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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Dalvinder Singh Grewal" data-source="post: 226809" data-attributes="member: 22683">CHAPTER II                                                                      LINE OF CONTROL1.Line of Control2. AGPL3. SiachinThe J & K territory has an area of 85,806 square miles (222,236 square kilometers; it is divided by a “line of control,” agreed upon in 1972, that leaves an area of 46,976 square miles in the north and west with Pakistan known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK); the remainder, 38,829square miles, is with India and is known as state of Jammu & Kashmir. The dispute of occupied territories of J & K by Pakistan and China have remained a thaw in the affairs between India and its neighbours Pakistan and China. All through these 52 years Pakistan never ceased to play mischief in Kashmir. The nasty suggestion that the Line of Control has not been properly delineated shows the ugly fangs behind the mask and Pakistan’s lip service to both the Shimla Accord and the Lahore Declaration. India has all along taken the stand that the stand that the so-called insurgency in Kashmir is purely the creation of Pakistan establishment, its army and the ISI. <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td> </td><td>[ATTACH=full]23466[/ATTACH]</td></tr><tr><td></td><td> </td></tr></table> But in the spillover of the cold war, USA refused to pay any heed to the wailing and complaints from India about Pakistan as the hub of international terrorism until USA had it in its neck when the notorious Bin Laden, operating from the sanctuary of the Pakistan- Taliban nexus, remote controlled the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi. Pakistani incursions across the Kargil sector in Ladakh came to light and New Delhi’s Herculean efforts to push the intruders back mounted. Pakistan intruded its troops with an aim to alter the LoC with an aim to gain an upper hand in any future negotiations. This intrusion across Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has drawn a lot of media attention. Among others, the Pakistan Foreign Minister in the course of his one-day visit to New Delhi (June 12) referred to “some confusion” about the “actual line of control” in that though there was “demarcation in the maps”’ it had “not been delineated on the ground”. This was “especially” so in the hilly areas leading to lack of clarity in the melting of snow. There was also the charge that “thrice” over in the past, New Delhi had “violated” the LoC in the Siachen area. Stoutly repudiating all suggestions about its vagueness, India has maintained that both countries had agreed “on the map” where the LoC runs and that Islamabad was not unaware of its alignment. The continuous day and night surveillance of the LoC has become more important because of the war like situation on the border and our glaring intelligence failure during Kargil war. The Chief of Army Staff Gen. Malik refused to comment on the much-reported failure of intelligence agencies prior to detecting the intruders last month in the Kargil sector and Dras and Batalik sub-sectors. “We are all working together. We are alright,” the general said about getting adequate support of civilian intelligence. “But we need to improve our surveillance along the LoC. Physical surveillance is not possible. We have to make use of more technical equipment.” Earlier, in his opening remarks, he said, “operations in Dras, Kargil and Batalik are progressing satisfactorily. Slow, on account of terrain and climatic conditions, but steady. I believe that we have been able to foil Pakistan’s military designs to sever the road between Zojila and Leh and turn our defences in Kargil, Batalik and Turtuk sectors. We are now fully balanced on the ground in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere.” He described Pakistan’s contention about the “ambiguous delineation” of the LoC as “full of mischief, wrong, dangerous and unacceptable.” He pointed out: “If it was so, then India and Pakistan would have been in a state of war all along the 740 km of LoC and would remain so in future.” Mentioning about the intrusion the Gen. said that irrespective of what the prime minister of Pakistan, their other leaders and military commanders have said, there is no doubt that the infiltration was conceived, planned and executed by Pakistani army regulars. “Their involvement has not been denied by Pakistan at the military to military level.” He said the intrusions had taken place across 110 to 120 km of the LoC and, initially, up to nine km inside the Indian Territory. Now, after almost one month of Operation Vijay, the maximum distance of Operation Vijay, the maximum distance of intrusion is about five to six km, he said. Drawing a difference between the infiltration across the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir over the past 10 years and in the Kargil Sector this time, Gen. Malik said that in the earlier case, militants, mostly foreign mercenaries, were being sent into Indian Territory with support from the Pakistan army. However, in the Kargil situation, the “Pakistani army itself has infiltrated across the LoC with a view to changing the delineated LoC alignment.”