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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Dalvinder Singh Grewal" data-source="post: 226812" data-attributes="member: 22683">CHAPTER IV                                                               PAKISTAN’S PROXY WAR<ol> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Background</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">Present state of Proxy War in Kashmir</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">OP Gulmarg</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">OP Gibralter</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ol">OP Tupac</li> </ol>BackgroundPakistan has been cut half after Bangladesh war. Strategically, militarily and economically too it is not in a state to wage direct war against India. It has nuclear weapons but does not have that much capcity with which it can destroy India. On the other hand if it initiates nuclear war its own annihiliation is near certain. It has adopted proxy war under these circumstances, by inciting the youth of Kahmir valley and also by sending its own terrorists who create panic and mayhem in the general public and attack Indian troops whenever or wherever they get chance. Since 1947 It has achieved wide experience in proxy war and has been successful in keeping the Kashmir couldren burning. This fact has been widely accepted by Indian leaders. At Nagpur Home Minister of India L K Advani said India would emerge victorious in the proxy war launched by Pakistan. India was fighting the fifth war, a proxy war, against Pakistan in the last 20 years, he said addressing a public meeting on the sidelines of National Council session of the Bharathia Janata Party. India had won all the previous wars in 1948, 1965, 1971 and in Kargil operation in 1999, Advani added. Launching a scathing attack on Pakistani intelligence agency ISI, he blamed it for disturbing communal harmony. Advani said Deendar-Anjuman outfit was found to be indulging in terrorist activities in the country by carrying out bomb blasts in churches in Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Goa. During the last few months, 15 religious places and prayer halls of Christians were made targets by the ISI, he said<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a>. Defence Minister George Fernandes termed Pakistan’s proxy war against India as the “biggest stumbling block” to peace and declared that as long as Islamabad continues to send armed intruders into India, talks between the two countries cannot take place. In his address to the armed forces on the eve of Independence Day, the Defence Minister said that Pakistan was well aware that its troops could not match the Indian forces in any war and so Islamabad had resorted to proxy war to destabilise India. “Even these designs are being foiled by our alert jawans. A large number of mercenaries, mostly foreign nationals, have been killed in Jammu and Kashmir creating demoralisation among the Pakistani terrorists”. The Defence Minister said India had always extended a hand of friendship to Pakistan, but Islamabad continued to nurse hostility “towards us”, adding that the Kargil intrusion was the latest example of betrayal by Islamabad. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn2" target="_blank">[2]</a> Mr Fernandes said keeping in view the prevailing security environment in the region, the government was taking urgent steps to ensure that the armed forces were equipped with state-of-the-art armaments and weapon systems, declaring that the problem of funds would not be allowed to come in the way of this process. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#top" target="_blank"> </a> The Army Chief, Gen. V. P. Malik, said on 17 July 2000 at Bhopal that, “there is vidence of a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir with increased militant activity and greater effort to send more trained militants from the Pakistan side in recent months”. Addressing a press conference, he said that after a lull in the post-Kargil phase there was evidence of a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir with more Pak-trained militants trying to cross the border. Since May 2000, there had been a larger number of clashes with militants, he said adding that the casualties were high along the line of control and inside. There was no let up from the other side, he said while asserting that the Army, para-military forces and Jammu and Kashmir police were doing a good job meeting the challenge. Asked whether the Army was now better equipped to face the border situation than what it was at the time of the Kargil crisis, the Army Chief said: ``we are better equipped''. While referring to the supply of arms, ammunition and equipment to the Army, he said procedural delays notwithstanding, a lot of work had been done. He added: ``equipping takes time and every thing is not available off the shelf.'' The victory in Kargil had brought the whole nation together, Gen. Malik said adding that the Army could complete its mission by throwing out the Pak Army intruders from Kargil with total support of the people. There was no evidence of militants but only the involvement of the Pakistan Army in Kargil, he asserted. To a pointed query, he said, “There were lessons from Kargil for every body, including the Army and these had been covered by the Kargil Review Committee. The lessons are both strategic and operational, he said adding that the Army has to learn more from the operational lessons.” Asked to spell out the solution for the Kashmir issue, Gen. Malik said: ``This is a serious political question that has to be resolved politically rather than militarily.'' Answering another query, he said that minimum deployment of Army in the internal security matters would be good for the Army as well as the country. The State Governments should be better prepared. Asked to comment on the casualty of young Army officers engaged in anti-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir, The gave credit to the junior Army leadership for its performance. He said that the Armymen are there to fight the challenges but pointed towards the number of those killed on the other side as well [1] These statements of three key Government functionaries not only accept the existence of proxy war by Pakistan against India, but also why it is being fought by Pakistan, the possible impact on India and how India is countering it. History of Pakistan’s Proxy War in Jammu & Kashmir For Islamabad, the liberation of Kashmir is a sacred mission, the only task unfulfilled since Muhammad Ali Jinnah's days. Moreover, a crisis in Kashmir constitutes an excellent outlet for the frustration at home, an instrument for the mobilisation of the masses, as well as gaining the support of the Islamist parties and primarily their loyalists in the military and the ISI<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn4" target="_blank">[4]</a>. Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was one of the 565 princely states of India on which the British paramountcy lapsed at the stroke of midnight on 15 August 1947. By the terms agreed upon for the partition of the Indian subcontinent between India and Pakistan, the rulers of princely states were given the right to opt for either Pakistan or India or- with certain reservations- to remain independent. The ruler of J & K, Maharaja Hari Singh did not exercise the option to join either of the two dominions, and instead, wanted a Standstill Agreement pending final decision on his state's accession. OP Gulmarg Having failed to annexe J & K, Pakistan planned proxy war against the state through Qabailies and Pathans along with Army Personnel in mufti, into the state. The proxy war was planned by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and Major-General Akbar Khan, with Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s authorization under code name Operation Gulmarg. Major General Akbar Khan known as Tariq was made the incharge of the operation. Major General Khursheed Anwar ex INA incited the Qabailies as per the plan. According to Sir Hush Brook Williams ex-Foreign Minister Patiala State, the control was in the hands of Major General Akbar Khan. General Qiani and General Haji Akhtiar assisted by 3000 Pakistani regulars. An American, Sergeant Hat Russel was promoted Brigadier and made incharge of one of the contingenets<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn5" target="_blank">[5]</a>. With the aim of intimidating the population, Pakistan tribesmen were pushed into Kashmir in October 1947. On 20 October 1947, under the direction and control of Pakistan Army Regulars, thousands of Qabaili Pathans that included Waziris of areas Banu and beyond, Khatak from Kohat, Afridi and Am-Darband of areas around Peshawar, and Gakhar and Kagani of areas of Agror and Tehsir Mansera; were armed, brought from Peshawar to Garhi Habib-Ula, Balakot, Kohala etc.and left like wild dogs on hapless and armless Kashmiris. Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Sultan of Boi, who was later made Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir was made incharge of all the administrative arrangements. The J & K government had No. 4 J & K Infantry to guard against general area Mozaffarbad and No. 6 J & K Infantry in general area Gilgit. The deployment of 4 J & K Infantry was as follows: <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Sr</td><td>Troops</td><td>Deployment</td><td>Commander</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>Bn Hqs</td><td>Dak Banglow Domel</td><td>Lt Col. Narain Singh Dogra</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>A Coy Dogra</td><td>Dak Banglow Barsala & Ghala Bridge</td><td>Lt. Labh Singh Dogra</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>B Coy Dogra</td><td>Karen & Tithwal</td><td>Capt. Prithi Singh Dogra</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>C Coy Muslim</td><td>Dak Banglow Lohar Gali & 2 Pl Ramkot</td><td>Lt. Mohammed Azam Khan</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>D Coy Muslim</td><td>Ghori. One Pl at Dub-Gali</td><td>Lt. Mozzaffar Ali Shah</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>One Pl Dogra</td><td>Village Kotli</td><td>One Jemandar</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>One Pl</td><td>Village Bhatika</td><td>-do-</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>One Pl Muslim</td><td>Bridge on Kishan Ganga</td><td>-do-</td></tr></table>The deployment of 6 J & K Infantry was as follows:<table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Sr</td><td>Troops</td><td>Deployment</td><td>Commander</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>Bn Hqs</td><td>Boonji Cantt.</td><td>Col Abdul Majid Khan</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>A Coy Sikh</td><td>Skardu Fort</td><td>Maj Sher Jang Thapa</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>B Coy Sikh</td><td>Boonji Cantt.</td><td>Captain Baldev Singh</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>C Coy Muslim</td><td>Sakardu Fort</td><td>Captain Ganga Singh</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>D Coy Muslim</td><td>Gilgit</td><td>Maj Mohammad Hassan Khan</td></tr></table>The information regarding Qabaili build up came to Gilgit, Gilgit Scouts who were Muslims revolted. The Governor of Gilgit, Ghansara Singh asked CO 6 J & K Col Abdul Majid Khan on phone to send one company to Gilgit for protection. Maj Mohammed Khan was ordered to move on 20 Oct to Gilgit along with D Company. Col Abdul Majid Khan also joined the Company. En route, Major Mohammad Khan revolted along with his troops and arrested CO.On the night of 21-22 Oct the invaders attacked Jaglot and Partap Bridge the two piquets established by A Company of Sikhs and killed almost all the Sikh soldiers. A few stragglers reached Bn Hqs. and reported the matter to Captain Baldev Singh and the Subedar Major. Captain Baldev Singh Bajwa took B Company for rescue of Partap Ghat. Subedar Major Bostan Khan took advantage of the situation and captured the kot and handed over all the weapons to Muslim soldiers. The heavy contingents of Qabailies assisted by Subedar Major Bostan Khan and Muslim troops overpowered Capt Baldev singh and the B Company, and Killed or arrested most of the Sikh soldiers. Meanwhile C Company located at Skardu consisting of Muslim troops also revolted. Pakistan Army joined them. A fight with A Company started in which the Company was overwhelmed and captured. Thus entire Gilgit including Skardu fell to invaders. On Mozaffarbad front, the report of a large - scale preparation in front of Muzzafarabad was given by the Army Post Commander of 4 J & K Infantry on 21 Oct 1947 to their CO Col Narayan Singh. He sent one Muslim Havildar Qudrat-Ula-Khan for further information. This Havildar deserted and joined