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ਸੋ ਦਰੁ | So Dar
ਸੋਹਿਲਾ | Sohilaa
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਿਰੀਰਾਗੁ | Raag Siree-Raag
Gurbani (14-53)
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Gurbani (71-74)
Pahre (74-78)
Chhant (78-81)
Vanjara (81-82)
Vaar Siri Raag (83-91)
Bhagat Bani (91-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਝ | Raag Maajh
Gurbani (94-109)
Ashtpadi (109)
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Ashtpadi (129-130)
Ashtpadiyan (130-133)
Bara Maha (133-136)
Din Raen (136-137)
Vaar Maajh Ki (137-150)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗਉੜੀ | Raag Gauree
Gurbani (151-185)
Quartets/Couplets (185-220)
Ashtpadiyan (220-234)
Karhalei (234-235)
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Baavan Akhari (340-343)
Thintteen (343-344)
Vaar Kabir (344-345)
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ਰਾਗੁ ਆਸਾ | Raag Aasaa
Gurbani (347-348)
Chaupaday (348-364)
Panchpadde (364-365)
Kaafee (365-409)
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Chhant (435-462)
Vaar Aasaa (462-475)
Bhagat Bani (475-488)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੂਜਰੀ | Raag Goojaree
Gurbani (489-503)
Ashtpadiyan (503-508)
Vaar Gujari (508-517)
Vaar Gujari (517-526)
ਰਾਗੁ ਦੇਵਗੰਧਾਰੀ | Raag Dayv-Gandhaaree
Gurbani (527-536)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਹਾਗੜਾ | Raag Bihaagraa
Gurbani (537-556)
Chhant (538-548)
Vaar Bihaagraa (548-556)
ਰਾਗੁ ਵਡਹੰਸ | Raag Wadhans
Gurbani (557-564)
Ashtpadiyan (564-565)
Chhant (565-575)
Ghoriaan (575-578)
Alaahaniiaa (578-582)
Vaar Wadhans (582-594)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੋਰਠਿ | Raag Sorath
Gurbani (595-634)
Asatpadhiya (634-642)
Vaar Sorath (642-659)
ਰਾਗੁ ਧਨਾਸਰੀ | Raag Dhanasaree
Gurbani (660-685)
Astpadhiya (685-687)
Chhant (687-691)
Bhagat Bani (691-695)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਤਸਰੀ | Raag Jaitsree
Gurbani (696-703)
Chhant (703-705)
Vaar Jaitsaree (705-710)
Bhagat Bani (710)
ਰਾਗੁ ਟੋਡੀ | Raag Todee
ਰਾਗੁ ਬੈਰਾੜੀ | Raag Bairaaree
ਰਾਗੁ ਤਿਲੰਗ | Raag Tilang
Gurbani (721-727)
Bhagat Bani (727)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸੂਹੀ | Raag Suhi
Gurbani (728-750)
Ashtpadiyan (750-761)
Kaafee (761-762)
Suchajee (762)
Gunvantee (763)
Chhant (763-785)
Vaar Soohee (785-792)
Bhagat Bani (792-794)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਿਲਾਵਲੁ | Raag Bilaaval
Gurbani (795-831)
Ashtpadiyan (831-838)
Thitteen (838-840)
Vaar Sat (841-843)
Chhant (843-848)
Vaar Bilaaval (849-855)
Bhagat Bani (855-858)
ਰਾਗੁ ਗੋਂਡ | Raag Gond
Gurbani (859-869)
Ashtpadiyan (869)
Bhagat Bani (870-875)
ਰਾਗੁ ਰਾਮਕਲੀ | Raag Ramkalee
Ashtpadiyan (902-916)
Gurbani (876-902)
Anand (917-922)
Sadd (923-924)
Chhant (924-929)
Dakhnee (929-938)
Sidh Gosat (938-946)
Vaar Ramkalee (947-968)
ਰਾਗੁ ਨਟ ਨਾਰਾਇਨ | Raag Nat Narayan
Gurbani (975-980)
Ashtpadiyan (980-983)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਲੀ ਗਉੜਾ | Raag Maalee Gauraa
Gurbani (984-988)
Bhagat Bani (988)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਾਰੂ | Raag Maaroo
Gurbani (889-1008)
Ashtpadiyan (1008-1014)
Kaafee (1014-1016)
Ashtpadiyan (1016-1019)
Anjulian (1019-1020)
Solhe (1020-1033)
Dakhni (1033-1043)
ਰਾਗੁ ਤੁਖਾਰੀ | Raag Tukhaari
Bara Maha (1107-1110)
Chhant (1110-1117)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕੇਦਾਰਾ | Raag Kedara
Gurbani (1118-1123)
Bhagat Bani (1123-1124)
ਰਾਗੁ ਭੈਰਉ | Raag Bhairo
Gurbani (1125-1152)
Partaal (1153)
Ashtpadiyan (1153-1167)
ਰਾਗੁ ਬਸੰਤੁ | Raag Basant
Gurbani (1168-1187)
Ashtpadiyan (1187-1193)
Vaar Basant (1193-1196)
ਰਾਗੁ ਸਾਰਗ | Raag Saarag
Gurbani (1197-1200)
Partaal (1200-1231)
Ashtpadiyan (1232-1236)
Chhant (1236-1237)
Vaar Saarang (1237-1253)
ਰਾਗੁ ਮਲਾਰ | Raag Malaar
Gurbani (1254-1293)
Partaal (1265-1273)
Ashtpadiyan (1273-1278)
Chhant (1278)
Vaar Malaar (1278-91)
Bhagat Bani (1292-93)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਾਨੜਾ | Raag Kaanraa
Gurbani (1294-96)
Partaal (1296-1318)
Ashtpadiyan (1308-1312)
Chhant (1312)
Vaar Kaanraa
Bhagat Bani (1318)
ਰਾਗੁ ਕਲਿਆਨ | Raag Kalyaan
Gurbani (1319-23)
Ashtpadiyan (1323-26)
ਰਾਗੁ ਪ੍ਰਭਾਤੀ | Raag Prabhaatee
Gurbani (1327-1341)
Ashtpadiyan (1342-51)
ਰਾਗੁ ਜੈਜਾਵੰਤੀ | Raag Jaijaiwanti
Gurbani (1352-53)
Salok | Gatha | Phunahe | Chaubole | Swayiye
Sehskritee Mahala 1
Sehskritee Mahala 5
Gaathaa Mahala 5
Phunhay Mahala 5
Chaubolae Mahala 5
Shaloks Bhagat Kabir
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Swaiyyae Mahala 5
Swaiyyae in Praise of Gurus
Shaloks in Addition To Vaars
Shalok Ninth Mehl
Mundavanee Mehl 5
ਰਾਗ ਮਾਲਾ, Raag Maalaa
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Canada Judge Rules Air India Defendants Not Guilty
