- Jan 3, 2010
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China-Bangladesh-Pakistan alliance - A cause for great concern for India
Dr Dalvinder Singh Grewal, Prof. Emeritus, Desh Bhagat University
Dr Dalvinder Singh Grewal, Prof. Emeritus, Desh Bhagat University
China started developing building roads in the Dokulm Valley, located at the trijunction between India, China, and Bhutan. India and China have been in direct confrontation at Doklum since it is strategically located on the borders between India, China, and Bhutan, and the Doklum Valley falls partly in Bhutan and India. Since Bhutan’s border security responsibility also falls with India, it became a major concern for India. It is further important to India as it provides an easy route to the Siliguri Corridor, also known as Chicken’s Neck, and connects Bangladesh, with which China has developed a close relationship recently. The Siliguri Corridor has become further important since it connects India’s seven Northeast states.
The unrest in Bangladesh and its stand against India and joining hands with Pakistan and China has furthered this concern. Both Doklum Valley and Chicken’s Neck (Siliguri Corridor) have become more important with China developing railroad connections touching India’s borders, building localities on the borders, and now building a large dam on the Teesta River. Hence, India is keeping a regular vigil in this area and firming in this area by building better infrastructure.
Doklum
Doklum is an area in Chumbi Valley. It is a high plateau and a valley, lying between China's Yadong County to the north, Bhutan's Haa District to the east and India's Sikkim state to the west. Since the 1960s, China and Bhutan have disputed sovereignty over the Doklam area. The dispute has not been resolved despite several rounds of border negotiations between Bhutan and China. The area is of strategic importance to all three countries. In 1988, the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the Doklam plateau and successfully took control of the area. In June 2017, China attempted to extend a road on the Doklam Plateau southward, prompting Indian troops to enter the area in an attempt to stop the project, which triggered a two-month border standoff between the two sides. On 28 August, India and China withdrew their troops from the standoff in Doklam. Since then, China has continued to control most of the Doklam area and built a village called Pangda there.
Chicken Neck (Siliguri Corridor)
The Siliguri Corridor—popularly called the “Chicken’s Neck” is a narrow land strip in northern West Bengal that connects mainland India to the eight Northeastern States. It is situated near Siliguri city in northern West Bengal. Flanked by Nepal (west), Bangladesh (south), Bhutan (north), and close to the Chumbi Valley (China-Bhutan-India tri-junction). The narrowest width is 20–22 km, making it one of the world’s most sensitive strategic bottlenecks. It was formed after the Partition of India (1947–48), when East Bengal became East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Strategic relevance increased after East Pakistan was converted into Bangladesh in 1971 and Sikkim merged with India in 1975, giving India greater hold over the northern Himalayan approaches. Its vulnerability became evident during the 1962 Sino-Indian War and again during the 2017 Doklam standoff.
Its importance lies in its being a major railway, road, and air link to the Northeast that passes through this strip. It houses military facilities, supply lines, and critical civilian infrastructure, which includes Bagdogra Airport, a key IAF base and civilian aviation hub. It forms a transit point for Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sikkim, and Northeast India. Connecting. It is defended by the Tri-Shakti Corps, BrahMos regiments, and Rafale squadrons at Hashimara. Its strategic importance lies in its potential as a target in geopolitical crises—any blockade could isolate the entire region, as it is close to the Doklam Plateau, where China has rapidly built border infrastructure.
The increasing influence of China in Bangladesh and Nepal has heightened security sensitivities. It acts as India’s eastern military buffer, enabling rapid troop movement towards LAC in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
China has been not only building structures along India’s borders and claiming some parts of Arunachal Pradesh and giving its cities Chinese names but also building infrastructure up to India’s borders, developing a dam on the Teesta, and not vacating the Ladakh area captured in 2020.
China’s links with Pakistan and Bangladesh
Pakistan has been at loggerheads since 1947, when some portions, including J&K, remained a battling point, and after 1971, when Bangladesh was separated from it by the Indo-Pak war. China has supported Pakistan with weapons and diplomatically in the Kargil War and Operation Sandhoor, the two battles between India and Pakistan. Now the issue of Shaksham, a disputed territory of J & K claimed by both India and Pakistan but now in control of Pakistan and handed over to China, where it is developing its infrastructure, is quite hot where China has developed its infrastructure.
India is alarmed at the turn of events with its increasing closeness with Bangladesh after the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina, the deposed prime minister, who took shelter in India. The deterioration in relations between the two states has repercussions on all sides. The collectivist mentality of the state is at play her and it does not differentiate its sentiments based on the nature of the relationship; instead, it seeks to enforce them universally, be it between individuals, culturally, or strategically.
The security situation in the Chittagong Hills has deteriorated over the past year. Incidents of drones coming from Bangladesh being spotted and intercepted by Indian agencies, as well as the seizure of 20,000 uniforms belonging to the Kuki-Chin National Front by Bangladesh police in May 2025, have raised concerns within India.
The situation in Bangladesh, where Hindus are being deliberately targeted, is a serious concern, with not only Hindus but also other Muslim minority groups being targeted after the change of government. This action could trigger a new flow of people fleeing the country. Attacks on minorities in Bangladesh are a domestic matter; they represent a major human rights violation as per universal norms. Thus, if India addresses this issue at an official level, it should not be considered a selective bias. The Border Security Force and Indian security agencies may face a significant challenge in handling this situation. Given the anti-India stance of the current Bangladeshi government, which may influence the actions of the border guards, the possibility of a border clash remains.
The deterioration in relations between the two states has repercussions on all sides. The recent spat in sports reflects this mindset.
The collectivist mentality of the state is at play here, and it does not differentiate its sentiments based on the nature of the relationship; instead, it seeks to apply them universally, be it between individuals, culturally, or strategically.
The Border Security Force and Indian security agencies may face a significant challenge in handling this situation. Given the anti-India stance of the current Bangladeshi government, which may influence the actions of the border guards, the possibility of a border clash remains.
The deterioration in relations between the two states has repercussions on all sides. The recent spat in sports reflects this mindset.
The collectivist mentality of the state is at play here, and it does not differentiate its sentiments based on the nature of the relationship; instead, it seeks to apply them universally, be it between individuals, culturally, or strategically.
The above developments, along with the changes in bilateral and multilateral relations, as seen in the case of Bangladesh-Pakistan-China, are worrisome.
However, with the current interim government in power, it is too early to predict the future course of Bangladesh. Perhaps, after the elections, India will establish and implement its own policy decisions on these matters.
In the meantime, India should maintain its defense ties with Bangladesh and continue joint military exercises. Proactive back-channel defence diplomacy can help mitigate the effects of Pakistan and China’s growing strategic influence in Bangladesh.
The actions of a single leader or government do not fully define the relationship between the two countries. This relationship reflects how different generations interact in different areas. The current relationship between India and Bangladesh appears strained, possibly due to public sentiment and specific policy decisions of the interim government’s leadership. However, the initial damage to the relationship is not extensive and can be repaired quickly.
The validity of the Bangladeshi elections has been repeatedly challenged. We cannot rule out the possibility of improved relations between India and Bangladesh after the elections. Public opinion polls show the BNP ahead, and some of its leading members have said that they intend to foster positive relations with India.
The BNP's victory in the elections is still uncertain as student and Islamist parties have formed a political alliance. While the BNP has historically been associated with Pakistan, the party's current leaders will strive for balanced relations given the current geopolitical and economic situation.
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