<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn1" target="_blank">[1]</a> If Indian troops ever have to cross the Line of Control (LoC) to pull curtains on the Kargil conflict, they will do so only after the Union Cabinet takes a decision in this regard, Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik announced. In the same breath, and answering another question, Gen. Malik added: “There is a need for us to look beyond Kargil.” Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee categorically stated that India, under no condition, would permit any alteration in the status quo along the Line of Control (LoC), which was inviolable under the Shimla agreement. At an all-party meeting on the current situation in the Kargil sector, attended by leaders of all leading political parties, the Defence Minister George Fernandes and the three service chiefs who briefed the meeting to discuss the Kargil crisis, the Prime Minister said, “His government was making no secret deals and there were no proposals for mediation by third countries on the Conflict. Lambasting Pakistan for the crisis, Mr. Vajpayee said “We wanted to hear from them their willingness to withdraw the intruders without condition and in a specified time-frame. This we did not hear”. He made it clear that the military action would not be stopped until the intruders were driven away. The Prime Minister said: “Nothing but complete and unconditional withdrawal of the intruders will satisfy our requirement”. He expressed satisfaction over the response of the international community on the Kargil issue saying: “The world has recognised the restraint shown by us. They have also recognised India’s responsible approach which consists of localising operations while pushing back the intruders and expressing our readiness to resume the Lahore process if Pakistan withdrew the intruders”. Mr. Vajpayee said: “We shall seek formal reaffirmation of the Line of Control as has emerged after the Shimla agreement and which both countries have formally delineated on the map. “Our position is to continue the dialogue but under no condition will we permit any alteration in the status quo along the Line of Control”, he said. The LoC was the end product of the Simla Agreement of July 1972, which brought to a close the third bout of hostilities between two neighbours. It may be recalled that the war itself, which led to the birth of Bangladesh as a separate political entity, had drawn to a close in December, 1971, and the India-Pakistan agreement at Simla had, inter alias, stipulated that insofar as the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir, agreed to in 1949, did no longer exist, after the hostilities of 1971, a new line had to be drawn.(See Appendix E1) It may be of interest to note that in 1949, as later in 1971, the new alignment took time to be in place. Actually, this long-drawn out exercise engaged the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) for almost seven months, January-July 1949, before the military advisor to the Commission prepared the map, which delineated the Cease Fire Line (CFL), later accepted by both the parties. The CFL was disturbed in August 1965 when a large number of Pakistani infiltrators entered Kashmir. In the ensuring hostilities, New Delhi was able to register sizeable territorial gains. Sadly for it, these were undone by the Tashkent declaration in January, 1966, which practically restored the status quo ante as far as the frontier in Kashmir was concerned. In sharp contrast to the CFL, which was drawn by a UN Commission and agreed to by both India and Pakistan, the LoC was the handiwork of a bilateral arrangement. India and Pakistan very carefully selected senior military commanders to shoulder this historic responsibility. On the Indian side the team captain was the well known, highly respected, gallant soldier scholar, Lt Gen PS Bhagat, PVSM, Victoria Cross and on Pakistan side the highly respected veteran and a man of sterling character Lt. Gen Hameed Khan, S PK, SQA. It was a fortunate coincidence that Bhagat and Hameed knew each other since their days in the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Consequently they worked on the difficult, time consuming and laborious mission with trust, utter frankness and mutual regard and respect. The composition of the two delegations was as under: <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td>Indian Delegation </td><td>Pakistan Delegation </td></tr><tr><td>Lt Gen P S Bhagat </td><td>Lt Gen Abdul Hameed Khan </td></tr><tr><td>Maj Gen M R Rajwade </td><td>Brig. S M Abbasi </td></tr><tr><td>Maj Gen I S Gill </td><td>Col Mahmud Shaukat </td></tr><tr><td>Col C M Sahni </td><td>Col Syed Refaqat </td></tr><tr><td>Lt Col M S Chahal </td><td>Lt Col M M Afzal Khan </td></tr><tr><td>Lt Col B M Tewari </td><td>Lt Col Ahmad Saeed </td></tr></table> General Bhagat’s team included the then Director Military Operations, Maj Gen. IS Gill, PVSM, MC, known in the Indian Army as a man of 24-carat-gold for his sterling qualities. <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td></td><td>[ATTACH=full]23467[/ATTACH] </td></tr><tr><td> </td><td> </td></tr></table> Similarly on the Pakistani side was the then Director Military Operations, Brig SM Abbasi, scion of the princely family of Bahawalpur. Included in the teams were also Deputy Directors of Survey of India and Pakistan with adequate Number of trained survey personnel and survey equipment. This author then a young Captain too had the luck of watching the functioning of these teams. The senior military commanders of the two sides were assisted by three sector commanders along the entire length of 740 Km of Line of Control which was divided in three segments namely the Southern Sector, the Central Sector and the Northern Sector. In turn, sector commanders were assisted by sub sector commanders to do the groundwork on the entire Line of Control. For example, in the Northern Sector were included the four Sub Sector Commanders of Partapur Sub Sector, Kargil Sub Sector (including Batalik), Shingo (Kaksar) Sub Sector and Drass Sub Sector which are the areas of current conflict. Sector and Sub Sector Commanders of the two countries worked in close co-operation. The Simla Agreement stipulated that in Jammu & Kashmir, the Line of Control separating the two Armies on the day of ceasefire would be delineated. The delineation of the LoC was effected during nine meetings as follows: <table style='width: 100%'><tr><td> </td><td>Dates </td><td>Venue </td></tr><tr><td>(a) First meeting </td><td>Aug, 10-12 1972 </td><td>Suchetgarh </td></tr><tr><td>(b) Second meeting </td><td>Aug, 21-22 1972 </td><td>Wagah </td></tr><tr><td>(c) Third meeting </td><td>Aug, 28-29 1972 </td><td>Suchetgarh </td></tr><tr><td>(d) Fourth meeting </td><td>Sept, 3-15 1972 </td><td>Wagah </td></tr><tr><td>(e) Fifth meeting </td><td>Sept, 18 - Oct 1, 1972 </td><td>Suchetgarh </td></tr><tr><td>(f) Sixth meeting </td><td>Oct, 7-8 1972 </td><td>Wagah </td></tr><tr><td>(g) Seventh meeting </td><td>Oct, 14-22 1972 </td><td>Suchetgarh </td></tr><tr><td>(h) Eighth meeting </td><td>Nov, 7-9 1972 </td><td>Wagah </td></tr><tr><td>(i) Ninth & final meeting </td><td>December 11, 1972 </td><td>Suchetgarh </td></tr></table> At each meeting the inputs of sub sectors were discussed, the sticky points resolved and where necessary, a joint survey was ordered to ensure that nothing was left vague or uncertain. In the whole exercise two sets of maps each comprising of 27 maps were prepared. These marked maps were joined and 19 mosaics were prepared, thus clearly delineating the entire stretch of Line of Control running through 740 Km starting from Sangam and ending at Pt NJ-9842. Besides the maps, there were 19 Appendix consisting of 40 pages, giving the details of every feature, landmark and coordinates of the Line of Control. Each map containing the inscription: “Delineation of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from the ceasefire of December 17,1971, in accordance with paragraph 4(II) of the Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972. Immediately after signing of the delineation maps and documents at the final meeting of senior military commanders, the DMO flew to New Delhi and reported to the COAS along with copies of the signed delineation proceedings and one copy of the signed maps at 1500 hours 11 Dec 72. The COAS presented these at a meeting of the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet at 1600 hours the same day. At 1620 hours a message was received from Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Special Assistant to the President of Pakistan for Mr. PN Haksar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, informing him that the Government of Pakistan had accorded its approval to the Joint Recommendations submitted by the senior military commanders of Pakistan and India on that day in regard to delineation of the Line of Control in J & K. At 0700 hours on 17 Dec 72 the mutually agreed statement was released in New Delhi and Islamabad. At 2100 hours on 20 Dec 72, a joint statement by the Indian and Pakistan Governments was released to the media regarding withdrawal of troops to other International Border and delineation in conformity with the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. In view of the facts explained above, there should be absolutely no reason for any reservation in anyone’s mind in India or Pakistan that there is anything vague or uncertain about the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. It is pertinent to add that for a period of over 27 years, the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has stood the test of time. There have been frequent clashes as well as exchange of fire, which were invariably discussed and resolved in flag meetings of the two sides, authenticity of the Line of Control was never questioned. It is worthwhile