hawala route. There is also a system of indirect funding — providing arms, ammunition, food and clothing to militants before pushing them on to this side of the India-Pakistan divide. It is ensured that before entering the valley the militants carry with them large amounts of cash (both Indian and Pakistani currency). In fact, militancy has become a flourishing business. The recruits get either a fixed salary or work on a contract basis. According to information available, a local militant's monthly salary varies between Rs 2,500 and Rs 5,000 depending on various factors. A foreign mercenary gets between Rs 5,000 and Rs 8,000. The financial support given to the family of a deceased militant ranges from Rs 1500 to Rs 3000 a month. A fresh recruit can secure anything between Rs 5,000 and Rs 20,000 as a one-time payment, depending on his capacity to bargain. A guide gets between Rs 30,000 and Rs 50,000, a porter between Rs 7,500 and Rs 20,000 and a motivator Rs 5,000. There are other kinds of payments made which show how meticulously the whole operation is carried on. A militant gets Rs 150 for throwing a grenade and Rs 6,000 for winter clothing. For killing an officer of the security forces up to the rank of Major the "reward" is Rs 7,000, for a Lieut-Colonel Rs 50,000 and for a Brigadier and above earns a much bigger amount. The militants of foreign origin cost the ISI a little more. When they enter into a two-year contract they are paid Rs 2 lakh to move to Kashmir. When they go back home after the contract period they get another Rs 5 lakh as a final payment. Now the figures about the year-wise expenditure (these do not include all payments made for the execution of the Kashmir plan of the ISI). For carrying out the operation from July to September, 1999, the "Supreme Commander" of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen received Rs 1,06,50,000. During 1998 the payments made to militants totalled Rs 6,94,31,733, and the payees mainly belonged to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Toiyaba. In 1997, Rs 70,39,473 was distributed and the money went to certain Shia militant outfits in the valley. In 1996, the total amount received for militant activity was Rs 10,50,738. Of this, Rs 5,00,000 reached the People's Conference and Hurriyat leaders. In the post-Kargil period militant organisations are getting special treatment to keep their morale high. The ISI funding is now more liberal. According to one source, the monthly aid to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is at least Rs 1 crore, to the Harkat-ul-Ansar Rs 40 lakh, to the Al-Barq Rs 12 lakh, to the All-Party Hurriyat Conference Rs 2 crore and other groups (minor ones) about Rs 35,000 each. There is widespread unemployment and poverty in certain areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan and some Muslim-dominated West Asian countries. This helps in recruiting youngsters for the destructive scheme, specially when the "salary" is so tempting. Religion comes handy in brainwashing the poverty-stricken people to risk their lives for a "cause". This is sheer exploitation of simple souls. Some details of the ISI's cash transactions: (These do not include the undetected ones, specially hawala deals and donations). <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Year Amount paid Major recipients 1996 Rs. 5,00,000 Sent through bank draft for leaders of the People's Conference and APHC. Rs. 5,50,738 Through a draft drawn on a foreign bank in London. 1997 Rs 70,39,473 Amount sent for Shia military outfits in the valley. 1998 Rs. 3,91,733 Channelling of funds from abroad to militants through a Srinagar-based trust. Jan Rs. 75,00,000 Paid by the ISI to militant organisations for continuing their operations. Jan Rs. 20,00,000 Received by unidentified outfits to intensify militant activity. Feb Rs. 85,00,000 Amt paid by ISI to Cdr of Hizb-ul- Mujahideen for distribution to militants. March Rs. 25,00,000 Amt paid by Hizb Supreme Cdr in Baramula for militant activity. May Rs. 60,00,000 Paid by Hizb ChiefSalahuddin, via Delhi-based courier for militant activity. June Rs. 1,00,00,000 Paid to Hizb functionaries by the ISI for families of killed militants. June Rs. 50,00,000 Paid to Hizb functionaries by ISI for distribution to families of killed militants. Aug Rs. 40,00,000 Paid by ISI to the Lashkar-e-Toiyaba to intensify militant activity. Oct Rs. 1,70,00,000 Paid by ISI to Hizb leaders as arrears and for purchase of winter clothing. Nov Rs. 15,40,000 Paid by ISI to Div Cdrs of oda, Banihal, Udhampur and Pir Panjal Dec Rs. 50,00,000 Paid by the Hizb Supreme Commander to valley-based militants. 