Qabailies. He passed information about the deployment of J & K troops to Akbar Khan. Soon after, the ‘C’ Company of 4 J & K Infantry that consisted of Muslim troops too revolted and joined the attackers. On 22 October, the Qabailies entered Muzaffarabad and created mayhem. They killed the able, captured the disabled and women, looted the houses and shops and put the city on fire. After capturing and destroying Mozaffarbad they advanced towards Domel. The Muslim troops of Hqs at Domel, took control of all arms and ammunition, killed all Sikhs and Dogra troops and helped advancing Qabailies to capture Domel. Same day they captured Kishen Ganga Bridge piquet and on 24 October Bhatika post fell. On 26 October they reached Dub Gali. Only opposition to the advancing Qabilies was from local Sikhs who were settled along Kishen Ganga. They gave good fights at Kotli, Seri, Abhial, Lohar Gali, Radu, Bhatika, Maira Parsacha, Naloochhee, Gali Seri, Tanda, Botha, Khanda, Bandi Jamadaran di, Rada Basnada, Chhattar, Garhi Hattian, Qaumi K, Chakaar, Chakothee, Dardkot and Janki Maira. Fed up of the opposition from these Sikhs they ordered the mass massacre of the Sikh families. At Domel, over 1000 Sikhs were collected and shot. Very heart tearing accounts of the mayhem and the fight by the Sikhs are given in the book ‘Kashmir te Sikh’ by Sarwan Singh Shaktiman<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn6" target="_blank">[6]</a>. Domel having fallen and both C & D Companies of Muslim troops having joined the raiders, there was no obstruction left for the advancing raiders; thereafter they advanced speedily towards Srinagar. On the other fronts, the Qabailies attacked, captured, looted, created mayhem and put on fire Baramula on 26 October 1947. Singhpura and Ichhohama were also attacked where local people gave a good fight. Finding the situation out of his control Maharaja Hari Singh reqested a battalion from Maharaja Patiala, but later thinking that this force too may not hold the advancing marauders who by then had closed on to Srinagar airport, Mahraja Hari Singh requested foor Indian Support. India agreed to take on only if the Maharaja signed an instrument of accession which he did on 27 october 1947. Meanwhile one battalion of Patiala followed by a Brigade from Indian forces arrived at Srnagar airport. Threat to Srinagar and Srinagar airport was immediately removed as the Sikhs from Patiala and Indian forces strarted pushing back Qabailies. They gradually cleared most area upto Baramula and Punchh. The Pakistani forces too reacted resulting into the first Indo Pak war which ended only in 1948 through a UNO brokered ceasefire. As per Part II of the resolution signed on August 13, 1948 by Pakistan and India in the presence of UNO representatives,the {akistan Government agreed to withdraw its troops from J & K as it cinstituted a material change in the situation. Pakistan was also asked to withdraw tribals and Pakistan Nationals. Indian Government was to withdraw bulk of the forces only after withdrawal of Pakistani Forces, tribesmen and other nationals. Pakistan however never met this commitment and kept its forces in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir till date. On the other hand it kept on claiming Indian part of Kashmir as well. For this it not only sent terrorists from time to time but also continued firing weapons and having broder skirmishes till date, the latest being 80 casualities on the day of summit between Vajpayee and Musharaf. Operation Gibraltar, In 1965, Pakistan again planned a proxy war, through the operation codenamed ‘Gibralter’.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn7" target="_blank">[7]</a> At that time the then Pakistan Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, had, after prolonged consultations with Army commanders, formulated the plan for "Operatian Gibralter" the dreams of Pakistan<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn8" target="_blank">[8]</a>. Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s effort to achieve what remained undone in 1947 saw five major task forces of specially trained Pakistanis moving into Kashmir in the summer of 1965, under the command of Major-General Akhtar Husain Malik’s headquarters at Murree. As per the "Operation Gibralter" Pakistan attempted at infiltrating thousands of infiltrators from the so-called Azad Kashmir routes into the Indian border villages. Its aim was that at the time of Pak invasion these infiltrators would terrorise the local people and guide the Pakistani troops. Pakistan had to face defeat in "Operation Gibralter" because of the courage, bravery and wisdom of the Indian soldiers. The background of this new war strategy was Pakistan's 44 years' of experience and especially its rejection of the advice the Chinese Premier, Chou-En-Lai, had given during the 1965 war against India. At that time the seeds of separatism had been sown in Kashmir but they had not sprouted yet. The inclination and the mind that were needed for making the "Operation Gibralter" a success was missing among the Kashmiri youth. The base on which the "Operation Gibralter" had been started was not strong. The Indian Army officers shattered Pakistan hopes and Gibraltar too was beaten back, and after Pakistan’s plans to use its troops to initiate a civil uprising failed, After Pakistan’s plans to use its troops to initiate a civil uprising failed, the U.N. brokered a ceasefire. But that too did not last long and the continuing Proxy War again turned into a War known as Indo-Pak War 1965. In January 1966, under international pressure, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, which dealt specifically with the Kashmir issue. Both countries reaffirmed their commitment to “settle their disputes through peaceful means.” They noted, “The interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries.” “It was against this background,” the Tashkent Agreement reads, “that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.” In 1966, under international pressure, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, which dealt specifically with the Kashmir issue. Both countries reaffirmed their commitment to “settle their disputes through peaceful means.” They noted, “The interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries.” “It was against this background,” the Tashkent Agreement reads, “that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.” OP Tupac The final major bilateral agreement on the future of Kashmir came after Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in the war of 1971. This agreement, signed by Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on July 3,1972, committed both countries to work for “a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir.” (See Appendix E). The agreement did not see any specific discussion of how this might come about, but it was mandated that meanwhile “neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.” By some accounts, Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutoo arrived at an unwritten agreement that the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir would be accepted as the border. Bhutto pleaded that he be not compelled to commit this in print, which would have undermined his political standing in Pakistan. Evidence of such a deal is purely circumstantial. Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, for instance, recently revealed in a television interview that Bhutto’s personal secretary informed him of it during his 1974 visit to Pakistan. The humiliation and defeat suffered by Pakistan in 1971 war was a major setback to the national pride of the common man in Pakistan, who up to now had always taken pride in the invincibility of the Pak soldier - a hoax fed to them by several military regimes of Pak to hide administrative lapses on account of their misrule. Against a backdrop of such military disillusionment, political misrule, economic and social cataclysm, and a beleaguered national pride, Gen. Zia Ul Haq charged with vendetta planned another proxy war with Operation Topac Operation Topac was to be conducted over a period of 20 years and in four parts. In part one he had planned to send terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir, create unrest among the general public and fail the civil administration.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn9" target="_blank">[9]</a> Gen. Zia launched a full fledged campaign to destabilize the existing political set up in J & K and foment militancy through active and persistent support to the anti national elements in J & K, morally, materially, politically and even by physical use of its regular troops, though covertly using his Inter Services Intelligence Wing (ISI). A friendly intelligence agency gave a copy of Zia’s speech delivered at the April conclave to the Indian Intelligence Agencies, a few months after Zia presented Operation Topac before his top Generals, This speech was reproduced in the April-June 1999 issue of the “Indian Defence Review” (IDR) as given below: “Gentlemen, I have spoken on this subject before, therefore, I will leave out the details. As you know due to our preoccupation in Afghanistan, in the service of Islam, I have not been able to put these before you earlier. Let there be no mistake, however, that our aim remains quite clear and firm – the liberation of the Kashmir Valley - our Muslim Kashmiri brothers cannot be allowed to stay with India for any length of time, now. In the past we had opted for ham handed military options and therefore, failed. So, as I have mentioned before, we will now keep our military option for the last moment as a coup de grace, if and when necessary. Our Kashmiri brethren in the valley, though with us in their hearts and minds, are simple-minded folk and do not easily take to the type of warfare to which, say, a Punjab or an Afghan takes to naturally, against foreign domination. The Kahmiris, however, have a few qualities which we can exploit. First, his shrewdness and intelligence; second, his power to persevere under pressure; and the third, if I may so say, he is a master of political intrigue. If we provide him means through which he can best utilitises these qualities- he will deliver the goods. Sheer brute force is in any case not needed in every type of warfare, especially so in the situation obtaining in the Kashmir Valley, as I have explained earlier. Here we must adopt these methods of combat which the Kashmiri mind can grasp and cope with – in other words, a coordinated use of moral and physical means, other than military operations, which will destroy the will of the enemy, damage his political capacity and expose him to the world as an aggressor. This aim, Gentlemen, shall be achieved in the initial phases. In the first phase, which may, if necessary, last a couple of years. We will assist our Kahmiri brethren in getting hold of the power apparatus of the State by political subversion and intrigue. I would like to mention here that as no Government can survive in Occupied Kashmir unless it has the tacit approval of Delhi, it would be unrealistic to believe that the MUF or any such organization can seize power through democratic or other means. In view of this, power must “apparently” remain with those whom New Delhi favours. We must therefore ensure that certain “favoured politicians” from the ruling elite be selected who would collaborate with us in subverting all effective organs of the State. In brief, our plan for Kashmir, which will be codenamed as “Op Topac” will be as follows: Phase 1: A low-level insurgency against the regime so that it is under siege, but does not collapse as we would not yet want central rule imposed by Delhi. We plant our chosen men in all the key positions; they will subvert the police forces, financial institutions, the communication network and other important organizations. We whip up anti-Indian feelings amongst the students and peasants, preferably on some religious issue, so that we can enlist their active support for rioting and anti-government demonstrations. Organize and train subersive elements and armed groups with capabilities, initially, to deal with para-millitary forces located in the valley. Adopt and develop means to cut off lines of communication between Jammu and Kahmir and within Kashmir and Ladakh by stealth, without recourse to force. The road over Zojila upto Kargil and the road over Khardungla should receive our special attention. In collaboration with Sikh extremists, create chaos and terror in Jammu to deliver attention from the valley at a critical juncture and discerdit the regime even in the Hindu mind. Establish virtual control in those parts of the Kashmir valley where the Indian Army is not located or deployed. The southern Kahmir Valley may be one such region. Phase 