adding that each flag meeting invariably developed into a competition in hospitality. It is also appropriate to take a close look on the wording of Paragraph dealing with the sanctity of the Line of Control of the Shimla Agreement which reads as under: - “In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that: In Jammu and Kashmir the Line of Control resulting from cease fire on 17th December, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides undertake to refrain from threat or use of force in violation of this Line.” <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn2" target="_blank">[2]</a> Para 4(II) of the Simla Agreement clearly laid down that the LoC “shall be respected by both sides” and that “neither shall seek to alter it unilaterally.” Moreover, both sides undertook “to refrain from the threat of the use of force in violation” of the Line. In a statement to the Lok Sabha on December 12,1972, the then Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh, tabled a separate document describing the LoC in four short paragraphs, A to D; Para C: “From Richmar Gali, the line of control runs north-wards passing west of Tithwal… and north of Chet in the Kargil sector, up to Chorbatla in Turtok sector.” Para D: “From there (viz. Chorbatla in Turtok sector) the line of control runs north-eastwards to Thang (inclusive to India), thence eastwards joining the glaciers.” Para C refers to the Kargil sector. The Siachen Glacier was left unmarked due to its unapproachability. It should follow that the LoC does not extend to the Siachen glacier; in the event, the charge of violating it there does not pass muster. It is clear that LoC is legally accepted by both the countries; but Pakistan never reconciled to the fact of separation of Bangladesh and held India responsible for it. It has been regularly violating this LoC to create troubles for India either by sending militants or attacking Indian posts along the Loc. Pakistan’s game plan is to sit on the LoC and to make the occupation of each feature contentious. However, since the LoC runs along a watershed and Indian positions tower over Pakistan’s, Indian observation posts have the vantage point. The Pakistan army had breached the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector over 15 years ago and established military posts on at least five features in the Batalik and Kaksar sub-sectors, it is now learnt. Most of these encroachments are only a few hundred meters inside Indian territory; but are nevertheless of considerable tactical importance. Several attempts by the Indian Army (minus air power) to forcibly regain these positions were repulsed, informed sources said. In addition, the Indian Army lodged futile protests at several flag meetings between the two sides. These areas have not been regained since; though the Indian Army went on to establish posts around the occupied stretches. One such encroachment was in Shangruti in the Batalik sub-sector. After encroaching into Indian territory, Pakistani soldiers occupied a dominating 16,000 ft high feature giving them a tactical advantage in the area. Since then, the Indian Army has established three posts at lower altitudes around this feature. A second area is near Chorbat La. A third feature is near Dhalulang, along the Shingo River in the Kaksar sub-sector. This was despite the partial mining of the area around Dhalulang by the Indian Army. In the late eighties, the Army had tried to retake the feature but in vain. “In due course, the situation came to be accepted,” said a senior officer.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn3" target="_blank">[3]</a> Point 5353 is another point along LoC forcibly occupied by Pakistanis. The Pakistanis agreed to vacate Point 5353 in one of the flag meetings it still remains in the hands of Pakistanis. “Although the peak is on the LoC, a Pakistani observation post at the top can look into Drass, ” said Maj.-Gen. Mohinder Puri of 8 Mountain Division Pakistan has now occupied another feature ahead of Point 5353. The cat-and-mouse game, described as “jostling for advantage” by XV Corps Commander Lt.-Gen. Krishan Pal, will continue till the territorial identity and possession of each feature along the LoC are decided. Finally, 27 years after the Shimla agreement, “what was delineated on the map is being demarcated on the ground”. However, it is a Herculean task to maintain supply lines in winter. The army has started building permanent bunkers and in the Mushkoh valley hectic road-building activity is on. “Advance winter stocking of posts will be done once the rough tracks from the depth areas to the LoC are declared operational,” said Brig. Ashok Duggal of 3 Mountain Division. In a bid to prevent Indian forces from permanently manning these posts, Pakistan has been resorting to artillery shelling. On an average three casualties are reported a day. Although a number of posts remain cut off in winter, each is now manned by 40 soldiers, including combat troops, sparrows (soldiers from the Signals Corps) and nursing assistants. Cheetah