Op Sindoor: 'Pakistan Was Completely Blind'
June 05, 2026 13:56 IST
'We won not (only) because we were able to carry out long-range precision strikes.'
'That is, of course, one of the reasons but we had better situational awareness about what's happening than Pakistan.'
IMAGE: People walk past a damaged structure after India's air strike on terror camps in Muridke near Lahore, Pakistan, May 7, 2025. Photograph: Gibran Peshimam/Reuters
Key Points
- 'We were immediately aware about where our strikes were taking place and what the effects of those strikes were.'
- 'We were also aware of what the adversary was undertaking and whether he was even able to achieve something or not.'
- 'We were able to choose the timing of ceasing hostilities when we were on top.'
General
Anil Chauhan, who retired as Chief of the Defence Staff on May 31, says the integrated theatre command plan he has proposed to the government takes into consideration India's strategic challenges on land and opportunities in water.
In an interview with
Satarupa Bhattacharjya/
Business Standard, the CDS also spoke about Operation Sindoor, the India-China border, and India's defence budget.
What are your major reflections on Operation Sindoor one year later?
Militarily, we can say that it was different from all the wars that India has fought until now, very unique in itself.
When I look back and think about why we won, we won not (
only) because we were able to carry out long-range precision strikes.
That is, of course, one of the reasons, but we had better situational awareness about what's happening than Pakistan.
We were immediately aware of where our strikes were taking place, what the effects of those strikes were.
We were also aware of what the adversary was undertaking and whether he was even able to achieve something or not. That helped us with any kind of decision-making.
The Pakistan side was completely blind, not only during those days when they lost this offensive on the 10th (
May 10, 2025, when the ceasefire was declared) but even after three-four days.
They were not sure as to what they had been able to do. Because of this, we were able to control the escalation—that is one important thing.
We were able to choose the timing of ceasing hostilities when we were on top.
I knew when they (
Pakistan) first spoke (
via the military hotline) at 9:30 am (
on May 10) that, okay, they wanted to talk, but we continued so that the margin of victory was absolute, and it also helped us to terminate the conflict when we wanted.
Is India better equipped to handle asymmetric warfare in general but with Pakistan in particular?
Pakistan's philosophy of using proxy war or asymmetric war—I think they don't understand it—is a strategy of diminishing returns.
When I say this, it is because with every act of terrorism, major act of terrorism, new space for conventional operations is created (
for India): Uri (
2016), Balakot (2019), and Sindoor (
2025).
When I say more space for conventional operations, I am not talking about more spatial distances—those, of course, and depth are there. It's force levels; it is domains.
You talk about preparations; there are two things. One is to deter, so that people are deterred and do not use this as a policy. The second is to prevent.
The armed forces are more towards building deterrence than prevention. The armed forces are part of it (
prevention), but it is intelligence agencies, state governments—all of us have to work together to see that such incidents don't occur.
IMAGE: Indian and Chinese troops and tanks disengage from the banks of the Pangong Tso lake in eastern Ladakh. Photograph: PTI Photo/Rediff Archives
How are things along India's border with China, including India's operational readiness and infrastructure development?
Also, has 100 percent disengagement been achieved, and to what extent has de-escalation taken place (since the Galwan River valley clash of June 15-16, 2020)?
In October 2024, India had an agreement with China, and, based on that, both sides have been able to restore their respective patrolling rights.
The disengagement in Depsang and Demchok (
eastern Ladakh) is complete.
Having said that, de-escalation, formal de-escalation through talks (
military level), hasn't taken place.
But yes, unilateral de-escalation has taken place. I would say the situation on the border currently is peaceful; both sides are maintaining the agreed-upon protocols for maintaining peace and tranquility.
As far as our preparation levels are concerned, by now, they (
Indian troops) have spent about four or five winters, so they're well-settled.
Now the infrastructure for them (
and their equipment) is there. The preparedness level is high.
Regarding infrastructure, we are working on multiple access and all-weather connectivity to Ladakh, so that will increase our operational preparedness (
further).
Do you have any comment on China's support of Pakistan during Operation Sindoor?
Recently, Chinese state TV aired a show on which an engineer said he was present at a support base in Pakistan during the four-day conflict.
