Pakistan on Fire and Its Effects on India

[Dalvinder Singh Grewal]

News about Imran Khan's death and the role of Asif Munir
Asim Munir might have the entire Pakistani army under his command, but nothing scares him more than Imran Khan. Munir engineered a regime change and put Imran behind bars, but the cricketer-turned-politician's aura has only grown. This is why one Pathan scares Pakistan's Punjabi-led hybrid regime.

The relationship between former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan and Army Chief Asim Munir is deeply personal. Yes, the feud involving Khan's mystical wife, Bushra Bibi, has created bad blood with Munir, Pakistan's de facto ruler. But that aside, the personal animosity lies in something more combustible, which could make things tough for Munir at this critical juncture when Pathans, marginalized, resentful, and unwilling to bow to Punjabi domination, have vocally taken on Pakistan's ethnic power bloc—the Punjabis, dominant and accustomed to holding the country's wealth, authority, and institutions.

Army Chief Asim Munir might have quietly crowned himself the de facto supreme authority in Pakistan, but the regime operating under his command seemed terrified to stay silent for more than a day about the whereabouts or well-being of the imprisoned former prime minister. Imran Khan hadn't been heard of in four weeks. And, after an Afghan outlet claimed he might be dead, thousands on Thursday gathered outside Rawalpindi's Adiala Jail. But jail authorities, or Punjab's top police officials, for long, had no answers for them on why they defied the court's order of weekly meetings. Access to Imran Khan had been cut off, leaving his family, party leaders, and lawyers with no information about him.

The last time rumors of Khan's death spread, the government rushed to issue a clarification. Why did Islamabad stay silent for this long?

"Asim Munir's fear of Imran Khan is so deep that he resorts to abduction, torture, and jailing anyone who dares to stand with Imran Khan. A powerless, insecure dictator masquerading as a general cannot silence a nation awakened by truth," said his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), from one of its verified handles on November 20—the 17th day of Imran Khan being detained with access to no acquaintance.

Does the Pathan politician terrify the Punjabi field marshal? Does Khan's moral authority, his victimhood, supporters, resistance, and community threaten the legitimacy Munir is trying to hold over a state built on coercion?

The dispute between Munir and Khan is personal. Munir was ousted as ISI chief by Khan in 2019 over alleged corruption probes into Bushra Bibi . The ISI chief is Pakistan's second most powerful military post after that of the army chief. The dispute is also institutional, with the army viewing Imran Khan and his party's popularity as a threat to its grip.

But Munir might be dreading something deeper. The simmering Pathan resentment against Punjabi hegemony.

Pathans, or Pashtuns, have long felt sidelined in Pakistan's power structure, where Punjabis dominate the military, bureaucracy, and economy. From historical rifts of the 1970s Pashtun nationalist movements for autonomy to violent clashes in the 1980s over resource allocation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and ongoing grievances in Balochistan, where Pashtuns ally with Baloch against Punjabi exploitation, instances of friction are plenty.

Punjab's control over federal funds has left Pathan-dominated KP underdeveloped. It has fuelled accusations of ethnic bias. This resentment spills across borders, with Pashtun solidarity between Pakistan and Afghanistan unbreakable. Millions of Afghan refugees, mostly Pashtun, have sheltered in Pakistan since the 1980s Soviet invasion. Recently, tensions flared after Pakistan's airstrikes on Kabul and eastern Afghanistan, which killed civilians, including 10 in Khost and Paktika just days ago. This, along with the sending of millions of Afghans back to Afghanistan in the biting cold, has sparked outrage among the community. Kabul has accused Islamabad of aggression, while Pashtuns on both sides have decried it as Punjabi-led oppression. This has boosted anti-establishment fervor in certain pockets of Pakistan.

"The latest official rhetoric from the military establishment paints Pashtuns, Afghans, and the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) as the problem, conveniently linking them with Talibanization and internal insecurity," Pakistani politician and lawyer Barrister Shahzad Akbar wrote in his October column in Global Village Space, a diaspora news portal.

"The country's most powerful man is recasting a domestic political crisis as an ethnic and security one, dividing Pakistanis to justify further militarization of national life," he added.

As thousands of supporters of Imran Khan camped outside Adiala Jail to meet him, a severe and chaotic state crackdown unfolded. It was obvious who was behind it. It came at a key moment for Asim Munir, who rose to near-untouchable status after the 27th Constitutional Amendment earlier in November. By amending Article 243, it effectively crowned him Chief of Defence Forces with lifetime immunity, command over the army, navy, and air force, and new curbs on the Supreme Court. This cemented Munir's military supremacy amid economic troubles and threats from the TTP, which is believed to enjoy support among some Pathans. That is why Munir is treading cautiously.

Imran Khan, now jailed for over 840 days since August 2023 on graft charges, embodies, for many, a kind of Pathan defiance. Releasing him risks mass unrest, especially in KP, the only province where the PTI still holds power despite fears for their lives and ongoing crackdowns.

"Reports surface of Imran Khan's killing. If true, the Pashtoon belt could see a chain reaction. Blood feud looms. His martyrdom would ignite fury from Khyber to Kandahar. Pakistan Army's Asim Munir can't contain that. And if Imran is alive, this increases pressure for his well-being," Delhi-based journalist Ninad Sheth wrote on X.