2: Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen, Kargil and Rajauri-Punchh sectors to force the Indian army to deploy reserve formations outside the main Kashmir Valley. Attack and destroy base depots and HQs located at Srinagar, Pattan, Kupwara, Baramulla, Bandipur and Chowkiwala by covert action at a given time Some of Afghan Mujahideen by then settled in Azad Kashmir, will then infiltrate in selected pockets with a view to extending areas of our influence. This aspect will require detailed and ingenious planning. The fiasco of Op Gibraltar (1965) holds many lessons for us here. At a Certain stage of the operations, Punjab and adjacent areas of Jammu and Kashmir will be put under maximum pressure internally by our offensive posture. Phase 3: Detailed plans for the liberation of Kashmir Valley and establishment of independent Islamic state in the third phase will follow. We do not have much time. Maximum pressure must be exerted before the general elections in India and before Indian Army reserves, which are still bogged down in Sri Lanka, become available. By the Grace of God, we have managed to accumulate large stocks of modern arms and ammunition from US consignments intended for Afghan Mujahideen. This will help our Kahmiri brethren achieve their goals. Even if we create a kind of “Azad Kashmir” in some remote parts of Occupied Kashmir as a beginning, the next step may not be as difficult as it appears today. On the other hand, it should also be noted that a part of the Indian Army, particularly the Infantry, will be well trained by now for such a situation due to their experience in the Northern-Eastern region and more recently in Sri Lanka. But the situation in Kashmir will be somewhat different; more like the “Intefada” of Palestinians in towns, and on the pattern of the Mujehideen in the countryside to attack hard target. A period of chaos in the State is essential in the circumstances. And what of our Chinese friends? They can do no more than ensure that Indian forces deployed against them are not moved out: but this may be required only at the last or the third stage of our operations. Of course, if we are in serious trouble, the Chinese and our other powerful friends shall come to our rescue one way or the other. They will ensure if we do not win, at least we don’t lose. Finally, I wish to caution you once more that it will be disastrous to believe that we can take on India in a straight contest. We must, therefore, be careful and maintain a low military profile so that the Indians do not find an excuse to pre-empt us, by attacking at a time and at appoint their own choosing, at least before phase 1 and 2 of the Operation are over. We must pause and assess the course of operations after each phase, as our strategy and plans may require drastic changes in certain circumstances. I need not emphasize any further than a deliberate and objective assessment of the situation must be ensured at each stage, otherwise a stalemate will follow with no good for Pakistan. Pakistan Paindabad.” Gen Zia’s death, the eventual political turmoil and Pakistan’s continued involvement in Afghanistan were some of the factors that delayed the implementation of Op Tupac. The Operation started with full steam from 1989 onwards. Around this time, Pakistan military strategists had also prepared blue-print of two more operations: Op Mushtary (Jupiter) and Plan X. Maj Gen Afsiir Karim (Retd), a much-decorated Indian solider who is also a member of the National Security Council Advisory Board, wrote in IDR that Op Mushtary will commence at a certain stage of ‘Zarb-e-Kamil’ and is likely to take the following form: <ul> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Extensive and continued firing including artillery and mortar fire all along the Line of Control. </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Attack on Isolated posts on the LoC particularly in remote and difficult areas </li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Capture of important but less defensible tactical features on the Shamsabari Range, Kargil, Shyok Valley - Saltoro Range and in the Punch-Rajauri sector </li> </ul> Plan X was prepared to pre-empt a possible Indian military offensive in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and force an Indian retreat from the Saltoro Crest Line and Siachen Glacier. Plan X also envisaged launching a surprise attack to seize and hold logistics support bases vital for maintenance of troops deployed on the Saltro Crest Line, Siachen and Southern Glaciers. The IDR (April-June 1999) published as follows the main features of Plan X made available to India by an intelligence agency of a third country: <ul> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">To achieve surprise, Plan X was to be executed in deep winter, preferably at a time when flights between Thoise (a forward air base of IAF in Ladakh) and the rest of India are unable to operate when the strategic Khardungla is blocked due to heavy snowfall.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Capture of forward positions of Partapur garrison astride Siari-Tutuk axis and logistics support bases for Southern Glaciers by infiltration across the LoC</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Heli-dropping of specially equipped and trained troops east of Partapur Thoise Airfield complex and Siachen Base simultaneously.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Interdiction of Khardungla by SSG commandos after blowing up sections of road and important culverts on either side of the pass.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Actual concentration of troops and simulation of major attacks at an appropriate time in Dras, Kargil, Gurz, Tangdhar and Punch sectors to tie down Indian reserve formations.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Raids and destruction of staging camps and gun position located on the Siachen Glacier. Exert maximum pressure on Indian posts on the crest line from both sides of the LoC,, Capture Sia La on the crest line in the northern Glacier area, if possible.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Step up guerilla and terrorist activity, raid airfields and radar facilities in the valley on given code words.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Activate major disturbances and widespread rioting in all major towns of Kashmir Valley and Jammu Division.