There are three things: one is fact. One is a reasonable assumption. One would be fiction or speculation. We know that Pakistan is dependent on China for 80 percent of its equipment (
defence). So that's a fact.
When you buy equipment from a foreign original equipment manufacturer (
FOEM), it is the responsibility of that FOEM to maintain the equipment.
After all, it's bought for war. It's not that they're helping them in targeting, but they are maintaining their equipment.
Chinese weapons would obviously be working on the Beidou (
navigation satellite system). So, that is also a given.
Although when the Pakistani ISPR (
Inter-Services Public Relations, the Pakistan military's communication unit) briefed (
the media) on the Indian ships' deployment (
the Indian Navy's forward deployment), especially the carrier battle group, during the conflict between May 7 and 10, they regularly said that the Indian carrier battle group was here or there—they were way off the mark.
Either they were faking it or they might have got it from somewhere else. It was highly inaccurate.
IMAGE: DRDO and the Indian Navy successfully conduct the maiden salvo launch of the Naval Anti-Ship Missile-Short Range (NASM-SR). Photograph: DRDO/ANI Video Grab
The US has 11 commands. China has five commands. How will India organise the integrated theater commands, and what will their mandates be?
America's concept of theater commands is absolutely different because they've got an expeditionary role for the forces. They have assumed global responsibilities.
If you look at the Chinese model, it's not so. What they've done is they've divided the geography of their country into the five commands.
And especially Tibet and Xinjiang remain not only an operational part but also administrative.
For us, our system is unique in itself. We would rather look outside our borders and beyond, or the LOC (
the Line Of Control, the de facto border with Pakistan) and beyond.
And the whole of the country's geography would be taken as one entity.
Our regional commands had divided the country's geography into various parts. That evolved from British times when they wanted to control India, not look at outside challenges.
We've reversed that. The rest of the country could be one (
entity), and we are looking outside.
It's different from the Chinese model; it's absolutely different from the American model.
Would there be two broad categories?
The geography of India is taken as one entity, and we look beyond that. There are two adversaries. There will be something.
There'll be something in the maritime domain (
too). These are as per our challenges and threats.
IMAGE: The Indian Army's, J&K Police and the CRPF's cordon and search operation continues for the 12th day to track down terrorists believed to be hiding in the dense forest areas of Gambhir Mughlan and Dorimal in the Manjakote sector in Rajouri, June 3, 2026. Photograph: ANI Video Grab
When do you think the Cabinet Committee on security clearance might come through?
I've said this on occasion: it should have come during my time. But I was late by about six or eight months because of Operation Sindoor. I was only able to submit my report recently.
If this goes forward, would the new integrated theatre commands be in place next year?
No, from the day the government decides that they're okay with theater commands—between our recommendations and whatever they accept, it should take one and a half to two years to implement (operationalize).
The US projects power globally. China has been projecting power beyond the South China Sea. Does India consider itself a regional power, and is the theatre command tied to ambition?
Rather than saying "regional power" or "superpower," we should consider that India has responsibilities both in the continental and the maritime domains.
Whatever we create should balance out the threats, the challenges, and the opportunities we have in these two domains.
Maybe we have more opportunities in the maritime domain than threats and challenges right now and more threats and challenges on the continental domain.
In the future, there could be opportunity there also if we settled on borders.
Will the 17 existing commands in India be dissolved?
It can't all be done together. We'll do some restructuring, but they'll exist (as
mentioned) in the report, which I have submitted. Some restructuring of these will happen, but these are fundamental for warfighting right now.
IMAGE: Outgoing Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan received a ceremonial guard of honour at the South Block Lawns in New Delhi, May 30, 2026. Photograph: Naveen Sharma/ANI Photo
Is India's defence budget at less than 2 percent of the country's GDP sufficient for modernizing the armed forces, or should it be raised amid geopolitical uncertainties?
You can't predict prices after about 10 years—what technology or weapons systems would be used.
But with our existing plans for acquisition, suppose we continue to grow at 8 percent (
economic growth) with a 10 percent increase year-on-year in the defence budget. What we require for the armed forces, as we foresee now, we should be able to manage within 2 percent of GDP.
In this budgeting, one of the thought processes is that you should set aside at least some per cent of your capital budget every year for disruptive technologies.