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<blockquote data-quote="Arvind" data-source="post: 7967" data-attributes="member: 245"><p>In continuation to above.... </p><p> </p><p>Ref: <a href="http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt/SC/05/03/2005BCSC0350.htm" target="_blank">http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt/SC/05/03/2005BCSC0350.htm</a><a href="http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt...005BCSC0350.htm" target="_blank">http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt...005BCSC0350.htm</a></p><p> </p><p>H. The Case Against Mr. Bagri</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1324] It is the theory of the Crown that Mr. Bagri’s involvement in the alleged offences lay in securing transport of the bomb-laden suitcases to the Vancouver Airport. The Crown rests its case on three primary bodies of evidence: evidence of motive, evidence of association, and evidence of incriminatory statements by Mr. Bagri to two individuals, Mr. C and Ms. E.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>1. Evidence of Motive</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1325] Offences of the enormity alleged here must necessarily be accompanied by a motive of similar magnitude. The Crown presents what it describes as evidence of such motive on the part of Mr. Bagri, namely, religious and political zealotry, revealed in various speeches and statements by him in 1984. The most significant of these was his speech to a convention of the World Sikh Organization at Madison Square Gardens in late July, 1984 (the “MSG Speech”). In that emotional and fiery speech, frequently tinged with violent imagery, Mr. Bagri described recent and historical Hindu mistreatment of Sikhs, and proposed the creation of an independent Sikh state of Khalistan as a solution to that problem. The punishment of traitors to the cause was another consistent theme. A number of months later in September, 1984, Mr. Bagri delivered a speech to the Panthak Conference in which he raised similar themes. He advocated a Sikh war of independence against the Hindu majority in India and called for a boycott of Hindu businesses, including Air India.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1326] While mindful, as submitted by the defence, that the MSG Speech contained rhetoric intended to meet the expectations of a Sikh audience outraged with the Government of India, when considered with the other evidence of motive, I conclude that Mr. Bagri harboured a motive for revenge sufficiently powerful as to countenance participation in offences as horrific as those alleged in the Indictment. This motivation stemmed from outrage at the actions of the Government of India towards Sikhs and their religion, and a concomitant desire to effect an independent Khalistan. That motive, however, was hardly unique to Mr. Bagri or to a small identifiable group that included him. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>2. Evidence of Association</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1327] Evidence of association between Mr. Bagri and Mr. Parmar establishes that Mr. Bagri had the opportunity to become a member of the conspiracy alleged. They were close associates in the Babbar Khalsa organization and, particularly in 1984, regularly travelled and attended meetings together. They travelled together to Toronto from June 7 to 9, 1985. As well, there is evidence of telephone contact between them. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1328] However, evidence of association between Mr. Parmar and persons other than Mr. Bagri in the months immediately preceding the Air India/Narita explosions supports an inference that it is less likely that Mr. Bagri played a prominent role in that conspiracy, if he played any role at all. For a conspiracy of this nature, many others in Canada and the United States also had an opportunity to participate. Accordingly, the finding that Mr. Bagri had an opportunity to participate does not render it any more likely that he in fact did.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>3. Inculpatory Statements by Mr. Bagri</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1329] Having laid a foundation of motive and opportunity, the Crown’s case against Mr. Bagri succeeds or fails on the strength of the evidence purporting to relay inculpatory statements made by him. The Crown’s two primary witnesses here are Mr. C and Ms. E. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>a. Mr. C</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1330] Mr. C is a Sikh from the same ancestral village in the Punjab as Mr. Bagri. He resided in New York during the 1980s and was an executive member of a Sikh organization called the Deshmesh Regiment for some of that period. Mr. C’s core evidence related to hearing a number of incriminating remarks allegedly made to him by Mr. Bagri. His evidence in this regard was as follows:</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>a) Mr. C invited Mr. Bagri to his home following the WSO Convention at Madison Square Gardens in July 1984 to meet some of the members of the Deshmesh Regiment. Mr. Bagri took him aside for a private conversation during which he said, “tell to your guys, ‘Don’t go to jail for a small thing. We have stuff that can blow like a – like a block’”.