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">All forces to be prepared and trained to operate for a period of eight days without re-supply or land link-up.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul">Plans for exfiltration of troops in unfavorable circumstances will be prepared but divulged only to a selected few.</li> </ul>ISINumber of movements were planned by Pakistani ISI and put into operation with an aim to merge Kashmir with Pakistan, independence for Jammu and Kashmir from both India and Pakistan, or the granting of union territory status to Buddhist Ladakh. To contend with these movements, to confront Pakistani forces along the cease-fire line, and to support the administrative structure of the state, the union government of India has maintained a strong military presence in the Indian sector, especially since the end of the 1980s. India acquired the lion’s share of both territory and population and with them substantial linguistic, ethnic, and religious problems. Pakistan exploited these problems to fomant trouble in the state and with an aim to create general unrest trained Kashmiri youth for creating terror. Pakistani Forces outfit Inter-Service Intelligence has remained very active in training, equipping and directing the youth. As the Kashmiri youth realised the Pakistani game plan, they gradually withdrew and surrendered before Indian authorities in large numbers. ISI made up the shortcoming initially by recruiting youth from PoK and then from rest of Pakistan. Over a period it also recruited number of Muslim mercenaries from all over the world. The latest have been the Talibans and the Saudi militants trained and funded by Osama Ben Laden. Pakistan has been waging a proxy war against this country for over six decades. This war was initiated in Kashmir in 1947. Later it was extended to Punjab in the 1980s and then gradually to north-east and the rest of India. Pakistan's game plan was to deter India's conventional and nuclear superiority through its own nuclear capability and by tying down two corps of the Indian army in Kashmir. It launched the Kargil aggression in the hope that nuclear deterrence - and the fatigue of the Indian army engaged in prolonged counter-militancy operations - would enable in prolonged counter-militancy operations - would enable Pakistan to seize the Kargil heights before the Zojila pass opened, as happens normally in June. A quirk in the weather and the opening of the pass a month earlier than expected frustrated Pakistan's designs. .<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn10" target="_blank">[10]</a> By 1984, Pakistan had gained considerable expertise in launching covert operations due to her role in the civil war in Afghanistan. Training of Kashmiris and supply of suitable weapons to start a proxy war in J&K was planned. Initially, psychological warfare was launched with the aim of creating a climate for sponsoring terrorism preceded by a virulent anti India campaign. Fundamentalism was injected in lethal doses over a period of time. Indoctrination and training of selected leaders was organised in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), to create militant cadres, while political Pakistani agents within the valley fomented unrest. Loyalties of local police and government servants were subverted systematically, and specially trained groups organised anti-government and anti Indian agitation. They also engineered incidents to provoke the authorities to take strong action against the local population, as bringing about alienation of the local population was their main aim. Sponsered Terrorism The next phase was 'sponsored terrorism'- planned, supported and inspired from across the border by Pakistan. This phase opened with bomb blasts, kidnappings, assassinations, arson and violent demonstrations. This Pak sponsored insurgency was a low cost, long-term option to internationalise the J&K issue and this could create a no-win situation for the Indian armed forces, while Pakistan watched from a safe distance. Thus, Gen. Zia had launched a 'proxy war' against India, with far reaching political and strategic aims. By 1988, the secessionists with a clear-cut pro Pakistan bias had emerged in the Valley. A violent movement took roots as a result of which the state administration was totally subverted by fundamentalist organisations. Pakistan was able to organise training camps for Kashmiri youth to impart training in terrorist activities, and continued to pour weapons and ammunition along with militants into J&K to sustain the proxy war. The end of 1989 saw militancy in its full flow in Kashmir valley. Various fundamentalist Islamic organisations with fancy Arabic names had proliferated and the political process atrophied in Kashmir. An organised phase of assassinations, kidnappings, murders and looting had started in J & K. At the pinnacle of militancy and to signify the virtual collapse of government machinery, Dr Rubaiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Union Home Minister of India was kidnapped and the release of some dreaded militants demanded in return, as a bargain. Selective killing of Hindus was carried out, to drive out the minority community from Kashmir. Crisis situations like that of Hazratbal shrine and the tragedy of Chrar-e-Sharif were precipitated by the militants with a view to challenge the authority of the Government of India and to further alienate the Muslim population from the rest of the country. To draw international attention and seek third party intervention on the J&K issue, even foreign tourists were not spared. In July 1995, ten foreign tourists were abducted from Pahalgam by the militant outfit, Al Faran. Only four, including three women, were released by them, one managed to escape later, a Norwegian tourist was beheaded and four disappeared forever. In an environment of near cataclysm, the Indian Government invoked 'The J&K Disturbed Areas Act 1990' and 'The Armed Forces (J&K) Special Powers Ordinance Act 1990'. With additional powers bestowed upon them, the security forces, which were thus far operating with their hands tied to their backs, became effective and soon had the militants on the run. Kargil War With relentless effort and sacrifices the security forces considerably improved the situation in the Valley. However, Pak trained militants along with weapons continue to pour from Pakistan. Militants hold a sophisticated inventory of weapons to include sniper rifles, rocket