1999 July Rs. 3,50,000 Paid by Hizb supremo to Dy Supreme Cdr as operation money for Aug-Sep. Sep Rs. 1,03,00,000 -do- </td></tr></table> Payments made to militants and their sympathisers. <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Local militant </td><td>Rs. 2500-5000 ($ 58-$ 116) per month </td></tr><tr><td>Foreign militant </td><td>Rs. 5000-8000 ($ 116-$ 186) per month </td></tr><tr><td>Guide </td><td>Rs. 30000-Rs. 50000 ($ 698-$ 1163) </td></tr><tr><td>Motivator </td><td>Rs. 5000 ($ 116) per recruit. </td></tr><tr><td>Recruit </td><td>Rs. 5000 to Rs. 20000 ($ 116 to $ 465) as one-time payment </td></tr><tr><td>Porter </td><td>Rs. 7,500 ($175) for amn box Rs. 20,000 ($ 465) 12-14 kg/trip </td></tr><tr><td>Each deceased militant's family </td><td>Rs. 1,500-3,000 ($ 35-$ 70) per month </td></tr></table> Other payments Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 2,00,000 ($ 1,163 to $ 4,651) to deceased militants' families or militancy-affected families. Rs. 6,000 ($ 140) for winter clothing. Rs. 150 ($ 3) for grenade throwing. Amount payable as a reward for killing Army/security forces' personnel Rs. 7,000 ($ 163) Upto Major rank or equivallent Rs. 50,000 ($ 1,163) Lieut-Colonel Larger amount Brigadier and above Foreign militants get Rs. 2,00,000 ($ 4,651) while coming in and another Rs. 5,00,000 ($ 11,628) on going back after a two-year contract. Fund Allocations: <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Sr </td><td>Name of Organisation </td><td> Amount Paid </td></tr><tr><td>1 </td><td>Hizbul Mujzideen </td><td>Rs. 1,00,00,000 ($ 232,558) </td></tr><tr><td>2 </td><td>Harkat-ul-Ansar </td><td>Rs. 40,00,000 ($ 93,023) </td></tr><tr><td>3 </td><td>Al-Barq </td><td>Rs. 12,00,000 ($ 27,907) </td></tr><tr><td>4 </td><td>Hurriyat </td><td>Rs. 20,00,00,000 ($ 4,651,160) </td></tr><tr><td>5 </td><td>Minor groups </td><td>Rs. 35,00,000 ($ 81,395) </td></tr></table> Arrest of an ISI gang There is growing evidence that fundamentalist groups in Pakistan are preparing to set off a new wave of terror across India. The operational strategy seeks to exploit communal fissures: fissures that the Hindu Right has had not a little to do with creating in the first place. On August 29, the Jammu and Kashmir Police announced the arrest of an 11-member Lashkar-e-Taiba cell, whose operatives were active in Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Delhi. Its top operative, Amir Khan, Pakistani national, was tasked to recruit Indians whose immediate family members had been killed in communal violence. At the time of his arrest, Khan was engaged in building a cover identity. Having obtained Indian educational documents and a driving licence from India, he planned to marry into a family living in Bhiwandi in Thane district of Maharashtra. The Lashkar-e-Taiba cell was busted after the Jammu and Kashmir Police and 5 Grenadiers regiment picked up Islam-ud-Din, a resident of Tirwara Ka Nangal village in Gurgoan district of Haryana, on the Samba border in Jammu while waiting for key a Lashkar-e-Taiba operative, Abu Ilyas. Islam-ud-din was not aware that Ilyas had been killed in an encounter while attempting to cross through Samba on July 31. Codenamed Abu Khalid, Islam-ud-Din told his interrogators that the cll had been ordered to carry out a series of explosions ahead of Independence Day. Amir Khan’s arrest, based on Islam-ud-Din’s interrogation, rapidly led to the arrest of toehr members of the cell the result of a coordinated operation between the State police and the Intelligence Bureau (I.B.). The most important operatives were based in Mumbai and Bhiwandi, placed hit hard by Shiv Sena terror and anti-Muslim pogroms. Bhiwandi residents Usman Khan and Mohammad Ismail had obtained for Amir Khan educational