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>b) Upon arriving home from work sometime after the Air India/Narita explosions, Mr. C received a telephone call from an Avtar Singh advising him that Mr. Bagri was in town and wished to see him. Mr. C attended at a gas station in New Jersey where he had a private conversation with Mr. Bagri. Mr. C expressed his concern that the Deshmesh Regiment was being blamed for the Air India disaster, to which Mr. Bagri replied, “why the {censored} they bother you? We did this.”</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>c) Mr. C spoke with Mr. Bagri at a pro-Khalistan conference in Stockton, California in September 1987. During a discussion about a split in the Babbar Khalsa, Mr. Bagri indicated that he did not trust certain members in the organization because they might speak to the police about the Air India bombing. Mr. C also raised the issue of the timing of bombs, namely, that one had exploded mid-flight and the other on the ground at Narita Airport. Mr. Bagri replied that they had expected the explosion one hour earlier. He did not elaborate which explosion he was referring to.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>d) In December 1987, Mr. C met Mr. Bagri at a Sikh temple in New York and asked him about building bombs. Mr. Bagri replied that he did not wish to discuss the matter because, “walls have ears. Only two of us knows; a third person will know, for this we can go in jail”.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>e) In April 1989, Mr. C met with Mr. Bagri at the same Sikh temple in New York and raised the issue of Mr. Reyat’s arrest and the possibility that he might cooperate with the police. Mr. Bagri responded, “Don’t worry; he {censored}ing don’t know nothing. Only two of us knows; nobody else.”</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1331] For the reasons that follow, there are serious concerns regarding the credibility of Mr. C.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1332] Mr. C is an individual driven by self-interest. His immigration history from the time he entered the United States illegally in 1983 until as recently as January, 2004 reveals his willingness to engage in deception and lies, even under penalty of perjury, whenever he believed it would advance his self-interest. His attempts at trial to rationalize his falsehoods on the basis that he had simply sought to better himself and his family do little to mitigate the obvious fact that he considered the truth secondary when it conflicted with that self-interest. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1333] In May, 1985, Mr. C engaged in criminal activity by assisting two fugitives, members of his Deshmesh Regiment, to escape from an attempted assassination of an Indian dignitary visiting New Orleans. His involvement in that incident was a motivating factor in his becoming an informant for the FBI shortly thereafter, as was his fear of deportation as an illegal immigrant, particularly after the heightened awareness caused by the New Orleans incident. Media reports in the aftermath of the Air India/Narita explosions to the effect that the Deshmesh Regiment was claiming responsibility for those incidents led Mr. C to fear being implicated and provided an additional impetus to maintain the informant relationship.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1334] Even though Mr. C began informing anonymously, revealing his role as an informant in the event he was subsequently detained or arrested could have assisted him in avoiding or diminishing the consequences. He in fact came to enjoy considerable assistance from the FBI with respect to his immigration status, a benefit that would only continue so long as he was perceived as a valuable source of information. This would have provided a powerful incentive to provide such information, whether entirely accurate or not. As one example, Mr. C attempted to deflect attention away from himself by informing the FBI that it had been another executive member of the Deshmesh Regiment who had arranged for the funds to procure airline tickets for the New Orleans fugitives.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1335] Mr. C’s self-interest further manifested in his bargaining with respect to the $300,000 USD he received to testify in these proceedings. He then attempted to extract an additional $200,000 USD on the very eve of his testimony, testifying unconvincingly that these attempts had been either the result of a misunderstanding or a tactic to delay his appearance in court in order to handle a family matter in India. His entreaties for immigration assistance at the same time he was demanding this additional payment firmly belie any notion that he was motivated other than by self-interest.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1336] In addition, Mr. C’s testimony was rife with examples of evasiveness and internal contradictions, followed by implausible explanations. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1337] Beyond these global concerns with respect to Mr. C’s credibility as a witness, an examination of each of the instances in which he testified to having heard incriminating remarks by Mr. Bagri reveals further credibility difficulties, including the following:</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>a) Mr. C raised the post-MSG Convention statement for the first time in February 1997. Despite having provided his FBI handler, Mr. Ron Parrish, with information regarding Mr. Bagri over the course of their four year informant/handler relationship, he never once mentioned this particular conversation. He also failed to mention it to the FBI in July 1992 in a detailed statement about this meeting at his residence.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>b) Mr. C’s evidence regarding the most inculpatory of Mr. Bagri’s alleged statements, “Why the {censored} they bother you. We did this”, contains external and internal inconsistencies. The evidence as a whole suggests that the window of opportunity for this alleged conversation between Mr. C and Mr. Bagri was a weekday after September 11 and shortly before September 25, 1985. Mr. Bagri’s work records reveal that he worked every weekday in September, thereby rendering his attendance in the New York area on a weekday highly unlikely. The possibility of a meeting occurring during this time frame is also undermined by Mr. C’s contradictory testimony that he related Mr. Bagri’s incriminatory statements to his roommates upon arriving home from Avtar Singh’s gas station but that his roommates had dispersed shortly after an FBI raid on their apartment. This latter event had taken place in late July. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>The evidence of Mr. Parrish does not substantiate Mr. C’s testimony about this important conversation in any material way. He testified that during a debriefing on September 25, 1985, Mr. C told him of an in-person meeting with Mr. Bagri during which the latter had stated that his group was responsible for the Air India/Narita explosions. Mr. Parrish’s only record of this information was a telex to FBI Headquarters in which he referred to his source having heard from several members of the Babbar Khalsa that the Babbar Khalsa in Vancouver was responsible for the Air India/Narita explosions. He testified that he had drafted the telex obliquely to protect the identity of his source. According to Mr. Parrish, Mr. C did not disclose the details of that meeting, such as it having occurred at Avtar Singh’s gas station at the end of September 1985 and the names of some of those who had also been present, until July 1989. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>Mr. Parrish, clearly a conscientious and diligent agent, testified that he had not made any accurate record of the information Mr. C had provided in September 1985, nor had he shared it with his supervisors. The evidence of former FBI agent Jack Cloonan revealed the extent to which Mr. Parrish’s handling of this apparent revelation of responsibility for one of the worst acts of aviation terrorism to have ever occurred departed from standard FBI protocol. However, it is not necessary to reconcile Mr. Parrish’s certainty regarding the level of information Mr. C had revealed on September 25, 1985 against his inability to adequately explain the unlikely manner in which dealt with that information since the only effect of his evidence is to eliminate the possibility of concoction by Mr. C after that date. The evolution of Mr. C’s account of the gas station conversation even on Mr. Parrish’s evidence undermines even that limited purpose.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>c) Mr. C’s recollection of the other three statements he attributes to Mr. Bagri was poor at the time he related them to the RCMP, often interchanging and confusing them. It is clear that they are not firmly etched in his memory to any sufficient degree such that it would be safe to rely on his evidence with respect to them.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1338] Accordingly, even in the absence of a Vetrovec caution, I find Mr. C’s evidence not to be credible.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>b. Ms. E</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1339] Ms. E is a former friend of Mr. Bagri. Her testimony at trial was not inculpatory of Mr. Bagri and the Crown therefore seeks to rely on her hearsay statements to CSIS agent, Mr. William Laurie, earlier ruled admissible as necessary and reliable to a threshold level. In those statements, Ms. E referred to a late night visit by Mr. Bagri to her home the evening before the Air India/Narita explosions during which he sought to borrow her car. He explained that he was going to the airport but that only the bags were making the trip; he was not. At trial, however, Ms. E professed a lack of recall with respect to the timing and content of this conversation. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1340] In her statements to Mr. Laurie, Ms. E consistently described Mr. Bagri’s visit as having occurred the evening before the Air India explosion. In her evidence at trial, however, she generally associated that event with CSIS surveillance, which placed the visit on June 9, 1985. Looking at the evidence as a whole as I must do in assessing ultimate reliability, what is troubling is that throughout her evidence and her prior statements, Ms. E never described a second late night visit by Mr. Bagri in June 1985. This anomaly would have properly been the subject of rigorous cross-examination at trial to explore the possibility of mistaken recollection or fabrication. The defence, however, was denied this opportunity because of what I find to have been feigned memory loss on the part of Ms. E. </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1341] Of less, but nonetheless valid, concern is the lack of an entirely full record of the statements and the defence’s inability to cross-examine Ms. E on the accuracy of that record. The statements were also provided following a promise of confidentiality, which, while adequately accounted for at the threshold level, is a further factor affecting the ultimate weight of the evidence.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1342] There is little else in the body of trial evidence to either confirm or contradict the material aspects of Ms. E’s statements to Mr. Laurie.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1343] Thus, proof of Mr. Bagri’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon hearsay statements for which there is no reliable confirmatory evidence. These statements were provided on a confidential basis and not under oath by a person who falsely claimed loss of memory when testifying. When one adds to this the inability of the defence to conduct an effective cross-examination on significant issues surrounding those hearsay statements, I conclude that, even without turning to the need for a Vetrovec caution, a reasonable doubt arises with respect to the ultimate reliability of Ms. E’s hearsay statements to Mr. Laurie.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>4. Conclusion Regarding Mr. Bagri</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1344] Considering the evidence as a whole, I find that the Crown has not proved its case against Mr. Bagri beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to his being a member of the alleged conspiracy or a party to the alleged offences and, accordingly, I find him not guilty on each count of the Indictment.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>I. Final Conclusion</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>[1345] I began by describing the horrific nature of these cruel acts of terrorism, acts which cry out for justice. Justice is not achieved, however, if persons are convicted on anything less than the requisite standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite what appear to have been the best and most earnest of efforts by the police and the Crown, the evidence has fallen markedly short of that standard.</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>“I.B. Josephson, J.”</p><p> </p><p>The Honourable Mr. Justice I.B. Josephson</p><p> </p><p></p><p>Gyani ji, I agree. Real culprits needs to be caught. Enough damage is already caused. Regards.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Arvind, post: 7967, member: 245"] In continuation to above.... Ref: [url="http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt/SC/05/03/2005BCSC0350.htm"]http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt/SC/05/03/2005BCSC0350.htm[/url][url="http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/Jdb-txt...005BCSC0350.htm"][/url] H. The Case Against Mr. Bagri [1324] It is the theory of the Crown that Mr. Bagri’s involvement in the alleged offences lay in securing transport of the bomb-laden suitcases to the Vancouver Airport. The Crown rests its case on three primary bodies of evidence: evidence of motive, evidence of association, and evidence of incriminatory statements by Mr. Bagri to two individuals, Mr. C and Ms. E. 1. Evidence of Motive [1325] Offences of the enormity alleged here must necessarily be accompanied by a motive of similar magnitude. The Crown presents what it describes as evidence of such motive on the part of Mr. Bagri, namely, religious and political zealotry, revealed in various speeches and statements by him in 1984. The most significant of these was his speech to a convention of the World Sikh Organization at Madison Square Gardens in late July, 1984 (the “MSG Speech”). In that emotional and fiery speech, frequently tinged with violent imagery, Mr. Bagri described recent and historical Hindu mistreatment of Sikhs, and proposed the creation of an independent Sikh state of Khalistan as a solution to that problem. The punishment of traitors to the cause was another consistent theme. A number of months later