helicopters fly in mail and extra supplies in fair weather. In this glacial, forbidding terrain, Indian and Pakistan are in for another eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. A second Siachen is in the making. <a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftn4" target="_blank">[4]</a> After Kargil War, the situation on LoC improved temporarily. But it became quite volatile again and it appeared to be a war like situation all along the Loc though termed as a localised border war. Infantry, Artillery and Air Force, all were committed in this conflict. Regular attacks on forward posts and planned infiltration with the active assistance of Pakistani regulars by heavy artillery and mortar shelling became the regular feature of each day. But replying to another question, the PM said: “If war is thrust upon us, we will fight with whatever we have.” In the meantime, the government started taking steps to see that important equipment reached our soldiers and deficiencies made up.” Answering a supplementary about threats to India’s nuclear installations, he added: “We are prepared for any contingency.” But on whether the ongoing conflict in Kargil is “already a war”, he said, “I don’t want to get into semantics. For the soldier who is fighting (to evict the intruders), it is war.” It is in actuality not an infiltration; it is an invasion, termed as proxy war. It is obvious for Pakistan to say that the Mujahideen or Afghans are involved in this conflict. The truth is that Pak Army regulars assist them to infiltrate. By invading our territory, Pakistan is trying to re-establish itself in Kashmir. Clearly, the aim is to alter the LoC and threaten our strategic interests in the area. Chief of Army Staff Gen V.K. Malik, the Army Chief during the Kargil conflict wanted to cross over the LoC to punish the infiltrators. This would have been an effective step as has been amply proved in the West Asia where Israelis contained the infiltrators by attacking on to their camps. However the permission was never granted by the political bosses, as they strictly wanted to stick to LoC to maintain peace. AGPL The Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) is the line of occupation by opposite forces in Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge beyond NJ 9842 up to the Chinese border. It is a glacial stretch beyond grid reference point NJ-9842 till the Chinese border in Xinjiang that is not demarcated. This is the core of the Siachen dispute that has pit soldiers on both sides in combat in the highest, coldest and costliest battlefield in the world. The 1949 Karachi Agreement spoke of the line beyond this point as going ``northwards to the glaciers.'' The 1972 Shimla Agreement's Line of Control (LoC) simply stopped at NJ-9842, leaving a 70-km stretch along the Saltoro Ridge un-delineated.                          [ATTACH=full]23462[/ATTACH][ATTACH=full]23463[/ATTACH]                                       Indian Army on Patrol in Siachen Indian Artillery Siachen Medal In 1949, after the first of three wars, the nations agreed to a cease-fire line that unfortunately stopped short of the remote massifs of north-central Kashmir -- a disputed area on the map where India, Pakistan and China rub shoulders. The wording in the agreement merely said the line was to continue "north to the glaciers." For two decades, this vague phrasing was of more concern to map makers than soldiers, but then in the 1970s and early eighties Pakistan permitted several mountaineering expeditions to climb high peaks on this glacier. This was to reinforce their claim on the area as these expeditions arrived on the glacier with a permit obtained from the Government of Pakistan. In many cases an liaison officer from the Pakistan army accompanied the team. Pakistan gave permission to a Japanese expedition to attempt Rimo peak in 1984. This peak is located in the side valley, east of Siachen. It overlooks the eastern areas of the Aksai Chin. Such an expedition would have firmly linked the western routes with the eastern routes, -- the trade route leading to Karakoram Pass and China. The Indian army decided to take action and to prevent such an expedition from proceeding. In April 13, 1984, the Indian Army made a "pre-emptive" move into the glacier to defend the territory and the peaks and passes around it when it launched "Operation Meghdoot". Within weeks, Pakistani forces swept in to oppose them, but the Indians have been able to hold on to the tactical advantage of the high ground. The last major gunbattle in the region was reported September 4, 1999, when India said Pakistani artillery and mortar fire killed nine Indian soldiers on the craggy slopes of Turtuk, near the 47-mile-long Siachen Glacier.                                [ATTACH=full]23460[/ATTACH][ATTACH=full]23461[/ATTACH]                                 Supplies packed Mi-17 dropping supplies Indian igloos As of date, some 10,000 troops are deployed by Pakistan and a befitting number faces them on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control. To cater to such a large number of troops, about 6000 tonnes of load is flown into the Siachen Glacier every year. An almost equal amount is para-dropped there. This is achieved by the IAF's AN-32 aircraft and helicopters which serve as a 'lifeline' for the Northern Sector. The Kargil fighting showed India that the most uninhabitable, frozen land was not a sufficient barrier to intrusion. The Indian air force, trying to show that it is on the alert in a region even harder to defend than the sheer Kargil cliffs, has arranged a series of trips for photojournalists to see the Siachen operation. "Particularly since the Kargil war, the load of responsibility of the air force has increased," Air Vice Marshal S.K. Jain told journalists during the tour. "The forces are on alert, ready to meet any threat." The sound of incoming gunfire could be heard as the air force transports loaded up at Leh, on the approach to the Siachen Glacier. Despite five layers of clothing, paratroopers shiver as they wait to board an air force transport at the world's highest air base at Leh. The AN-32A planes approach the stark runway at Leh in snowy mist, pushed by tail winds. The pilots navigate the steep mountains by sight. Higher on the icy Himalayan peaks, helicopter pilots battle downdrafts as they land on helipads to deliver precious supplies or rescue injured soldiers. The pilots stay on the ground no more than 30 seconds for fear of being shot. But cold kills more troops than bullets. Soldiers brought down to base camp often suffer hearing, eyesight and memory loss because of prolonged use of oxygen masks. Many lose eyes, hands or feet to frostbite. At the glacial heights, where even drinking water is from melting the ice on stoves, bathing is a rarity. Washing of clothing, too, is not possible. Hence, 14 pairs of thermal socks per individual are given for a 90-day stay so that the problem of washing at the posts is eliminated. But soldiers have to wash their clothing before depositing it back and leaving the glacier. Clothing used in the glacier is washed at the hot water sulphur springs on the banks of the Nubra at Panamik, a village near the base camp. Such is the rotation schedule that the washing goes on round the year. A serving Captain, just back from his glacier tenure, describes Panamik as the "world's biggest and highest dhobi ghat". Some army posts on the peaks are only 1,000 feet from Pakistani entrenchments. Cheetah helicopters fly in to retrieve wounded or sick soldiers and drop supplies to their comrades, who remain behind on the lonely promontories. The enemy is hard to see in the crags and craters in the vast whiteness -- and harder to hit. Rifles must be thawed repeatedly over kerosene stoves, and machine guns need to be primed with boiling water. At altitudes of 18,000 feet, mortar shells fly unpredictable and extraordinary distances, swerving erratically when met by sledgehammer gusts. While some troops fall to hostile fire, far more perish from avalanches and missteps into crevasses that nature has camouflaged with snow. This is especially so now in springtime, as the sun licks away several feet of ice and opens new underground cracks and seams. But for all these logistical peculiarities, the Siachen conflict might be thought of as just another low-intensity border war -- were it not being fought between the world's two newest nuclear powers. Their combat over a barren, uninhabited nether world of questionable strategic value is a forbidding symbol of their lingering irreconcilability. "This is like a struggle of two bald men over a comb," said Stephen P. Cohen, an authority on the Indian subcontinent at the Brookings Institution. "Siachen is the epitome of the worst aspects of the relationship. These are two countries that are paired on a road to Oslo or Hiroshima, and at this point they could go either way." Most of India's many outposts are west of the glacier along the Saltoro Range of the Karakoram Mountains. These pickets are reachable to an enemy only after a strenuous climb and then a frontal assault, a near-hopeless task in such thin air. After 50 strides, even a well-conditioned man is gasping for breath with his muscles in a tremble. Fifteen years of refrigerated combat have brought only 15 years of hardened stalemate. The Pakistanis cannot get up to the glacier; the Indians cannot come down. "Nobody can win, no matter how long we fight," said Maj. Gen. V. S. Budhwar, the Indian commander in Leh, whose region includes Siachen. "But this is our land. It is a portion of our nation-state, and we will not cede it." Occasionally, some vital strategic importance is assigned to the Siachen area, with hypothetical aggressors flooding across mountain highways. More often, the conflict is described as a simple matter of principle. Imagine, people say, how America would respond if the Russians overran even a small, barren chunk of Alaska. "Siachen is an awful place where you can step on a thin layer of snow and, poof, down you go 200 feet," said Gen. Khalid Mehmood Arif, the retired former vice chief of Pakistan's