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Guru Granth Sahib
Composition, Arrangement & Layout
ਜਪੁ | Jup
ਸੋ ਦਰੁ | So Dar
ਸੋਹਿਲਾ | Sohilaa
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਿਰੀਰਾਗੁ | Raag Siree-Raag
Gurbani (14-53)
Ashtpadiyan (53-71)
Gurbani (71-74)
Pahre (74-78)
Chhant (78-81)
Vanjara (81-82)
Vaar Siri Raag (83-91)
Bhagat Bani (91-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਝ | Raag Maajh
Gurbani (94-109)
Ashtpadi (109)
Ashtpadiyan (110-129)
Ashtpadi (129-130)
Ashtpadiyan (130-133)
Bara Maha (133-136)
Din Raen (136-137)
Vaar Maajh Ki (137-150)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗਉੜੀ | Raag Gauree
Gurbani (151-185)
Quartets/Couplets (185-220)
Ashtpadiyan (220-234)
Karhalei (234-235)
Ashtpadiyan (235-242)
Chhant (242-249)
Baavan Akhari (250-262)
Sukhmani (262-296)
Thittee (296-300)
Gauree kii Vaar (300-323)
Gurbani (323-330)
Ashtpadiyan (330-340)
Baavan Akhari (340-343)
Thintteen (343-344)
Vaar Kabir (344-345)
Bhagat Bani (345-346)
ਰਾਗੁ ਆਸਾ | Raag Aasaa
Gurbani (347-348)
Chaupaday (348-364)
Panchpadde (364-365)
Kaafee (365-409)
Aasaavaree (409-411)
Ashtpadiyan (411-432)
Patee (432-435)
Chhant (435-462)
Vaar Aasaa (462-475)
Bhagat Bani (475-488)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੂਜਰੀ | Raag Goojaree
Gurbani (489-503)
Ashtpadiyan (503-508)
Vaar Gujari (508-517)
Vaar Gujari (517-526)
ਰਾਗੁ ਦੇਵਗੰਧਾਰੀ | Raag Dayv-Gandhaaree
Gurbani (527-536)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਹਾਗੜਾ | Raag Bihaagraa
Gurbani (537-556)
Chhant (538-548)
Vaar Bihaagraa (548-556)
ਰਾਗੁ ਵਡਹੰਸ | Raag Wadhans
Gurbani (557-564)
Ashtpadiyan (564-565)
Chhant (565-575)
Ghoriaan (575-578)
Alaahaniiaa (578-582)
Vaar Wadhans (582-594)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੋਰਠਿ | Raag Sorath
Gurbani (595-634)
Asatpadhiya (634-642)
Vaar Sorath (642-659)
ਰਾਗੁ ਧਨਾਸਰੀ | Raag Dhanasaree
Gurbani (660-685)
Astpadhiya (685-687)
Chhant (687-691)
Bhagat Bani (691-695)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਤਸਰੀ | Raag Jaitsree
Gurbani (696-703)
Chhant (703-705)
Vaar Jaitsaree (705-710)
Bhagat Bani (710)
ਰਾਗੁ ਟੋਡੀ | Raag Todee
ਰਾਗੁ ਬੈਰਾੜੀ | Raag Bairaaree
ਰਾਗੁ ਤਿਲੰਗ | Raag Tilang
Gurbani (721-727)
Bhagat Bani (727)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੂਹੀ | Raag Suhi
Gurbani (728-750)
Ashtpadiyan (750-761)
Kaafee (761-762)
Suchajee (762)
Gunvantee (763)
Chhant (763-785)
Vaar Soohee (785-792)
Bhagat Bani (792-794)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਲਾਵਲੁ | Raag Bilaaval
Gurbani (795-831)
Ashtpadiyan (831-838)
Thitteen (838-840)
Vaar Sat (841-843)
Chhant (843-848)
Vaar Bilaaval (849-855)
Bhagat Bani (855-858)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੋਂਡ | Raag Gond
Gurbani (859-869)
Ashtpadiyan (869)
Bhagat Bani (870-875)
ਰਾਗੁ ਰਾਮਕਲੀ | Raag Ramkalee
Ashtpadiyan (902-916)
Gurbani (876-902)
Anand (917-922)
Sadd (923-924)
Chhant (924-929)
Dakhnee (929-938)
Sidh Gosat (938-946)
Vaar Ramkalee (947-968)
ਰਾਗੁ ਨਟ ਨਾਰਾਇਨ | Raag Nat Narayan
Gurbani (975-980)
Ashtpadiyan (980-983)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਲੀ ਗਉੜਾ | Raag Maalee Gauraa
Gurbani (984-988)
Bhagat Bani (988)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਰੂ | Raag Maaroo
Gurbani (889-1008)
Ashtpadiyan (1008-1014)
Kaafee (1014-1016)
Ashtpadiyan (1016-1019)
Anjulian (1019-1020)
Solhe (1020-1033)
Dakhni (1033-1043)
ਰਾਗੁ ਤੁਖਾਰੀ | Raag Tukhaari
Bara Maha (1107-1110)
Chhant (1110-1117)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕੇਦਾਰਾ | Raag Kedara
Gurbani (1118-1123)
Bhagat Bani (1123-1124)
ਰਾਗੁ ਭੈਰਉ | Raag Bhairo
Gurbani (1125-1152)
Partaal (1153)
Ashtpadiyan (1153-1167)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਸੰਤੁ | Raag Basant
Gurbani (1168-1187)
Ashtpadiyan (1187-1193)
Vaar Basant (1193-1196)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਾਰਗ | Raag Saarag
Gurbani (1197-1200)
Partaal (1200-1231)
Ashtpadiyan (1232-1236)
Chhant (1236-1237)
Vaar Saarang (1237-1253)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਲਾਰ | Raag Malaar
Gurbani (1254-1293)
Partaal (1265-1273)
Ashtpadiyan (1273-1278)
Chhant (1278)
Vaar Malaar (1278-91)
Bhagat Bani (1292-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਾਨੜਾ | Raag Kaanraa
Gurbani (1294-96)
Partaal (1296-1318)
Ashtpadiyan (1308-1312)
Chhant (1312)
Vaar Kaanraa
Bhagat Bani (1318)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਲਿਆਨ | Raag Kalyaan
Gurbani (1319-23)
Ashtpadiyan (1323-26)
ਰਾਗੁ ਪ੍ਰਭਾਤੀ | Raag Prabhaatee
Gurbani (1327-1341)
Ashtpadiyan (1342-51)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਜਾਵੰਤੀ | Raag Jaijaiwanti
Gurbani (1352-53)
Salok | Gatha | Phunahe | Chaubole | Swayiye
Sehskritee Mahala 1
Sehskritee Mahala 5
Gaathaa Mahala 5
Phunhay Mahala 5
Chaubolae Mahala 5
Shaloks Bhagat Kabir
Shaloks Sheikh Farid
Swaiyyae Mahala 5