in September, 1984, Mr. Bagri delivered a speech to the Panthak Conference in which he raised similar themes. He advocated a Sikh war of independence against the Hindu majority in India and called for a boycott of Hindu businesses, including Air India. [1326] While mindful, as submitted by the defence, that the MSG Speech contained rhetoric intended to meet the expectations of a Sikh audience outraged with the Government of India, when considered with the other evidence of motive, I conclude that Mr. Bagri harboured a motive for revenge sufficiently powerful as to countenance participation in offences as horrific as those alleged in the Indictment. This motivation stemmed from outrage at the actions of the Government of India towards Sikhs and their religion, and a concomitant desire to effect an independent Khalistan. That motive, however, was hardly unique to Mr. Bagri or to a small identifiable group that included him. 2. Evidence of Association [1327] Evidence of association between Mr. Bagri and Mr. Parmar establishes that Mr. Bagri had the opportunity to become a member of the conspiracy alleged. They were close associates in the Babbar Khalsa organization and, particularly in 1984, regularly travelled and attended meetings together. They travelled together to Toronto from June 7 to 9, 1985. As well, there is evidence of telephone contact between them. [1328] However, evidence of association between Mr. Parmar and persons other than Mr. Bagri in the months immediately preceding the Air India/Narita explosions supports an inference that it is less likely that Mr. Bagri played a prominent role in that conspiracy, if he played any role at all. For a conspiracy of this nature, many others in Canada and the United States also had an opportunity to participate. Accordingly, the finding that Mr. Bagri had an opportunity to participate does not render it any more likely that he in fact did. 3. Inculpatory Statements by Mr. Bagri [1329] Having laid a foundation of motive and opportunity, the Crown’s case against Mr. Bagri succeeds or fails on the strength of the evidence purporting to relay inculpatory statements made by him. The Crown’s two primary witnesses here are Mr. C and Ms. E. a. Mr. C [1330] Mr. C is a Sikh from the same ancestral village in the Punjab as Mr. Bagri. He resided in New York during the 1980s and was an executive member of a Sikh organization called the Deshmesh Regiment for some of that period. Mr. C’s core evidence related to hearing a number of incriminating remarks allegedly made to him by Mr. Bagri. His evidence in this regard was as follows: a) Mr. C invited Mr. Bagri to his home following the WSO Convention at Madison Square Gardens in July 1984 to meet some of the members of the Deshmesh Regiment. Mr. Bagri took him aside for a private conversation during which he said, “tell to your guys, ‘Don’t go to jail for a small thing. We have stuff that can blow like a – like a block’”. b) Upon arriving home from work sometime after the Air India/Narita explosions, Mr. C received a telephone call from an Avtar Singh advising him that Mr. Bagri was in town and wished to see him. Mr. C attended at a gas station in New Jersey where he had a private conversation with Mr. Bagri. Mr. C expressed his concern that the Deshmesh Regiment was being blamed for the Air India disaster, to which Mr. Bagri replied, “why the {censored} they bother you? We did this.” c) Mr. C spoke with Mr. Bagri at a pro-Khalistan conference in Stockton, California in September 1987. During a discussion about a split in the Babbar Khalsa, Mr. Bagri indicated that he did not trust certain members in the organization because they might speak to the police about the Air India bombing. Mr. C also raised the issue of the timing of bombs, namely, that one had exploded mid-flight and the other on the ground at Narita Airport. Mr. Bagri replied that they had expected the explosion one hour earlier. He did not elaborate which explosion he was referring to. d) In December 1987, Mr. C met Mr. Bagri at a Sikh temple in New York and asked him about building bombs. Mr. Bagri replied that he did not wish to discuss the matter because, “walls have ears. Only two of us knows; a third person will know, for this we can go in jail”. e) In April 1989, Mr. C met with Mr. Bagri at the same Sikh temple in New York and raised the issue of Mr. Reyat’s arrest and the possibility that he might cooperate with the police. Mr. Bagri responded, “Don’t worry; he {censored}ing don’t know nothing. Only two of us knows; nobody else.” [1331] For the reasons that follow, there are serious concerns regarding the credibility of Mr. C. [1332] Mr. C is an individual driven by self-interest. His immigration history from the time he entered the United States illegally in 1983 until as recently as January, 2004 reveals his willingness to engage in deception and lies, even under penalty of perjury, whenever he believed it would advance his self-interest. His attempts at trial to rationalize his falsehoods on