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Guru Granth Sahib
Composition, Arrangement & Layout
ਜਪੁ | Jup
ਸੋ ਦਰੁ | So Dar
ਸੋਹਿਲਾ | Sohilaa
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਿਰੀਰਾਗੁ | Raag Siree-Raag
Gurbani (14-53)
Ashtpadiyan (53-71)
Gurbani (71-74)
Pahre (74-78)
Chhant (78-81)
Vanjara (81-82)
Vaar Siri Raag (83-91)
Bhagat Bani (91-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਝ | Raag Maajh
Gurbani (94-109)
Ashtpadi (109)
Ashtpadiyan (110-129)
Ashtpadi (129-130)
Ashtpadiyan (130-133)
Bara Maha (133-136)
Din Raen (136-137)
Vaar Maajh Ki (137-150)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗਉੜੀ | Raag Gauree
Gurbani (151-185)
Quartets/Couplets (185-220)
Ashtpadiyan (220-234)
Karhalei (234-235)
Ashtpadiyan (235-242)
Chhant (242-249)
Baavan Akhari (250-262)
Sukhmani (262-296)
Thittee (296-300)
Gauree kii Vaar (300-323)
Gurbani (323-330)
Ashtpadiyan (330-340)
Baavan Akhari (340-343)
Thintteen (343-344)
Vaar Kabir (344-345)
Bhagat Bani (345-346)
ਰਾਗੁ ਆਸਾ | Raag Aasaa
Gurbani (347-348)
Chaupaday (348-364)
Panchpadde (364-365)
Kaafee (365-409)
Aasaavaree (409-411)
Ashtpadiyan (411-432)
Patee (432-435)
Chhant (435-462)
Vaar Aasaa (462-475)
Bhagat Bani (475-488)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੂਜਰੀ | Raag Goojaree
Gurbani (489-503)
Ashtpadiyan (503-508)
Vaar Gujari (508-517)
Vaar Gujari (517-526)
ਰਾਗੁ ਦੇਵਗੰਧਾਰੀ | Raag Dayv-Gandhaaree
Gurbani (527-536)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਹਾਗੜਾ | Raag Bihaagraa
Gurbani (537-556)
Chhant (538-548)
Vaar Bihaagraa (548-556)
ਰਾਗੁ ਵਡਹੰਸ | Raag Wadhans
Gurbani (557-564)
Ashtpadiyan (564-565)
Chhant (565-575)
Ghoriaan (575-578)
Alaahaniiaa (578-582)
Vaar Wadhans (582-594)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੋਰਠਿ | Raag Sorath
Gurbani (595-634)
Asatpadhiya (634-642)
Vaar Sorath (642-659)
ਰਾਗੁ ਧਨਾਸਰੀ | Raag Dhanasaree
Gurbani (660-685)
Astpadhiya (685-687)
Chhant (687-691)
Bhagat Bani (691-695)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਤਸਰੀ | Raag Jaitsree
Gurbani (696-703)
Chhant (703-705)
Vaar Jaitsaree (705-710)
Bhagat Bani (710)
ਰਾਗੁ ਟੋਡੀ | Raag Todee
ਰਾਗੁ ਬੈਰਾੜੀ | Raag Bairaaree
ਰਾਗੁ ਤਿਲੰਗ | Raag Tilang
Gurbani (721-727)
Bhagat Bani (727)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੂਹੀ | Raag Suhi
Gurbani (728-750)
Ashtpadiyan (750-761)
Kaafee (761-762)
Suchajee (762)
Gunvantee (763)
Chhant (763-785)
Vaar Soohee (785-792)
Bhagat Bani (792-794)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਲਾਵਲੁ | Raag Bilaaval
Gurbani (795-831)
Ashtpadiyan (831-838)
Thitteen (838-840)
Vaar Sat (841-843)
Chhant (843-848)
Vaar Bilaaval (849-855)
Bhagat Bani (855-858)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੋਂਡ | Raag Gond
Gurbani (859-869)
Ashtpadiyan (869)
Bhagat Bani (870-875)
ਰਾਗੁ ਰਾਮਕਲੀ | Raag Ramkalee
Ashtpadiyan (902-916)
Gurbani (876-902)
Anand (917-922)
Sadd (923-924)
Chhant (924-929)
Dakhnee (929-938)
Sidh Gosat (938-946)
Vaar Ramkalee (947-968)
ਰਾਗੁ ਨਟ ਨਾਰਾਇਨ | Raag Nat Narayan
Gurbani (975-980)
Ashtpadiyan (980-983)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਲੀ ਗਉੜਾ | Raag Maalee Gauraa
Gurbani (984-988)
Bhagat Bani (988)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਰੂ | Raag Maaroo
Gurbani (889-1008)
Ashtpadiyan (1008-1014)
Kaafee (1014-1016)
Ashtpadiyan (1016-1019)
Anjulian (1019-1020)
Solhe (1020-1033)
Dakhni (1033-1043)
ਰਾਗੁ ਤੁਖਾਰੀ | Raag Tukhaari
Bara Maha (1107-1110)
Chhant (1110-1117)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕੇਦਾਰਾ | Raag Kedara
Gurbani (1118-1123)
Bhagat Bani (1123-1124)
ਰਾਗੁ ਭੈਰਉ | Raag Bhairo
Gurbani (1125-1152)
Partaal (1153)
Ashtpadiyan (1153-1167)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਸੰਤੁ | Raag Basant
Gurbani (1168-1187)
Ashtpadiyan (1187-1193)
Vaar Basant (1193-1196)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਾਰਗ | Raag Saarag
Gurbani (1197-1200)
Partaal (1200-1231)
Ashtpadiyan (1232-1236)
Chhant (1236-1237)
Vaar Saarang (1237-1253)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਲਾਰ | Raag Malaar
Gurbani (1254-1293)
Partaal (1265-1273)
Ashtpadiyan (1273-1278)
Chhant (1278)
Vaar Malaar (1278-91)
Bhagat Bani (1292-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਾਨੜਾ | Raag Kaanraa
Gurbani (1294-96)
Partaal (1296-1318)
Ashtpadiyan (1308-1312)
Chhant (1312)
Vaar Kaanraa
Bhagat Bani (1318)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਲਿਆਨ | Raag Kalyaan
Gurbani (1319-23)
Ashtpadiyan (1323-26)
ਰਾਗੁ ਪ੍ਰਭਾਤੀ | Raag Prabhaatee
Gurbani (1327-1341)
Ashtpadiyan (1342-51)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਜਾਵੰਤੀ | Raag Jaijaiwanti
Gurbani (1352-53)
Salok | Gatha | Phunahe | Chaubole | Swayiye
Sehskritee Mahala 1
Sehskritee Mahala 5
Gaathaa Mahala 5
Phunhay Mahala 5
Chaubolae Mahala 5
Shaloks Bhagat Kabir
Shaloks Sheikh Farid
Swaiyyae Mahala 5