Swaiyyae in Praise of Gurus
Shaloks in Addition To Vaars
Shalok Ninth Mehl
Mundavanee Mehl 5
ਰਾਗ ਮਾਲਾ, Raag Maalaa
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Demographic Tectonics
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<blockquote data-quote="Archived_Member16" data-source="post: 146836" data-attributes="member: 884"><p><span style="color: Navy">May 25, 2011</span></p><p> <span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"><span style="font-size: 18px"><strong>Demographic Tectonics</strong></span></span></p><p> <span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">By PIERRE BUHLER - NEW YORK TIMES - May 25, 2011</span></p><p> <span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"><strong>PARIS </strong>— Slow but steady contraction in the north, vigorous and sustained expansion in Africa; seven billion of us by October this year, eight billion sometime around 2025. The latest United Nations population figures provide a dramatic glimpse of how the demographic map of the planet is being reshaped. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">For the latest revision of its biennial “World Population Prospects,” the U.N. Population Division has extended its forecasts by 50 years, to 2100. Long-term forecasts must be taken with a grain of salt — they “have no operational role,” as the French demographer Hervé Le Bras has written; they just help “staging and exaggerating today’s fears.” </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">Still, the margins of error allow for a fairly reliable picture of the world’s population in the decades to come. And what matters more is the breakdown of the aggregate figures, as their distribution holds far-reaching consequences. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">For this, demography delivers a high level of certainty. The women liable to give birth within a generation are already born; life expectancy and mortality indexes evolve slowly. The most volatile factor is actually the fertility rate — the number of children per woman. Only if this rate is above the generation replacement level of 2.1 will there be a natural increase of a population. When it hovers between 5 and 7, as it does in some 20 countries, the “compounded interest” effect is extremely powerful. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">Unsurprisingly, Asia remains the largest human reservoir, holding more than 60 percent of the world’s population — a proportion that should still be around 55 percent by 2050. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">What is most striking, though, is the unabated demographic swelling of Africa. Africa’s population has almost doubled between 1975 and 2000, growing from 416 to 811 million; it will add another 75 percent to reach 1.4 billion people in 2025, and presumably another 55 percent to reach the staggering figure of 2.2 billion by mid-century. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">The main reason is that the demographic transition — the decrease of birth rates following the drop of death rates when a country takes off — is slow to occur in the least developed countries. With the exception of Afghanistan, Timor and Yemen, all such countries, with current fertility rates above 4.5 children per woman, are located in sub-Saharan Africa — and there are some 25 of them. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">The U.N. assumes this rate will decrease steadily from five to three children per woman, which is considered the medium. Still the population of Africa as a whole is expected to keep growing briskly, from only 9 percent of the world’s population in 1950 to 24 percent by 2050. The absolute figures will have increased tenfold within that century. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">And while countries such as Nigeria (230 million in 2025, 390 million in 2050); Ethiopia (110 million and 145 million) and Congo (95 million and 148 million) have since long been identified as the demographic giants of sub-Saharan Africa, new applicants are following suit. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">With a population of 45 million inhabitants today and a fertility rate of 5.5, Tanzania is on the path toward 71 million in 2025 and 138 million in 2050. Kenya is expected to jump from 41 million to 59 million and then to 97 million in that same time span, while Uganda might reach the 100 million mark after mid-century. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">In the 1960s and 1970s the population growth rates — then of the same magnitude as those of sub-Saharan Africa today — fostered a number of controversies in the West about the capacity of the earth to feed a constantly growing mankind. They also prompted birth-control policies in a number of Third World countries. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">The slowing of the exponential curve of demography after the 1970s muted the neo-Malthusian voices. But the toll that demographic growth in Africa will take on an already stressed ecosystem will no doubt reopen those debates. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">Another consequence of the growth curve is the pressure to emigrate generated by the annual arrival on the African labor markets of some 20 million youths. That bulge is liable to increase year after year, reaching 40 million by 2050. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">The migratory pressure will be directed in the first place toward Europe, whose population, in sharp contrast with Africa’s, is bound to age and stagnate. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">Here the figures provided by the U.N. do not show any reverse trend. Even though they assume a surge in fertility rates close to the generation replacement levels, within a decade Europe — for the first time in peacetime — will have no natural increase of its population. Russia’s population has been declining for two decades; more recently so has Germany’s (and Japan’s). The issue is not only one of decline in absolute figures, but also one of a graying population and a shrinking workforce. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">Not all European countries are equally affected. France, Ireland, Britain and some Nordic countries have fertility rates quite close to the generation replacement rate and are not threatened by demographic decline. But this does not change the trends for Europe as a whole, nor the fact that the Continent will remain a desired destination for immigrants from the South. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">Another French demographer, Alfred Sauvy, once said that the 21st century would be “the century of demographic aging.” One should add that it might be the century of immigration. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">The United States and some other countries have long turned immigration into a public policy that, despite some stumbling blocks, has helped preserve a balanced age pyramid. In Europe, recent developments have shown the extent to which immigration can corrode the European construction. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy">“Demography is destiny,” says the maxim attributed to Auguste Comte. It is about time for Europeans to take their destiny into their hands and to address it from both ends: the urgent need for massive development in Africa and sound management of the inescapable migratory flows from south to north. </span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"><em>Pierre Buhler is a former French diplomat and associate professor at Sciences Po, Paris. </em></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"></span></p><p><span style="color: Navy"><strong>source:</strong> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/opinion/26iht-edbuhler26.html?_r=1&ref=global" target="_blank">http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/opinion/26iht-edbuhler26.html?_r=1&ref=global</a></span></p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Archived_Member16, post: 146836, member: 884"] [COLOR="Navy"]May 25, 2011 [SIZE="5"][B]Demographic Tectonics[/B][/SIZE] By PIERRE BUHLER - NEW YORK TIMES - May 25, 2011 [B]PARIS [/B]— Slow but steady contraction in the north, vigorous and sustained expansion in Africa; seven billion of us by October this year, eight billion sometime around 2025. The latest United Nations population figures provide a dramatic glimpse of how the demographic map of the planet is being reshaped. For the latest revision of its biennial “World Population Prospects,” the U.N. Population Division has extended its forecasts by 50 years, to 2100. Long-term forecasts must be taken with a grain of salt — they “have no operational role,” as the French demographer Hervé Le Bras has written; they just help “staging and exaggerating today’s fears.” Still, the margins of error allow for a fairly reliable picture of the world’s population in the decades to come. And what matters more is the breakdown of the aggregate figures, as their distribution holds far-reaching consequences. For this, demography delivers a high level of certainty. The women liable to give birth within a generation are already born; life expectancy and mortality indexes evolve slowly. The most volatile factor is actually the fertility rate — the number of children per woman. Only if this rate is above the generation replacement level of 2.1 will there be a natural increase of a population. When it hovers between 5 and 7, as it