the basis that he had simply sought to better himself and his family do little to mitigate the obvious fact that he considered the truth secondary when it conflicted with that self-interest. [1333] In May, 1985, Mr. C engaged in criminal activity by assisting two fugitives, members of his Deshmesh Regiment, to escape from an attempted assassination of an Indian dignitary visiting New Orleans. His involvement in that incident was a motivating factor in his becoming an informant for the FBI shortly thereafter, as was his fear of deportation as an illegal immigrant, particularly after the heightened awareness caused by the New Orleans incident. Media reports in the aftermath of the Air India/Narita explosions to the effect that the Deshmesh Regiment was claiming responsibility for those incidents led Mr. C to fear being implicated and provided an additional impetus to maintain the informant relationship. [1334] Even though Mr. C began informing anonymously, revealing his role as an informant in the event he was subsequently detained or arrested could have assisted him in avoiding or diminishing the consequences. He in fact came to enjoy considerable assistance from the FBI with respect to his immigration status, a benefit that would only continue so long as he was perceived as a valuable source of information. This would have provided a powerful incentive to provide such information, whether entirely accurate or not. As one example, Mr. C attempted to deflect attention away from himself by informing the FBI that it had been another executive member of the Deshmesh Regiment who had arranged for the funds to procure airline tickets for the New Orleans fugitives. [1335] Mr. C’s self-interest further manifested in his bargaining with respect to the $300,000 USD he received to testify in these proceedings. He then attempted to extract an additional $200,000 USD on the very eve of his testimony, testifying unconvincingly that these attempts had been either the result of a misunderstanding or a tactic to delay his appearance in court in order to handle a family matter in India. His entreaties for immigration assistance at the same time he was demanding this additional payment firmly belie any notion that he was motivated other than by self-interest. [1336] In addition, Mr. C’s testimony was rife with examples of evasiveness and internal contradictions, followed by implausible explanations. [1337] Beyond these global concerns with respect to Mr. C’s credibility as a witness, an examination of each of the instances in which he testified to having heard incriminating remarks by Mr. Bagri reveals further credibility difficulties, including the following: a) Mr. C raised the post-MSG Convention statement for the first time in February 1997. Despite having provided his FBI handler, Mr. Ron Parrish, with information regarding Mr. Bagri over the course of their four year informant/handler relationship, he never once mentioned this particular conversation. He also failed to mention it to the FBI in July 1992 in a detailed statement about this meeting at his residence. b) Mr. C’s evidence regarding the most inculpatory of Mr. Bagri’s alleged statements, “Why the {censored} they bother you. We did this”, contains external and internal inconsistencies. The evidence as a whole suggests that the window of opportunity for this alleged conversation between Mr. C and Mr. Bagri was a weekday after September 11 and shortly before September 25, 1985. Mr. Bagri’s work records reveal that he worked every weekday in September, thereby rendering his attendance in the New York area on a weekday highly unlikely. The possibility of a meeting occurring during this time frame is also undermined by Mr. C’s contradictory testimony that he related Mr. Bagri’s incriminatory statements to his roommates upon arriving home from Avtar Singh’s gas station but that his roommates had dispersed shortly after an FBI raid on their apartment. This latter event had taken place in late July. The evidence of Mr. Parrish does not substantiate Mr. C’s testimony about this important conversation in any material way. He testified that during a debriefing on September 25, 1985, Mr. C told him of an in-person meeting with Mr. Bagri during which the latter had stated that his group was responsible for the Air India/Narita explosions. Mr. Parrish’s only record of this information was a telex to FBI Headquarters in which he referred to his source having heard from several members of the Babbar Khalsa that the Babbar Khalsa in Vancouver was responsible for the Air India/Narita explosions. He testified that he had drafted the telex obliquely to protect the identity of his source. According to Mr. Parrish, Mr. C did not disclose the details of that meeting, such as it having occurred at Avtar Singh’s gas station at the end of September 1985 and the names of some of those who had also been present, until July 1989. Mr. Parrish, clearly a conscientious and diligent agent, testified that he had not made any accurate record