Swaiyyae in Praise of Gurus
Shaloks in Addition To Vaars
Shalok Ninth Mehl
Mundavanee Mehl 5
ਰਾਗ ਮਾਲਾ, Raag Maalaa
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<blockquote data-quote="Neutral Singh" data-source="post: 2664" data-attributes="member: 2"><p><strong>Nonreductive Materialism</strong></p><p></p><p>Nonreductive materialists generally follow functionalists in emphasizing the importance of multiple realizability. Before we can appreciate the evidence for multiple realizability, we need an appropriate vocabulary. A type of state, property, process, object, or event (hereafter, simply "object"), is a class or kind of object that admits of instances. An egg, for example, is a type of single-celled organism. There are many concrete instances of eggs: for instance, in humans, in hatcheries, and in many refrigerators. These individual eggs are tokens. We understand an object as a type or a token relative to a taxonomy, a means of classification—although it does not follow that the existence of all tokens depends on language. A particular mastiff may be a token of the type mastiff, but it is also a token of the type dog, mammal, animal, domesticated animal, and slobbering thing. Types may be scientifically taxonomic, but are not so automatically; whether they are such depends on their role in a scientific theory. With these concepts in hand, let us turn to the issue of type-type, or "smooth," reduction.</p><p></p><p>The smooth reduction of one theoretical description to another preserves causal/explanatory role. This preservation of causal/explanatory role is reflected in at least one of two ways: (a) the laws in the reduced and reducing theories are similar (this concerns whether they isolate the same covariations in the world) and (b) theoretical-predicate pairs across the reduced and reducing theories isolate, or pick out, the same objects. (Cf. Churchland 1989, chaps. 1, 3, and Hooker 1981.) Traditional accounts of reduction imply that theories, laws, and terms can be objects of reduction. One law, for instance, is reducible to another if the law targeted for reduction is logically derivable from the corresponding law in the reducing domain. Reduction, construed ontologically, is a relation between two theoretically characterized domains of entities, whether postulated objects, properties, processes, states, events, or laws. (A postulated entity need not, of course, be an actual entity.)</p><p></p><p>The type-type identity theory has the disadvantage that, as a formulation of materialism, there is inadequate evidence for it. For example, there is no evidence that it is generally the case that, for every type of psychological process (relative to the best psychological taxonomy), there is a corresponding type of neural process (relative to the best neuroscientific theory). Many materialists hold that there is evidence instead for a weaker, token-token identity theory, according to which any individual or token—a particular dog, a particular NaCl molecule, a particular cultural ritual—is entirely composed of physical phenomena. We might assure ourselves of this fact by a strategy of decomposition: Analyze all the constituents of the token, and determine whether any nonphysical phenomena are present. There is, of course, an epistemological question about how we might detect (and thus interact with) nonphysical phenomena. Awaiting evidence for nonphysical phenomena, materialists can perhaps be excused for withholding assent to such phenomena.</p><p></p><p>Endorsing the aforementioned multiple realizability functionalists may acknowledge token-token identity, but they challenge type-type reduction. Relative to dualism, acknowledgment of mind-body token identity may itself seem reductive because it rejects dependence of minds on nonphysical substances. Nonetheless, acknowledgment of just token identity is, as materialist doctrines go, a nonreductive formulation of materialism. Another nonreductive version of materialism, compositional materialism, casts even token-identity theories as too demanding.</p><p></p><p>Compositional materialism implies that physical (and thus, for the physicalist, psychological) events are not typically identical to their smaller constituent features. There is, according to compositional materialism, plasticity (or, multiple realizability) even within a single physical token, just as there is within a type susceptible to instantiation by different physical tokens. An example from some influential work on compositional materialism states that an individual car remains the same car even if its generator is replaced, at least on our ordinary criteria of car identity (Boyd 1980, p. 100). A difference in molecular constituents of the car in two possible worlds does not preclude, on this view, sameness of car. (For an analysis of this and other accounts, see Moser and Trout 1995a).