documents and a driving licence and even loaned him an autorickshaw. Abdul Salam, Ismail’s brother, arranged Khan’s wedding through a local moulvi. Another Bhiwandi resident, Mohammad Mobin, was engaged in finding accommodation for Khan, without knowing his real identity. Funds for this cell were routed through Jamal Ahmad, a resident of Mumbai’s Mazagaon areas. The rest of Khan’s recruits were scattered across the country. Abdul Adil, a resident of Kurnool in Andhra Pradesh, worked for the cell even as he studied at Jamia Milia Islamia in New Delhi. Muzaffarnagar resident Mohammad Mustafa and Baghpat resident Mohammad Mustafa were roped in too. Wali Mohammad Zahid, originally a resident of Islam-ud-Din. Zahid had been instructed to obtain fake travel documents to faciliate movement out of India when instructed to do so by the Lashkar-e-Taiba leadership. One of Zahid’s recruits, Mohammad Sharif, had been arrested three months earlier. Jammu and Kashmir Police officials say that Islam-ud-Din was trained at the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Abu Bashir camp in Bhawalpur, Pakistan. The Abu Bashir camp, one of five major Lashkar training centres, specialises in bomb-making. The Umar Kuka camp puts volunteers through a basic, three-month insurgency course, while the Abdullah bin Masood camp nearby offers more specialised training. The Taiba camp at Muridke engages in basic ideological indoctrination, after which recruits are sent for a rigorous six-month course, the Daura Khasta, in the mountains. Another Muridke camp, Aksa, focusses on training volunteers from several countries, including Afghanistan, Sudan, Nigeria and Pakistan, for the wr in Jammu and Kashmir. Islam-ud-Din left Pakistan in early 1999, with cash to help set up the cell. More money came from Ilyas. Both visited several cities to gather recruits, using the infrastructure of the revandhist religious organisation, the Tabligh-I-Jamaat. Islam-ud-Din also arranged for Khan to work at the clinic of a doctor in Punhana, Faqir-e-Alam, by introducing the Lashkar operative as his relative. Faqir-e-Alam, a recent migrant to Haryana from Bihar, did not know Khan’s real identity. The latest arrests affirm that the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s pan-Indian network is exploiting Muslim insecurities fuelled by the rise of a regime with no commitment to secularism. In the March 26 issue, Frontline had reported on the arrests of several important members of the Lashkar’s Abdul Karim ‘Tunda’ cell, including Pakistani nationals Mohammad Salim Junaid from Hyderabad and Abdul Sattar from Delhi along with Indian nationals Shoaib alam, Mohammad Faisal Hussain and Aamer Hashim Kamran. Saifullah Chitrali, a top operative of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and the Hizbul Mujahideen’s Ali Mohammad Dar had also set networks outside Jammu and Kashmir. Organisations such as the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front had even liised with Abdul Razzak Memon, a key accused in the Mumbai serial bomb blasts.The BJP’s pro-active policy, an ill-conceived militarist response to growing violence in Jammu and Kashmir, fails to address the changing character of terrorism and the forces that drive it. As long as Hindu revanchism continues to fuel tensions in India, any number of soldiers will not be enough to engage with the Islamic Right<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn4" target="_blank">[4]</a>.<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/" target="_blank">http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/</a> created by John Pike, maintained by <a href="mailto:webmaster@fas.org">Webmaster</a> , Updated Thursday, April 20, 2000 12:22:21 PM<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref2" target="_blank">[2]</a> Gurmeet Singh Kanwal, Senior Fellow, IDSA Proxy War in Kashmir: Jehad or State-Sponsored Terrorism?<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref3" target="_blank">[3]</a> Indian Express October 15,1988<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref4" target="_blank">[4]</a> Frontline, Sept.10,1999, p.39.</blockquote>

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