launchers, Pika guns (which can also be used as anti-aircraft guns), mortars, and the latest model of AK series rifles, machine guns and revolvers/pistols. Unlike in the past, militant groups later began to avoid engaging security forces directly. However, they carried out selective killing of innocent civilians; those who were moderates and did not support their nefarious designs. Notwithstanding this, the situation returned to near normal. Elections to the parliament and state assembly were held peacefully in 1996 and again in 1998. In order to divest centralised control and to encourage mass participation of people in self-government, elections to the Village Development Councils (Panchayati Raj) were held relatively peacefully. With improvement in the situation, touristsh once again begun to throng the Kashmir Valley (popularly referred to as the queen of hill stations) in large numbers. In 1998, 1,50,000 tourists from all over the world had visited Kashmir, With the onset of 1999, a surge in tourist activity begun and beholding a promise of economic prosperity and development to the common man in Kashmir. Following these developments came the proposal of voluntary cease-fire announced by India which was later extended four times. The terrorists primarily Pakistani outfits LeT and Hizzub considered it as India’s weakness and stepped up their activities. India’s effort to involve Hurriyat, a group of parties claiming to be political wings of the terrorists, did not materialize, as Hurriyat was more keen to make Pakistan a party than to solve its problem. Despite Mr. Pant having been appointed as chief negotiator by the Indian Government, Hurriyat never tried to or wanted to enter into direct dialogue. Facing a roadblock from the Hurriyat side, India thought it better to have direct talks with Pakistan. Accordingly, the Cheif Executive Gen Musharraf was invited by India for talks on 14-15 July 2001. This gave Gen. Musharraf a direct advantage. His position was not only secured and accepted but further eleveated as he managed to take over as the President of Pakistan himself. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn11" target="_blank">[11]</a> The results of the dialogue between Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India and President Musharraf too were the same as were of earlier dialogues. India and Pakistan agreed after each war to mutually settle the Kashmir problem through dialogue but the dialogue has never succeeded to achieve the desired results due to the political compulsions on both the sides. India acquired the lion’s share of both territory and population and with them substantial linguistic, ethnic, and religious problems. Pakistan exploited these problems to formant trouble in the state and with an aim to create general unrest trained Kashmiri youth for creating terror. Pakistani Forces outfit Inter-Service Intelligence has remained very active in training, equipping and directing the youth. As the Kashmiri youth realised the Pakistani game plan, they gradually withdrew and surrendered before Indian authorities in large numbers. ISI made up the shortcoming initially by recruiting youth from PoK and then from rest of Pakistan. Over a period it also recruited number of Muslim mercenaries from all over the world. The latest have been the Talibans and the Saudi militants trained and funded by Assam Ben Laden. Despite the timely intelligence provided by a friendly country, there was no political will from the successive governments to take Pakistan head on and try to nip the problem in the bud. The Pakistani audacity and resolve was apparent from the fact that Op Topac was prepared a year after India had flexed its military muscle in the famous Operation Brass Tacks of 1987. The architect of that defeat, General Pervez Musharraf is still not willing to learn the lessons of the setbacks Pakistan suffered in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Indeed, since General Pervez Musharraf is unlikely to succeed in setting things right domestically in Pakistan, his hope is to demonstrate some spectacular achievement in the proxy war in Kashmir. Unfortunately, successive Indian governments have tended to treat this proxy war as a law and order problem in which the army merely extends `aid to civil power'. The unified command in Kashmir is not a truly integrated command appropriate to fight the Pakistani plan. Upgrading and equipping the paramilitary forces take on the responsibility of fighting the proxy war - with the army providing back up support - has not so far been tried. Only in the high-level government conference on Kashmir on January 17 has a move in this direction been made. In spite of all the fanfare, however, Monday's decisions do not meet the requirements of the situation. What is needed in Kashmir is a totally unified command, under an army general, with all forces totally integrated and intelligence performing an operational role as part of the counter-proxy war campaign under that command. The Indian political and administrative culture appears to inhibit efficient team-work and coordination. Punjab proved what works in India is single line structure. There has been too much of turf fighting and oneupmanship in Kashmir among the different agencies. The Central Government has tended to pass the buck on to the army, without giving it the necessary capability to fight effectively The January 17 decisions are merely improvisations and fall far short of a total rethinking on the most effective command structure and force composition needed to fight the proxy war. Necessary though these changes in the military approach to the problem are, the government must also accompany them with some fresh thinking on the political front. The present upsurge in militancy may be directed by Pakistan but the myopic approach of the Abdullah government in Kashmir is not helping matters either. If it is interested in a permanent solution, the Centre must take the lead in liberating Kashmir from the clutches of dynastic politics. It should also assume the responsibility of reviving a normal political process, not excluding the release of some of the imprisoned dissident leaders.