"Why the secrecy? Because the regime led by Asim Munir and Shehbaz Sharif fears even a 30-second clip of Imran Khan will ignite the streets. His support base is massive, and the establishment knows it. When you're scared of showing a man's face, it means something is very wrong," said Indian filmmaker Abhilash Badli.

"Asim Munir thinks jailing Imran Khan, Bushra Bibi, several leaders, and thousands of workers will secure his throne. Power-hungry and scared, yet still failing miserably to break the will of the people. The more he clings, the smaller he looks," PTI UK posted in September.

Khan's Pashtun roots amplify his appeal among a community long weary of marginalization. Khan has become, for Munir, the bone stuck in the throat. He also has substantial support from his community behind him. One wrong move now, and it could unravel Munir's iron-fisted rule.​

 

[Dalvinder Singh Grewal]

In spite of India receiving a reasonable amount of support following the brutal terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam earlier this year, the Pakistanis nevertheless managed to minimise the expressions of support for Indian actions in Operation Sindoor.

Its military managed to make the case globally that they held off Indian attacks, even setting off some ill-advised comparisons between Chinese and Western weapons platforms.

IMAGE: US President Donald Trump with Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir at the White House, September 25, 2025. Photograph: Kind courtesy X

With the United States, the Pakistanis have managed to eke out a relatively favourable trade agreement that reduced tariffs on the country to 19 percent from the earlier 29 percent and also secured US investment in the country's supposed fossil fuel reserves.

Its army chief has met President Donald Trump twice in recent times, once for a longer-than-expected lunch and once with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, during which Mr. Trump was shown a display of the critical minerals and rare earths that Pakistan (also supposedly) possesses.

What is certain is that the US Exim Bank has committed millions to financing mining projects in the country, including the gold and copper mine at Reko Diq.

They have lavished praise on Mr. Trump, nominating him for the Nobel Prize and so on—and the president seems to have developed a decided partiality for a country he once condemned as untrustworthy.

A 'tilt,' as they used to say in the 1970s.

The Chinese might have lost some enthusiasm for their 'iron friends' in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, but they are not turning off the tap completely.

Mr. Sharif's visit to Beijing last month was accompanied by news that a new $8.5 billion deal for investment was signed—though how much of that will actually materialise and at what cost to the Pakistani public is not clear.

We have never had answers to such questions about China's big plans for Pakistan, of course. Some existing Chinese investments in the country have had to be co-financed or taken over by more traditional multilateral sources.

But calmer relations with the US may in fact help China's activity in Pakistan; there have been reports in that country's press that a recent American delegation even expressed interest in investing in the Chinese-controlled port of Gwadar, perhaps by building a terminal there that could receive shipments of liquefied natural gas from the US.

Even Russia, which should by any reasonable standard be grateful to India for not adding to its international isolation, has made a few startling statements of late.

President Vladimir Putin has described Pakistan and Russia as 'natural allies' and called Islamabad Moscow's 'traditional partner in Asia.'

It's hard to understand exactly where this is coming from, but then nobody ever really knows what Mr. Putin is thinking at any point.

The Russians even put New Delhi in the difficult position of accepting Pakistan as an 'observer' in the Zapad military exercises in which the Indian military participated (alongside China and more than 15 other nations).

And, finally, there was the bombshell news that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have signed a defence agreement that includes mutual protection.

We can disagree over whether this means that Rawalpindi's nuclear umbrella has been extended to the Gulf.

It is also the case that the two countries have a long history of security cooperation, with the Pakistani army as the senior partner.

But it certainly represents something of an improvement over the past decade, during which Islamabad's refusal to join Riyadh in its war against the Houthis in Yemen had caused a chill in relations.

How has the Pakistani establishment—discredited, undemocratic, and profligate, running an economy that has signally failed to invest in itself and develop productive potential—managed this series of achievements? Partly it is because they are willing to make promises and pay rhetorical tributes to leaders like Mr. Trump in a way that the Indian leadership simply cannot.

But partly it is old-fashioned flexibility—finding ways in which they can be useful to multiple partners.

New Delhi might have loudly welcomed an age of multipolarity, hedging, and strategic autonomy. But it appears that Islamabad has an edge; hence, India has to gird up its loins.

 

[Dalvinder Singh Grewal]

Pakistani drones are suspected to hover around the Samba, Rajouri, and Poonch districts, along the LoC and IB. All the flying objects were seen hovering over the Indian airspace and hovering over sensitive locations and then going back towards Pakistan, the officials added. At least five drone movements were observed. All the flying objects were seen entering Indian airspace from across the border, hovering briefly over sensitive locations, and then retreating back towards Pakistan. Security forces in Jammu and Kashmir were put on high alert. Security forces were prompted to activate their anti-unmanned aerial system to respond and to effectively conduct extensive ground search operations to rule out the possibility of arms or contraband being dropped on the Indian side on January 11, 2026.​

In the Nowshera sector of Rajouri, the army fired at the drones with medium and light machine guns to drive them away.

It is the most significant incident along the tense border since a four-day conflict last May that pushed South Asia to the brink of nuclear war. Last year’s fighting signalling a resurgence in hostilities after nearly eight months of relative calm.