of the information Mr. C had provided in September 1985, nor had he shared it with his supervisors. The evidence of former FBI agent Jack Cloonan revealed the extent to which Mr. Parrish’s handling of this apparent revelation of responsibility for one of the worst acts of aviation terrorism to have ever occurred departed from standard FBI protocol. However, it is not necessary to reconcile Mr. Parrish’s certainty regarding the level of information Mr. C had revealed on September 25, 1985 against his inability to adequately explain the unlikely manner in which dealt with that information since the only effect of his evidence is to eliminate the possibility of concoction by Mr. C after that date. The evolution of Mr. C’s account of the gas station conversation even on Mr. Parrish’s evidence undermines even that limited purpose. c) Mr. C’s recollection of the other three statements he attributes to Mr. Bagri was poor at the time he related them to the RCMP, often interchanging and confusing them. It is clear that they are not firmly etched in his memory to any sufficient degree such that it would be safe to rely on his evidence with respect to them. [1338] Accordingly, even in the absence of a Vetrovec caution, I find Mr. C’s evidence not to be credible. b. Ms. E [1339] Ms. E is a former friend of Mr. Bagri. Her testimony at trial was not inculpatory of Mr. Bagri and the Crown therefore seeks to rely on her hearsay statements to CSIS agent, Mr. William Laurie, earlier ruled admissible as necessary and reliable to a threshold level. In those statements, Ms. E referred to a late night visit by Mr. Bagri to her home the evening before the Air India/Narita explosions during which he sought to borrow her car. He explained that he was going to the airport but that only the bags were making the trip; he was not. At trial, however, Ms. E professed a lack of recall with respect to the timing and content of this conversation. [1340] In her statements to Mr. Laurie, Ms. E consistently described Mr. Bagri’s visit as having occurred the evening before the Air India explosion. In her evidence at trial, however, she generally associated that event with CSIS surveillance, which placed the visit on June 9, 1985. Looking at the evidence as a whole as I must do in assessing ultimate reliability, what is troubling is that throughout her evidence and her prior statements, Ms. E never described a second late night visit by Mr. Bagri in June 1985. This anomaly would have properly been the subject of rigorous cross-examination at trial to explore the possibility of mistaken recollection or fabrication. The defence, however, was denied this opportunity because of what I find to have been feigned memory loss on the part of Ms. E. [1341] Of less, but nonetheless valid, concern is the lack of an entirely full record of the statements and the defence’s inability to cross-examine Ms. E on the accuracy of that record. The statements were also provided following a promise of confidentiality, which, while adequately accounted for at the threshold level, is a further factor affecting the ultimate weight of the evidence. [1342] There is little else in the body of trial evidence to either confirm or contradict the material aspects of Ms. E’s statements to Mr. Laurie. [1343] Thus, proof of Mr. Bagri’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon hearsay statements for which there is no reliable confirmatory evidence. These statements were provided on a confidential basis and not under oath by a person who falsely claimed loss of memory when testifying. When one adds to this the inability of the defence to conduct an effective cross-examination on significant issues surrounding those hearsay statements, I conclude that, even without turning to the need for a Vetrovec caution, a reasonable doubt arises with respect to the ultimate reliability of Ms. E’s hearsay statements to Mr. Laurie. 4. Conclusion Regarding Mr. Bagri [1344] Considering the evidence as a whole, I find that the Crown has not proved its case against Mr. Bagri beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to his being a member of the alleged conspiracy or a party to the alleged offences and, accordingly, I find him not guilty on each count of the Indictment. I. Final Conclusion [1345] I began by describing the horrific nature of these cruel acts of terrorism, acts which cry out for justice. Justice is not achieved, however, if persons are convicted on anything less than the requisite standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite what appear to have been the best and most earnest of efforts by the police and the Crown, the evidence has fallen markedly short of that standard. “I.B. Josephson, J.” The Honourable Mr. Justice I.B. Josephson Gyani ji, I agree. Real culprits needs to be caught. Enough damage is already caused. Regards. [/QUOTE]
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Canada Judge Rules Air India Defendants Not Guilty
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