</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Neutral Singh, post: 2664, member: 2"] [B]Nonreductive Materialism[/B] Nonreductive materialists generally follow functionalists in emphasizing the importance of multiple realizability. Before we can appreciate the evidence for multiple realizability, we need an appropriate vocabulary. A type of state, property, process, object, or event (hereafter, simply "object"), is a class or kind of object that admits of instances. An egg, for example, is a type of single-celled organism. There are many concrete instances of eggs: for instance, in humans, in hatcheries, and in many refrigerators. These individual eggs are tokens. We understand an object as a type or a token relative to a taxonomy, a means of classification—although it does not follow that the existence of all tokens depends on language. A particular mastiff may be a token of the type mastiff, but it is also a token of the type dog, mammal, animal, domesticated animal, and slobbering thing. Types may be scientifically taxonomic, but are not so automatically; whether they are such depends on their role in a scientific theory. With these concepts in hand, let us turn to the issue of type-type, or "smooth," reduction. The smooth reduction of one theoretical description to another preserves causal/explanatory role. This preservation of causal/explanatory role is reflected in at least one of two ways: (a) the laws in the reduced and reducing theories are similar (this concerns whether they isolate the same covariations in the world) and (b) theoretical-predicate pairs across the reduced and reducing theories isolate, or pick out, the same objects. (Cf. Churchland 1989, chaps. 1, 3, and Hooker 1981.) Traditional accounts of reduction imply that theories, laws, and terms can be objects of reduction. One law, for instance, is reducible to another if the law targeted for reduction is logically derivable from the corresponding law in the reducing domain. Reduction, construed ontologically, is a relation between two theoretically characterized domains of entities, whether postulated objects, properties, processes, states, events, or laws. (A postulated entity need not, of course, be an actual entity.) The type-type identity theory has the disadvantage that, as a formulation of materialism, there is inadequate evidence for it. For example, there is no evidence that it is generally the case that, for every type of psychological process (relative to the best psychological taxonomy), there is a corresponding type of neural process (relative to the best neuroscientific theory). Many materialists hold that there is evidence instead for a weaker, token-token identity theory, according to which any individual or token—a particular dog, a particular NaCl molecule, a particular cultural ritual—is entirely composed of physical phenomena. We might assure ourselves of this fact by a strategy of decomposition: Analyze all the constituents of the token, and determine whether any nonphysical phenomena are present. There is, of course, an epistemological question about how we might detect (and thus interact with) nonphysical phenomena. Awaiting evidence for nonphysical phenomena, materialists can perhaps be excused for withholding assent to such phenomena. Endorsing the aforementioned multiple realizability functionalists may acknowledge token-token identity, but they challenge type-type reduction. Relative to dualism, acknowledgment of mind-body token identity may itself seem reductive because it rejects dependence of minds on nonphysical substances. Nonetheless, acknowledgment of just token identity is, as materialist doctrines go, a nonreductive formulation of materialism. Another nonreductive version of materialism, compositional materialism, casts even token-identity theories as too demanding. Compositional materialism implies that physical (and thus, for the physicalist, psychological) events are not typically identical to their smaller constituent features. There is, according to compositional materialism, plasticity (or, multiple realizability) even within a single physical token, just as there is within a type susceptible to instantiation by different physical tokens. An example from some influential work on compositional materialism states that an individual car remains the same car even if its generator is replaced, at least on our ordinary criteria of car identity (Boyd 1980, p. 100). A difference in molecular constituents of the car in two possible worlds does not preclude, on this view, sameness of car. (For an analysis of this and other accounts, see Moser and Trout 1995a). [/QUOTE]
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