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn12" target="_blank">[12]</a> Continuity of Proxy War After Kargil Since Pakistan-sponsored militancy first erupted in the Kashmir Valley in 1989-90 and cries of azadi (independence) rent the air, the pendulum of public opinion in Kashmir has swung away from thoughts of jehad to more mundane 'bread and butter' issues. While the security situation in Kashmir Valley has improved considerably, Pakistan is now endeavouring to spread the cult of militancy and terrorism to new areas south of the Pir Panjal range in the Jammu region, so as to create an ethnic and sectarian divide and trigger a communal backlash. Pakistan's increasing frustration and desperation can be gauged from the number of incidents of terrorism that its mercenary agents have been perpetrating since the situation in Kashmir Valley began to slip out of control in 1997-98. Pakistan's aim is clearly to de-stabilise India by all possible means. A protracted 'proxy war' and sustained political and diplomatic offensives, are part of a well-crafted strategy to keep India engaged in internal squabbles and impose a heavy burden on the Indian economy. Pakistan has achieved considerable success in projecting the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) issue as an international 'flashpoint'. Pakistan also aims to ensure that the Indian Army and Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs) remain increasingly engaged in counter-insurgency/internal security operations in J&K and the north-eastern states, so as to degrade India's superiority in conventional combat through a process of strategic fatigue. While ensuring that violence in the ongoing low intensity conflict is maintained at a low level so that it does not lead to a conventional war (that is, it does not cross India's perceived threshold of tolerance), Pakistan can be expected to continue to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities to match Indian capabilities in these fields. Pakistan hopes that such capabilities would further deter India from resorting to conventional conflict to resolve the Kashmir issue. The Indian Government, on the other hand, has exhibited remarkable restraint in the face of grave provocation. It is now engaged in taking stock of the emerging developments to evolve a co-ordinated civil and military 'action plan' to ensure that the initiative does not remain with Pakistan and that India is able to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity, as well as, eventually root out militancy from J&K and other parts of India. Though military operations against the Pakistan-sponsored militants and terrorists have been extremely successful, the nation has paid a heavy price in terms of civilian and military casualties. The economic costs have also been staggering and obviously cannot be sustained indefinitely. It is imperative that the impact of the various complexities and nuances of the J&K issue is carefully evaluated so that pragmatic decisions can be made to resolve it expeditiously. These plans can be outlined as under:- Part I 1 Send Terrorists to Kashmir Valley 2. Create general unrest in the Valley 3. Fail Civil Administration Part II Commit Indian troops away from Kashmir Valley Part III Large scale infiltration into Kashmir Valley, cut off Kashmir Valley from rest of India and then merge with India. Part IV If needed Military action as a coup de grace. This proxy war to separate Kashmir from India was to be carried out in four stages:- Alienation of the Kashmiri Muslims from India and to wean them away towards Pakistan, through negative propaganda war and internationalising Kashmir problem to create world opinion in Pakistan’s favour. Wearing away India through continuous unrest through militancy and terrorism, employing Indian troops for a prolonged period of time in guerrilla warfare and clandestine operations in Kashmir and throughout India through ISI to weaken Indian economy and causing general unrest all over India. Infiltration of Pakistani troops to actively aid and assist the Militants in the physical separation of Kashmir. Drawing India into a limited war in case all efforts fail making use the offices of long term allies U.S.A., China and Saudi Arabia to tilt the balance in his favour. Steps planned by Pakistan to meet these objectives can be covered under the following headings: Information Compaign ISI activitiesMilitancy InfiltrationWarThese developments are discussed in succeeding chapters<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> PTI,<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref2" target="_blank">[2]</a> The Tribune, 14 August 2000<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref3" target="_blank">[3]</a> The Tribune, July 22, 2000.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref4" target="_blank">[4]</a> Yossef Bodansky (Director of the US Congress Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare), "Pakistan's Kashmir Strategy", from the monograph entitled "Pakistan, Kashmir & the Trans-Asian Axis" (Houston, Texas: Freeman Centre for Strategic Studies, Summer 1995).<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref5" target="_blank">[5]</a> Political Conspiracies in Pakistan, P.39-43.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref6" target="_blank">[6]</a> Sarwan Singh Shaktiman, Kashmir te Sikh, Punjabi, Patiala, 1995.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref7" target="_blank">[7]</a> As the saboteurs in the first instance had not produced the desired results, our Government decided to set in motion the second option -- to launch guerrillas into Indian-held Kashmir. This decision was taken in May 1965 soon after the Kutch skirmish. The guerrilla operation was named Gibralter and another operation supplementary to it was called Grandslam..."-- Lt. General Gul Hassan Khan, former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in his Memoirs.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref8" target="_blank">[8]</a> Navbharat Times Jan 17, 1970.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref9" target="_blank">[9]</a> The Tribune, Saturday, June 26,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref10" target="_blank">[10]</a> The Times of India, Clarity on Kashmir, 19 January 2000.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref11" target="_blank">[11]</a> India Today, July 16, 2001, Cover Story: Indo-Pak Special : One-Sided Encounter<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref12" target="_blank">[12]</a> The Times of India, Clarity on Kashmir, 19 January 2000.</blockquote>

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