military. "But no nation ever wants to lose a single inch of territory, so Siachen has psychological and political importance. Its value is in ego and prestige." Arduous to live in, the Siachen area is beautiful to look at. Some of the world's tallest mountains fill the landscape, their snowy tops giving way to rivulets of white that glitter against the black and purple rock. It is a moonscape of mesmerizing pinnacles and ridges and drops. Ice formations rise a mile high. Clouds seem at arm's reach. The Indian base camp is at the very start of the glacier, which gently curves upward like a giant white tongue. Barracks, helipads, supply sheds, satellite dishes, a hospital and Hindu shrines are spread across several acres. It is clear the Indians have been here awhile and are ready to stay. The command post is carpeted. Curtains hang along the windows. "We have the heights," said Brig. P. C. Katoch, who runs the operation. In contrast with the superior vista those heights afford, he said, the Pakistani soldier sees nothing: "He hears a helicopter and shoots. He hears artillery and shoots. It's stupid. He doesn't know where he's shooting." But being king of the hill is costly. The Pakistanis can resupply most of their posts by road and pack mule. At their forward positions, some as high as 21,000 feet, the Indians must rely on helicopters. The whirlybirds strain against the altitude like oversized bumblebees. Many an airdrop is swallowed by the snow. Both sides deploy about 3,000 soldiers. While the Pakistanis refuse to divulge how much they spend in Siachen, the Indians estimate the cost at about $350,000 to $500,000 a day, said Lieut. Gen. R. K. Sawhney, the army's director general of military intelligence. Transporting kerosene is one major expense. Some Indian soldiers live in igloos made of fiberglass panels. Six soldiers can sleep in jigsaw configurations, crowded into a room the size of a king-size bed. Others live in ice tunnels gouged out with a pickax. Either way, small kerosene stoves are the hearths they huddle around. The hissing competes with the howling of the wind. Black smoke seems to color everything, including a man's spit. The highest perches are occupied by only a handful of soldiers, and sleeping is rarely done at night, for this is the most likely time for the enemy to sneak up. Sentry duty is bleak work. Hot water bottles do not stay hot for long. A relay must be set up to exchange frozen rifles for defrosted ones. During storms, the heavy snowfall seems as thick as long, white drapery. The wind does pinwheels, and the basics of a hard life gets that much harder. "At my post, you have to use a crawl trench to get to the toilet," said Cpl. Joginder Singh. "When it snows, the trench fills up and you have to stand. The enemy can see you and that's how you die." It is difficult to know how many men have been killed. Some local news reports put casualty totals for both sides in the thousands, but this seems based on conjecture. The Pakistanis do not release such details, and the Indians say they have lost only the 616 soldiers whose names appear on a stone memorial at the base camp. The inscription reads: "Quartered in snow, silent to remain. When the bugle calls, they shall rise and march again." To this day, Kashmir is the issue that most heats the blood of Indians and Pakistanis. "The roots of the Kashmir problem are very tangled, but as far as the glacier goes, this is simply a matter of Pakistanis sneaking their way into a place that doesn't belong to them," said India's Lieut. Gen. M. L. Chibber, retired, who is central to the Siachen saga. In 1978, however, he was a commander with responsibility for Siachen. He was alarmed to learn that the Pakistanis were accompanying mountaineers to the glacier. Just as troubling were maps printed in the West. They showed Siachen as part of Pakistan. By the early 80's, both armies were sending expeditions into the area, and suspicions accumulated like fresh snow. In late 1983, the Indians became convinced the Pakistanis were about to seize the glacier, General Chibber said. This was inferred from intercepted communiqués. If further evidence was needed, he said, it came when India sent procurers to Europe to buy cold-weather gear. They ran into Pakistanis doing the same shopping. India's "pre-emptive" takeover of Siachen was called<hr /><a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref1" target="_blank">[1]</a> ”The Indian Express, June 24,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref2" target="_blank">[2]</a> Lt Gen (Dr) ML Chibber -The Writer Lt Gen (Dr) ML Chibber, was Deputy Director of Military Operations after 1971 War and later C-in-C Northern Command when Pakistan was prevented from occupying Saltoro North Plus, Sunday, August 15,1999<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref3" target="_blank">[3]</a> The Times of India, June 30, 1999.<a href="https://www.sikhphilosophy.net/#_ftnref4" target="_blank">[4]</a> The week, August 15,1999, P.46</blockquote>

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