does in some 20 countries, the “compounded interest” effect is extremely powerful. Unsurprisingly, Asia remains the largest human reservoir, holding more than 60 percent of the world’s population — a proportion that should still be around 55 percent by 2050. What is most striking, though, is the unabated demographic swelling of Africa. Africa’s population has almost doubled between 1975 and 2000, growing from 416 to 811 million; it will add another 75 percent to reach 1.4 billion people in 2025, and presumably another 55 percent to reach the staggering figure of 2.2 billion by mid-century. The main reason is that the demographic transition — the decrease of birth rates following the drop of death rates when a country takes off — is slow to occur in the least developed countries. With the exception of Afghanistan, Timor and Yemen, all such countries, with current fertility rates above 4.5 children per woman, are located in sub-Saharan Africa — and there are some 25 of them. The U.N. assumes this rate will decrease steadily from five to three children per woman, which is considered the medium. Still the population of Africa as a whole is expected to keep growing briskly, from only 9 percent of the world’s population in 1950 to 24 percent by 2050. The absolute figures will have increased tenfold within that century. And while countries such as Nigeria (230 million in 2025, 390 million in 2050); Ethiopia (110 million and 145 million) and Congo (95 million and 148 million) have since long been identified as the demographic giants of sub-Saharan Africa, new applicants are following suit. With a population of 45 million inhabitants today and a fertility rate of 5.5, Tanzania is on the path toward 71 million in 2025 and 138 million in 2050. Kenya is expected to jump from 41 million to 59 million and then to 97 million in that same time span, while Uganda might reach the 100 million mark after mid-century. In the 1960s and 1970s the population growth rates — then of the same magnitude as those of sub-Saharan Africa today — fostered a number of controversies in the West about the capacity of the earth to feed a constantly growing mankind. They also prompted birth-control policies in a number of Third World countries. The slowing of the exponential curve of demography after the 1970s muted the neo-Malthusian voices. But the toll that demographic growth in Africa will take on an already stressed ecosystem will no doubt reopen those debates. Another consequence of the growth curve is the pressure to emigrate generated by the annual arrival on the African labor markets of some 20 million youths. That bulge is liable to increase year after year, reaching 40 million by 2050. The migratory pressure will be directed in the first place toward Europe, whose population, in sharp contrast with Africa’s, is bound to age and stagnate. Here the figures provided by the U.N. do not show any reverse trend. Even though they assume a surge in fertility rates close to the generation replacement levels, within a decade Europe — for the first time in peacetime — will have no natural increase of its population. Russia’s population has been declining for two decades; more recently so has Germany’s (and Japan’s). The issue is not only one of decline in absolute figures, but also one of a graying population and a shrinking workforce. Not all European countries are equally affected. France, Ireland, Britain and some Nordic countries have fertility rates quite close to the generation replacement rate and are not threatened by demographic decline. But this does not change the trends for Europe as a whole, nor the fact that the Continent will remain a desired destination for immigrants from the South. Another French demographer, Alfred Sauvy, once said that the 21st century would be “the century of demographic aging.” One should add that it might be the century of immigration. The United States and some other countries have long turned immigration into a public policy that, despite some stumbling blocks, has helped preserve a balanced age pyramid. In Europe, recent developments have shown the extent to which immigration can corrode the European construction. “Demography is destiny,” says the maxim attributed to Auguste Comte. It is about time for Europeans to take their destiny into their hands and to address it from both ends: the urgent need for massive development in Africa and sound management of the inescapable migratory flows from south to north. [I]Pierre Buhler is a former French diplomat and associate professor at Sciences Po, Paris. [/I] [B]source:[/B] [url]http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/opinion/26iht-edbuhler26.html?_r=1&ref=global[/url][/COLOR] [/QUOTE]
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